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ABSTRACT 
OBJECTIVE: To determine the predominance of linked fate and socio-demographic 
predictors race, class, and gender in the political partisanship of African Americans, and 
in the political partisanship of comparison racial and ethnic group populations. 
METHODS: Data obtained from the 1996 National Black Election Study panel series 
were used to examine the political attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs of 824 adult African 
Americans. In addition, data collected for the 2004 National Politics Study examined 
3,087 American adults from comparison racial and ethnic population groups. These 
groups included 706 African Americans, 868 White Non-Hispanics, 676 Hispanics, 466 
Asians, and 371 Black Caribbeans. Multinomial logistic regression models were used to 
analyze linked fate and socio-demographic predictors of African American political 
partisanship. 
RESULTS: In the 1996 sample about 69% of African Americans were Democrats, 20% 
Independent, and 4% Republicans. Similarly, in the 2004 sample Democratic preferences 
were held by 70% African Americans followed by about 66% Black Caribbeans, 44% 
Hispanics, 37% Asians, and 36% White Non-Hispanics. In the multinomial logistic 
regression models linked fate was less likely to influence African American political 
partisanship in 1996. Still, when considering the unique contribution of linked fate and 
social demography—race, class, and gender—used to predict political partisanship 
among comparison populations in 2004, support for the Democratic Party was more 
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likely among respondents with perceptions that linked fate has some affect on them; and among 
all racial and ethnic population groups when compared to Non-Hispanic Whites. On the other 
hand, as class increased the likelihood of Democratic partisanship decreased, whereas gender 
was not significantly associated with predicting political partisanship (p>0.05). 
CONCLUSIONS: Race continues to be the predominant predictor of significant and distinctive 
partisan preference attitudes in the African American racial group. The relationship of race, 
class, gender, linked fate, and partisanship shows some reliance on a (black) racial or ethnic 
group heuristic for political decision-making. Still, further investigation is needed to assess 
whether such group cues in partisan decisions actually reflect perceptions of a (black) linked 
racial fate rather than a sense that one’s fate is linked to that of the Democratic Party.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Ever since the Civil Rights Act was passed in 1964, there has been considerable 
speculation and debate among scholars that as improved social, economic and political 
opportunities expanded for African Americans they would assimilate into the mainstream 
United States population like white ethnics that preceded them.1  Most importantly, they 
were expected to hold more diverse political party preferences.  The subsequent 
emergence of a larger black middle class accompanied by the appearance of greater 
economic diversity (Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson 1989) during the post-civil rights era 
furthered suppositions that African Americans would become more conservative in their 
ideological orientations and partisan predispositions.  Despite noticeable improvements in 
black economic class standing, African Americans emerged as a politically distinctive 
and cohesive group with a strong Democratic bias (Black and Black 2002; Stanley and 
Niemi 1991).  Consequently, scholars raised questions about the extent to which 
improved economic standings could compete meaningfully with racial group identities, 
and thereby prompt changes in African American decisions about the two main political 
parties.  
                                                             
 1.  In Who Governs (1963), Robert Dahl developed the political assimilation 
theory referenced. 
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To investigate this long-term relationship between the African American 
electorate and the Democratic Party, the present study draws from Michael C. Dawson’s 
general theory of African American racial group interests as advanced in Behind the Mule 
(1994).  Specifically, this dissertation focuses on his study of “African American 
Partisanship and the American Party System,” 2  and the supposed lack of political 
diversity within the black community.  Dawson’s empirical research on the importance of 
race and class develops a systematic framework—the Black Utility Heuristic—that 
assumes race has a profound impact on African American political decisions.  This 
includes decisions about which political party better addresses issues of most importance 
to African Americans.  Thus far, no other study has applied Dawson’s theory of African 
American racial group interests and his Black Utility Heuristic paradigm to measure the 
relative degree of racial group solidarity and political cohesion beyond his own research 
using the 1984 and 1988 National Black Election Studies (Jackson 1984; 1988).  I test a 
modification of Dawson’s Black Utility Heuristic using the 1996 National Black Election 
Study (Tate 1997), and extend his model to test the extent to which such heuristics apply 
to both racial and ethnic groups surveyed in the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson et 
al. 2009). 
In keeping with Dawson’s theory, I agree that the Black Utility Heuristic is 
applicable and reliable as long as race continues to determine prospects of life in the 
United States.  This is true as long as historical as well as contemporary social and 
demographic structures shape perceptions of circumstances within the African American 
                                                             
 2. See: Michael C. Dawson, “African American Partisanship and the American 
Party System” (Chapter 5) in Behind the Mule (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1994), 96-129. 
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community, particularly with regard to black life chances.3  While race is considered the 
prime factor explaining African Americans’ overwhelming and consistent political 
choices, their Democratic partisanship reflects a rational decision calculus that only one 
political party of the limited U.S. two-party system meets median racial group policy 
preferences.  Besides, decisions about which political party is more responsive to African 
American racial group interests denotes a rational assessment of how each governing 
party fares in promoting the well-being of the racial group (Fiorina 1981).  In this regard 
race, rather than class and/or other social demography typically shown to influence 
partisanship, is central to judgments about policy congruence, or the lack thereof, 
between each political party and the African American racial group.  Hence, the group 
rationale for making political choices is easily transmittable to individual members.  This 
is primarily because of the continuing significance of race in American society, and 
because of the political parties either ignoring or overlooking race-based issues.  
Both theoretical and practical political reasons reinforce the basis for this on-
going relationship.  For instance, African Americans perceive the Democrats as having 
the best over-time record of addressing wrongs against the race; of having a better 
approach to dealing with issues of most importance to them; and, of elevating their status 
in the economic, social, and political order (Bositis 2002; Tate 1994).  So, their long-term 
assessments of the policies and performance of the two governing parties (Fiorina 1989) 
                                                             
 3.  Originally, Max Weber used the term, life chances to describe social class 
differences. See: Weber, Max. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. H.H. Gerth 
and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946). The distinctions in 
access to material goods like food and housing also included differences in access to 
services like public education and health care.  All of these goods and services are 
available in the market, according to: A.G. Johnson, Power, Privilege, and Difference 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005).  
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should point them to the Democratic, not the Republican, Party.  Moreover, affiliation 
with the Democratic Party is important for practical political reasons as well.  Through 
this association African Americans have access to the party organization, to institutions 
of government, and to both appointive and elective offices.  In short, the meaningful 
long-term political clout realized by African Americans derives from association with the 
Democrats.  Hence, this association is efficient in that voting for Democrats allows 
African Americans to maintain a sense of group position while engaging the political 
system.  Correspondingly, Democratic control or “capture” of the black vote is a crucial 
factor in securing electoral success (Frymer 1999).  
This study contributes to the larger body of literature investigating how social 
group identifications shape individual political orientations toward the two main political 
parties, as well as to studies of African American politics.  Explicitly, the primary focus 
of this dissertation is African American political partisanship, and the extent to which 
race versus class or other social demography explain their seemingly stable Democratic 
Party preferences. In other words: why do African Americans think the way they do 
politically, and what induces them to change?  To investigate this question I test 
Dawson’s Black Utility Heuristic (1994) using data collected for analysis of African 
American politics.4  Secondarily, the research aim is to assess the extent to which the 
African American form of group-based identity politics influences politically emerging 
racial and pan-ethnic minority groups.  Important to this examination are individual 
perceptions about which party better serves racial group interests, but is this merely a 
                                                             
 4.  Specifically, data collected for the 1996 National Black Election Study (Tate 
1997), and for the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson et al. 2009). 
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“black” phenomenon or does Dawson’s heuristic provide a viable (and similar) 
explanation for party choice among other racial and ethnic minority groups as well?  To 
investigate this question I include comparison populations of African Americans, White 
Non-Hispanics, Hispanics, Asians, and Caribbean Blacks.  Typically, mainstream 
research of American party identifications include only a cursory statement about African 
American partisanship5 or apply the traditional black-white dichotomy in explanations of 
party identifications (Hajnal and Lee 2011).  Although this standard relationship is 
important, understanding how race and ethnicity matters overall is just as important.  This 
dissertation fills this gap. 
In the 1970s tension between race and class as factors determining black life 
chances erupted into intense debate primarily among sociologists from two competing 
theoretical perspectives.  The “class” perspective, proposed by William J. Wilson in The 
Declining Significance of Race (1978; 1980), claims that since the mid-1960s economic 
class6 has become the most important factor determining the personal life styles and 
external living conditions of African Americans.  On the other hand, the “race” 
perspective, articulated by Charles V. Willie (1978) holds that integration and affirmative 
action programs, implemented after passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, place middle-
                                                             
 5.  African Americans are the most loyal supporters of the Democratic Party, i.e. 
in relation to other socio-demographic constituent groups.  They are, therefore, often 
dismissed as highly predictable and virtually resistant to partisan change. 
 
 6.  Wilson’s (1980) thesis, that improved economic class situations within the 
African American community account for the declining significance of race, is based on the 
notion that money is the principle reason for black-white racial inequities.  Hence, the 
opportunity to make money increases economic (class) standings and life prospects. Note: 
W. J. Wilson, The Declining Significance Of Race: Blacks And Changing American Institutions, 
(Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1980). 
 
 6
class blacks in direct contact with whites where extensive interactions make the 
resurgence of race quite evident.  However, Wilson’s (1980) thesis fueled speculations 
about the increasing importance of class interests versus racial group interests in African 
American politics, and raised expectations that improved economic class situations would 
create greater political diversity within the racial group.   
Michael C. Dawson (1994) responded explicitly to these two competing 
theoretical arguments and to social scholars’ persistent query about the single most 
important determinant of African-American politics.  Furthermore, in response to 
Wilson’s declining significance of race hypothesis, Dawson contends that race interests 
supersede class interests primarily because of the continuing significance of race in the 
United States.  Moreover, the historical circumstances of race shape perceptions of 
common interests and racial group solidarity among African Americans producing a 
sense of common/linked fate.  From Dawson’s perspective, African-American politics as 
subsumed within cognitive processes, presupposes that the structure of group perceptions 
is on a psychological level where the degree of distinctive actions by individuals depends 
on the presence of certain group characteristics.  The most notable variables are racial 
group identification, a black consciousness, group cohesiveness, and the salience of one’s 
racial identity.  A relatively high degree of salience means that there is sufficient 
information about one’s identity and about “the fit of that identity with social reality” 
(Dawson 1994, 11).  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the reality is that race 
remains a major force in African American lives.  
First, with regard to those prominent racial group characteristics noted above, the 
origin of the concept of “linked fate” is closely related to that of group consciousness 
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(McClain et al. 2009), and to the idea that there is an intimate association between 
individual and group life chances (Simien 2005).  This common or linked fate results 
when members of a racial grouping face common experiences such as economic 
exploitation, social subordination, and psychological oppression (Dawson 1994).  It is for 
this reason that ascriptive characteristics of race, like the identity of “blackness” and the 
African phenotype, have a significant influence on life chance opportunities or the 
opportunity to attain meaningful goals in life rather than one’s knowledge, skills and/or 
abilities.  Being “black” is a visible stereotypical differentiation from those who 
determine accessibility to social, political, and economic power in the United States. 
Dawson attributes linked fate primarily to perceptions when “economic domination of 
blacks by whites became inter-twined with a sense of political domination as well” 
(Dawson, 55).   
Second, a resulting group political cohesion becomes rational as individual 
members follow race-group cues to evaluate and interpret the political world of objects 
like parties, issues, candidates, and events.  According to Dawson, group political 
cohesion is also efficient because individual members can rely on their perceptions of 
racial group interests to make the appropriate political choices.  Dawson’s theory of 
African-American racial group interests employs the economic theory of administrative 
decision-making as advanced by Herbert Simon in Administrative Behavior (1947).  
Simon argues that multiple factors, including psychological influences, can explain 
rational human choice or bounded rationality whereby an individual opts for a satisfying 
or “satisficing” solution (Simon 1955).  In this regard, the African-American outlook, or 
black worldview, provides a sense of “community” where individual members identify 
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self with the racial group, and with the relative position of the race—predominantly 
within the bottom tiers of a stratified social hierarchy.  As individuals become more 
politically aware of their group’s social class position, they develop a racial group or 
“black” consciousness and commit to collective action (Miller, Gurin, Gurin and 
Malanchuk 1981).  
Here Dawson agrees with seminal studies of political participation (Verba and 
Nie 1972; Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk 1981; Shingles 1981) that what 
distinguishes African Americans from their White counterparts are “the development of 
self-conscious awareness of group membership” (Verba and Nie 1972, 150).  There is, 
therefore, a sense of “belongingness” or identification with the racial grouping revealed 
in such self-identifications, as “I am an African American,” “I am a Liberal,” or “I am a 
Democrat” (Sherif and Sherif 1961; Verba and Nie 1972).   Herein lies the difference 
between blacks and whites, a racial group or black consciousness and a perception of 
linked racial fate—us versus them—that serves as a mechanism for political cohesion and 
mobilization, and guarantees solidarity in attitudes about appropriate decisions and 
behavior.  Linked fate insulates individual members against the changing effects of other 
structures of attitudes, such as economic class.  Most importantly, Dawson (1994) finds 
that race continues to be the most powerful explanatory variable for predicting African 
American politics because of its continued, profound influence on black life chances, 
particularly within the social and economic arenas of life.   
According to Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk (1981) politicization of the 
racial group produces a sense of black consciousness that occurs when an individual 
becomes aware of the relative position of her or his racial group in society.  The concepts 
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of group identification and race consciousness based on perceptions of linked fate 
confirm the highly distinctive attitudes and behaviors produced by race (Miller, Gurin, 
Gurin, and Malanchuk 1981) as previously reported in The American Voter7 (Campbell et 
al. 1960).  In this regard, identification is a causal factor that, once politicized, determines 
individual decisions that adhere to the group political standard.  For African Americans 
that position tends to be disproportionately at the lower end of the socio-economic scale 
(Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson 1989).  This, coupled with the reality of their struggle for 
basic civic inclusion, serves as a catalyst for consensus and solidarity among individuals 
who perceive their similarly situated class status.  Such individuals respond politically by 
forming a stable and cohesive bloc to advance African American racial group interests in 
partisan politics and within the electoral arena.   
Finally, Dawson’s empirically grounded political research demonstrates how 
linked racial fate and/or the Black Utility Heuristic influence contemporary African 
American orientations toward the two main political parties.  He employs his theoretical 
framework to analyze African American group political cohesion on this wise:  a (black) 
racial group consciousness shapes individual perceptions of self-interests and links them 
to perceptions of race group interests, both economic and political.  Henceforth, 
individual perceptions of linked fate stimulate solidarity and direct political orientations. 
This is important because there are considerable differences in individual perceptions of 
the political world; however, it is imperative for the member to develop a sense of 
“community” with the racial group.  In so doing, there is a greater likelihood that one will 
deem significant the attitudes and behaviors expected by the race, and assume the group 
                                                             
 7. Reference: Angus Campbell, et al. “Membership in Social Groupings” (Chapter 
12) in The American Voter (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), 295-332. 
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partisan standard.  This is what Dawson refers to as the Black Utility Heuristic, a 
mechanism employed to determine which political decisions to make in advancing racial 
group goals.  It is a reliable shortcut for accurate political preference attitudes, voting 
decisions, and public opinions. 
Race is most significant in determining party identifications.  If the Black Utility 
Heuristic serves as the primary factor used to decipher political messages, and as a 
strategic causal factor within the African American decision calculus, as Dawson 
contends, then individuals should correctly identify the political party that is most 
responsive to [black] racial group interests in accordance with the current racial group 
political standard, the Democratic Party.  Such a finding for this research study would 
support the “race” perspective as articulated by Willie (1979), and further demonstrate 
the significance of linked racial fate and Dawson’s (1994) model, the Black Utility 
Heuristic.    
This dissertation addresses an important and timely topic in contemporary 
American politics. The current chapter introduces the basis for my theoretical framework, 
the Black Utility Heuristic as formulated by Michael C. Dawson (1994) in his theory of 
African American racial group interests. Additionally, this chapter establishes the focus 
of the present research study, and introduces briefly scholarly debates about the single 
most important factor that best explains African American life chances: race or class.  
Dawson’s response to the race versus class sociological debates is essential to 
understanding key variables employed in explaining his theory of African American 
racial group interests: racial group identification, a black consciousness, group 
cohesiveness, and the salience of racial identity.  These factors serve to clarify distinctive 
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African American politics, and the rational and efficient African American decision 
calculus. 
Chapter 2 provides the principle theoretical goal for this dissertation.  I begin with 
a discussion of the traditional conceptualization of party identification using classic 
literature formulated in the Michigan School. I also present literature regarding 
alternative explanations of partisanship from rational theorists and the revisionists.  In 
addition, later approaches returning to the “Michigan” tradition are included in the 
discussion, as well as explanations of partisan change based primarily on Carmines and 
Stimson’s (1989) issue evolution.  It is, therefore, within the context of this general body 
of literature on American party identifications that I review explanations of African 
American partisan identifications.  The value of the Black Utility Heuristic model, for 
comparison among racial and pan-ethnic minority groups, is also considered within the 
frame of the theoretical goal.   
A core theme of this dissertation is the reality or perception of policy congruence 
between African Americans and the two main political parties, and how the parties 
responded to secure the black vote.  This idea is considered in the historical perspective 
discussed in Chapter 3, which covers historical periods from the Reconstruction era to the 
Post-New Deal era.  Additionally, Chapter 3 sets a background discussion leading up to 
the 1860 presidential election of Abraham Lincoln.  This historical perspective continues 
with a discussion of strategies employed by African Americans to demand that the 
political parties provide attention and action to issues that address racial group interests.  
African American strategies, the emergence of race to the national political agenda, and 
responses from the political parties are further discussed in Chapter 4 during historical 
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periods representing the Civil Rights and Post-Civil Rights eras. The methodological 
approach and model construction used to test research hypotheses explored in this study 
are covered in Chapter 5, while reports of statistical analyses and study findings are 
presented in Chapter 6. Finally, Chapter 7 discusses both study results and conclusions, 
and proffers recommendations for future research endeavors. 
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CHAPTER 2 
TOWARD A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR AFRICAN AMERICAN 
PARTISANSHIP 
Of extreme importance to this investigation of African Americans’ partisanship is the 
conceptualization of party identification.  Hence, reviews of some major orientations that 
have most influenced explanations of citizens’ attitudes toward the two main political 
parties, and changes thereto, are enumerated in this chapter.  In addition, I attempt to 
identify particularly important theoretical issues that underlie different orientations that 
contribute to our understanding of African Americans’ decisions about the Democratic 
and Republican parties. Lastly, the theoretical framework guiding this dissertation is 
formulated.    
 The relationship between American citizens’ social identifications and their 
orientations toward the two main political parties has received considerable attention 
from political scientists. Key questions guiding this extensive body of research are: What 
is party identification, and what causes partisan change? Some scholars contend that 
party identification is a deeply rooted psychological attachment (Campbell, Converse, 
Miller, and Stokes 1960; Miller and Shanks 1996) or social identity (Green, Palmquist, 
and Schickler 2002) that shapes political preferences.  Others suggest that partisanship is 
largely an informational short cut (Downs 1957) comprised of a “running tally” of other 
political attitudes and evaluations (Achen 1992; Fiorina 1981).  This on-going debate, 
primarily regarding the conceptualization of partisan identification in keeping with the
 14
social-psychological prototype and critical challenges from rational choice theorists and 
the revisionists, has spanned half a century and includes a number of pivotal research 
studies.   
2.1 FROM CLASSIC CONCEPTUALIZATION TO REVISIONIST CRITIQUES 
The predominant view of party identification in classic voting behavior research 
is advanced in the “Michigan” model of electoral decision-making.  Formulated by 
Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes in their seminal 
study of The American Voter, this social-psychological paradigm emphasizes “the role of 
enduring partisan commitments in shaping attitudes toward political objects” (Campbell 
et al. 1960, 135).  According to Campbell, et al. and subsequent scholarship that has 
adopted this perspective (Goldberg 1966; Kelley and Mirer 1974; Miller and Shanks 
1996), party identification is as an “unmoved mover” (Johnston 2006); a deeply held 
long-term psychological and/or group attachment that is largely unchanging even as 
events and other political objects change.  This is primarily because candidates and issues 
are election specific whereas citizens’ orientations toward the two main political parties 
endure since the parties themselves remain relatively stable.  Furthermore, party 
identification is framed as a conceptual screen through which citizens view and interpret 
new political information.  While shaping policy preferences and other political attitudes, 
party identification remains largely unchanged by them. 
 On the other hand, revisionist scholars contest strongly the concept of Party 
identification as formulated in the social-psychological perspective.  Instead, revisionists 
contend that party identification is not unmoved; it is shaped by political attitudes and 
evaluations.  This critique is developed most fully in Retrospective Voting in American 
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Elections (1981), in which Morris Fiorina frames party identification as a “running tally” 
of citizen evaluations of other political objects and events. Christopher Achen (1992) 
further articulates the revisionist conceptualization of partisanship as a Bayesian 
updating, or learning process model.   
Revisionists build their theoretical perspective on the rational approach employed 
by Anthony Downs in An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957), and V.O. Key‘s 
treatment of partisan preference, in The Responsible Electorate (1966), as an information 
shortcut based on which political party’s ideological and policy positions are relatively 
closer to those held by the citizen.  Thus, in the revisionists’ perception party 
identification is not considered a psychological or group attachment independent of 
citizens’ evaluations of contemporary politics.  Rather, partisanship represents a summary 
of the political evaluations individuals have formed over time.  So, while party 
identification might be quite stable from one election to the next, it also may change over 
time in response to policy preferences, candidate evaluations, evaluations of party 
performance, and vote decisions (Jackson 1975; Page and Jones 1979; Markus and 
Converse 1979; Fiorina 1981; Franklin and Jackson 1983; Franklin 1984). 
The revisionist view clearly supports the idea that individuals might change their 
party loyalties in response to their attitudes on policy issues, particularly those salient, 
emotional, and polarizing issues commonly associated with periods of partisan change.  
Yet, similar to the social-psychological argument, revisionist scholarship acknowledges 
the possibility of a long-term component to party identification stemming from childhood 
socialization  (Fiorina 1981; Achen 2002).  Revisionists further purport that partisanship 
may shape expectations of future party performance (Fiorina 1981), or that party 
 16
identification may cause policy preferences as well as be caused by them (Franklin 1984; 
Jackson 1975); Page and Jones 1979; Markus and Converse 1979). Most importantly, the 
general position of revisionists is that partisanship is more a summary of other political 
attitudes than a shaper of them.  Fiorina characterizes the revisionist view of party 
identification as “an evolving indicator of an individual’s relationship to the parties” 
(Fiorina 2002, 98).  
2.2 BACK TO THE BASICS?  THE DEBATE CONTINUES 
Responding to the revisionist case, Warren Miller (1991) initiates defense of the 
social-psychological paradigm that he and J. Merrill Shanks further articulate in The New 
American Voter (1996).  Suggesting that party identification may not be far from the 
theoretical framework constructed in The American Voter (1960), Miller and Shanks 
indicate that party identification is primarily an attitude of preference that provides a 
meaningful explanation for candidate and policy preferences, especially when uncertainty 
is present.  In addition, Donald Green and his colleagues fully develop a critique of the 
revisionist perspective on party identification.  They show that when random 
measurement error is corrected party identification is almost entirely exogenous in the 
short-run to issues, candidates, and performance evaluations (Green and Palmquist 1990; 
1994; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002).  Furthermore, Alan Gerber and Donald 
Green (1998) reject Christopher Achen’s (1992) conceptualization of party identification 
as a Bayesian updating process suggesting instead that it is incompatible with the reality 
of partisan stability.  Green, et al. argues that party ties represent an attachment to a group 
similar to religious identification (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002).  “People 
maintain their partisan identities as long as their image of the partisan groups remains 
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intact.  But when secular realignment is afoot, the public image of the partisan groups 
shifts, which in turn produces a shift in party identifications and perhaps further alters 
perceptions of partisan groups” (Green et al. 2002, 816).  In short, the works of Green 
and his colleagues reaffirms the view of partisanship as a deeply rooted social identity 
independent of other political evaluations that is firmly held by most citizens. 
In spite of this reaffirmation, Green et al. depart from one very important 
component of the traditional American Voter model.  They argue against the idea of 
selective perception, and hold instead that Democratic and Republican identifiers update 
their political evaluations in similar ways.  In doing so Green and his colleagues reject the 
idea that party identification serves as a perceptual screen that shapes the evaluation of 
new political information (Gerber and Green 1999; Green, Palmquist and Schickler 
2002).  Additional scholars contend that partisanship causes change in other political 
evaluations.  For example, Zaller (1992) suggests that partisan predispositions regulate 
the flow of information from political elites to the mass public; thusly, individuals tend to 
bring their own policy attitudes into line with those of their party’s leaders.  Bartels 
(2002) provides even stronger support for the American Voter model with his evidence of 
the effect of party identification in shaping political evaluations.  He argues that Gerber 
and Green’s (1999) unbiased updating actually confirms that there is a partisan bias.  
Both Bartels (2000) and Hetherington (2001) provide further support for the role of party 
identification as a causal force based on evidence of the strengthening of party 
identification and its impact on vote choice. 
Finally, while the American Voter model emphasizes the idea that party 
identification is a “durable attachment not readily disturbed by passing events and 
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personalities” (Campbell et al. 1960, 151), it does not rule out the possibility of some 
issue-based change in party loyalties.  Here Campbell et al. acknowledge the possibility 
of party realignment, suggesting that when individuals hold particularly strong feelings 
about issues on which they differ with their party, “this pressure is intense enough, [that] 
a stable partisan identification may actually be changed” (Campbell et al. 1960, 135).  
The political attitudes most likely to create enough pressure that individuals may shift 
their party loyalties are deeply held attitudes on the emotional and polarizing issues 
associated with partisan change, such as racial and economic issues (Carmines and 
Stimson 1989).  Therefore, while party identification may be the causal force in its 
relationship with most policy preferences, attitudes toward certain issues that structure 
party conflict may lead to shifts in party ties for some citizens.  In short, this body of 
research revalidates party identification as a principle mover of other political attitudes; 
however, it is not an unmoved mover in every situation. 
2.3 SOURCES OF CHANGE IN POLITICAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
 In order for individuals to change either their party identifications or their issue 
preferences they must first recognize that there are differences in the policy positions of 
the two main political parties.  Research has established the relationship between issues 
and party change (Carmines and Stimson 1989; MacDonald and Rabinowitz 1987; 
Sundquist 1983) when parties and candidates assume distinct positions on important 
issues, and when citizens are aware of the parties’ differences.  Citizens that do not 
recognize partisan conflict based on divergent policy stands should have no cause for 
change.  On the other hand, for individuals that are aware of party differences on 
particularly polarizing and emotion-laden issues, the salience of those issues is critical.  
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Therefore, when considering the centrality and stability of party identification, the only 
individuals that should change their political party preferences on the basis of their issue 
attitudes are those that find the issues to be particularly salient.  Conversely, citizens that 
are not aware of polarizing partisan policy stands on particularly powerful easily 
understood, emotional, or symbolic issues have no reason to change their partisanship. 
 
2.4 A BROADER ACCOUNT OF PARTY CHANGE: ISSUE EVOLUTION 
A prominent position relegated to issues, especially between the 1964 and 1972 
presidential elections, is attributed to the polarizing policy positions of the two main 
political parties and their candidates (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Black and Black 
1987).  Carmines and Stimson’s predominant explanation of partisan change during this 
decisive election period is articulated in Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of 
American Politics (1989).  They argue that major changes in the policy stands of the two 
main political parties occur in response to the type of issues that command center stage in 
American politics.  Certain economic, foreign, racial, and social policies that dominate 
electoral campaigns evoke powerful emotional responses from the parties and candidates, 
and cut across traditional party cleavages such as the New Deal coalition, causing 
conflict. According to their theory of issue evolution race is the prime factor explaining 
post-New Deal transformations in the partisan balance of identification in the American 
electorate (Pomper 1989); and, changes in the doctrinal stances of the political parties 
where the Democratic Party emerges as racially liberal and actively pro-civil rights 
(Feinstein and Schickler 2008).  
Subsequently, defections among white southerners from the New Deal coalition 
(Petrocik 1987), who were “going Republican,” (Black and Black 1987) correspond to 
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ideological transformations of Democratic, and Republican, Party policies with regard to 
racial issues (Feinstein and Schickler 2008).  Apart from white southerners, the most 
noticeable shifts to the Republican Party among other social groupings within the 
electorate include whites, self-designated conservatives, and both younger and older 
cohorts (Norpoth 1987, Petrocik 1987, Black and Black 1989; Gurin, Hatchett, and 
Jackson 1989).  Social status group factors, especially differences in educational 
background, are also prominent forces explaining increased preferences for the 
Republican Party among white citizens during the period spanning the 1960s and 
extending into the late 1980s (Miller 1992).   Carmines and Stimson (1989) further 
contend that party-based changes reflect attitudes toward race-related policies regarding 
integration, black civil rights, and voting rights for the disenfranchised.  
By the mid-1960s African Americans, seemingly impervious to change, culminate 
their realignment that began with the 1936 presidential election of Franklin D. Roosevelt 
(Weiss 1989). This attachment to the Democratic Party continues to intensify into the late 
1980s.  Thereafter, most African Americans perceive the Democrats as having the best 
over-time record of giving attention to, and taking action to address issues of most 
importance to the African American racial group.  Moreover, African Americans’ 
distinctive and enduring Democratic partisanship appears to confirm the significance of 
race, or of particular issues that focus on racial group interests, when making decisions 
between the two main political parties.   Even though important demographic 
differentiations are also present within the African American community, variables 
commonly associated with predicting political partisanship do not typically provide 
meaningful explanations of persistent racial distinctiveness in political partisanship. 
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Because of persistent racial group solidarity Democratic, not Republican 
partisanship appears rational, at least from the perspective of procedural rationality 
(Simon 1955).  While the Democrats may not be the best choice, they may be the “lesser 
of two evils.” Still, the extent to which political distinctiveness and durable partisan 
predispositions persist at any point in time depends upon continued perceptions of the 
Democratic Party as best capable of addressing racial group interests.  Nevertheless, 
Bositis (2002) shows evidence of increased conservative ideological preferences among 
African Americans in the 1980s Reagan era that furthered speculation of increased 
preferences for the Republican Party. Luks and Elms (2005) contend that Democratic 
attachments have declined since passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, particularly among 
younger cohorts.  Correspondingly, Lee and Hajnal (2007) reveal a discernible pattern of 
fluctuations in African American party affiliation. In spite of such empirical evidence 
African Americans continue to prefer the Democrats.  
2.5 AFRICAN-AMERICAN PARTISANSHIP: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 Therefore, in formulation of a theoretical perspective for studying partisanship 
among African Americans the theory of African-American racial group interests provides 
a more useful paradigm than the traditional prototypes.  This is mainly because “to 
understand black politics one needs to draw on many methodologies, and one clearly 
needs to pay more attention to the boundaries between society and the individual, with 
the group as the intermediary phenomenon” (Dawson 1994, 13).  Of particular value to 
the development of this theoretical framework is the Black Utility Heuristic that provides 
a parsimonious explanation for the group-based decision calculus of individual African 
Americans.  The present model of partisanship endeavors to construct a conceptual 
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framework based on Michael C. Dawson’s synthesis of “psychological theories of the 
social group” with “Simonesque approaches to rational decision-making” (Dawson, 12). 
In so doing, Dawson “provides a rational choice foundation for the formation of group 
identity [where] rationality is procedural, based on assessments of what works as opposed 
to what is best [which is useful] to gain insight into the decision-making processes of 
African Americans both as individuals and as part of a politically active group within the 
American polity” (Dawson, 12).   
The theoretical background of African American racial group interests is a group 
process perspective of the relationship between the individual and the group, where the 
racial grouping is construed as a psychological group. According to John C. Turner 
(1987) such groups, descriptively speaking, are psychologically relevant to individual 
members subjectively for social comparison. Psychological groups influence individual 
members since it is from the group that the individual acquires norms, values, and beliefs.  
Herein lies the utility of group membership for such persons.  Individuals can accept 
membership in, and identification with the group (privately) based on a view of 
themselves in relation to those persons that constitute the group (Turner 1987, 1-2). This 
makes the group relevant to the establishment of their own socio-political reality.  
Henceforth, the psychological group becomes an important frame of reference that shapes 
the individuals’ own attitudes, orientations and ideas.  In this way, a deference to group 
interests as opposed to individual interests is located within the individual. Therefore, the 
individual decision is consistent with the notion of procedural rationality, an important 
component of the Black Utility Heuristic (Dawson 1994).  Moreover, recognition of the 
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individual by others as a group member reinforces the perception of us versus them and 
enhances the importance of identification with the group.  
      Instrumental to this theoretical approach, and consistent with the theory of 
African-American racial group interests, is the idea that individuals are social beings 
Fundamentally, the influence of individuals on one another, particularly in relation to 
change is inherent in the political motives of African Americans.  Any change among a 
substantial proportion of individual members or within subgroups is potentially 
detrimental to the group as a whole.  Movement in opposition to the political standard 
could threaten the African American racial group position within the polity. As a 
psychological group this collectivity of individuals exerts powerful influence on 
individual attitudes toward the two main political parties in the United States.  This is 
denoted in the seemingly habitual, stable, and enduring relationship between the 
Democratic Party and the African Americans. Perceptions of interconnectedness explain 
the presence of an “interdependence of fate,” a perceptual realization that one’s fate 
depends on the fate of the group as a whole, and “task interdependence” or the 
dependence of individual group members on each other for goal achievement (Lewin 
1946).  
 Kurt Lewin (1946, 165-166) explains his principle of interdependence of fate in 
relation to the position of Jews in 1939 thusly: 
[I]t is not similarity or dissimilarity of individuals that constitutes a group, but 
rather interdependence of fate. Any normal group, and certainly any developed 
and organized one contain and should contain individuals of very different 
character…. It is easy enough to see that the common fate of all Jews makes them 
a group in reality…. What is more, a person who has learned to see how much his 
own fate depends upon the fate of his entire group will ready and even eager to 
take over a fair share of responsibility for its welfare. 
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The historical case of African Americans is most applicable to this concept.  As a 
psychological construct, linked fate measures the degree to which an individual’s own 
self interests are tied to the interests of the entire group. Nonetheless, the perception of 
relationship with the group waxes or wanes depending upon the extent to which self 
becomes less, and group becomes more important.  Hence,    
 Hypothesis 1: African Americans with stronger (black) linked fates are likely to 
 support a political party whose policy preferences are perceived as consistent with 
 (black) racial group interests. 
     
The case of African American women suggests distinct historical and 
contemporary life situations that make even more significant the role of interdependence 
of fate (Gay and Tate 1998; Simien 2005). This is coupled with making decisions in the 
face of multiple identities, such as race and gender.  So, to further investigate this 
underlying dimension of African American racial group partisanship, the following 
proposition is formulated. 
Hypothesis 2: African American women are more likely to support the 
Democratic Party than African American men or women of other ethnicities. 
     
Of further significance to this theoretical perspective is the concept of task 
interdependence that sheds light on the inducing influence of certain group attributes. 
Understandably, individuals choose membership with the group based on their 
perceptions of a common purpose, and on their interest in achieving a common goal. 
Bound by perceptions of interconnectedness, individuals often view group goals as more 
important than their own.  This is because they consider that their goals are interrelated 
with the goals of the individuals that compose the group and with whom they share 
ascriptive characteristics, an important component of the black utility heuristic. Even 
though group strategies and outcomes may not produce the best possible (optimizing) 
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solution for the individual, the decision to align oneself with a collectivity of individuals 
similarly situated is both procedurally rational and efficient. In so doing individuals 
satisfactorily assess the pursuit, and accomplishment, of racial group goals as fulfilling 
their own aspirations.  
Hypothesis 3: African Americans are more likely to identify with the political 
party that they perceive best helps their racial group. 
 
Interdependence plays a significant role in understanding the dynamic processes 
of the African American racial group.  Using the framework of the black utility heuristic, 
Dawson demonstrates how linked racial fate affects political attitudes and decisions of 
group cohesion.  Additionally, the concept of linked fate guides Dawson’s later work on 
the root of contemporary African American politics in Black Visions (2002).  In this 
regard, his interpretations and systematic findings confirm the race perspective (Willie 
1979). Nonetheless, Dawson also finds “limited evidence” confirming the declining 
significance of race hypothesis or class perspective (Wilson 1979; 1980) in determining 
life chance opportunities (Dawson, 38).  Recent relevant research studies that also 
employ the concept of linked fate and the black politics model demonstrate its profound 
effect on explanations of the political attitudes and behavior of ethnic minority population 
groups representing Latinos (Sanchez & Masuoka 2008; Sanchez 2008; Nicholson, 
Pantoja & Segura 2005), Asian Americans (Junn & Masuoka 2008), Afro-Caribbeans 
(Watt 2009), and West Indians (Rogers, 2001).  Correspondingly, the concept of linked 
fate also provides a meaningful explanation for predictors of pan-ethnic group 
consciousness and the use of group identity cues among Asian Americans and Latinos 
(Masuoka 2006).  Then,  
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Hypothesis 4: The more a person views that the fate of their racial/ethnic group 
affects their own fate, the greater the likelihood of support for the political party 
perceived as addressing racial/ethnic group interests. 
   
Explaining the theory of African-American racial group interests, Dawson 
considers the following variables: Individual perceptions of racial group interests, 
Individual socioeconomic status, Evaluations of the economy, Liberalism, Local black 
economic conditions, Approval of Reagan’s presidential performance, and Demographic 
characteristics—age, gender, and region (Dawson, 113 – 115).  Using data from the 1984 
and 1988 National Black Election Studies (NBES) panel series (Jackson 1984; 1988), 
Dawson tests his model to assess the strength of interrelationships.  He shows that “a key 
to African-American partisanship is the economic status of the race.”  Moreover, “any 
party that wants to attract and hold African-American political support must be seen as 
more effective than its rivals in improving the economic health of the black community” 
(Dawson, 116-117).   
This research study is a modification of Dawson’s (1994) empirical test, 
employing data feasible for such analysis: the 1996 National Black Election Stud and the 
2004 National Politics Study. 8  The focus is African American partisanship.  In the 
theoretical framework, an influence on decisions about which political party is most 
responsive to racial group interests is largely a factor of race, class, and gender (Figure 
2.1 below). In addition, race structures individual orientations and determines the extent 
                                                             
 8. Katherine Tate, National Black Election Study, 1996 [Computer file]. ICPSR 
Version. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University [producer] 1997. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-
university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2004).  
James S. Jackson, et al., National Politics Study, 2004. ICPSR24483-V1. Ann 
Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 
2009-03-23. DOI: 10.3886/ICPSR24483.v1. 
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to which ideological predispositions influence partisanship, and frames perceptions of 
how the parties perform when in control of government.  Moreover, race has a profound 
effect on individual perceptions about historical experiences, and on contemporary 
encounters with White, and other Americans that have resulted in confinement of the 
racial group along the perimeter of the social, economic, and political order.  In short, 
race matters. 
What then is race? It is a vast family of human beings, generally of 
common blood and language, always of common history, traditions and 
impulses, who are both voluntarily and involuntarily striving together for 
the accomplishment of certain more or less vividly conceived ideals of 
life.  
 
W.E.B. DuBois9 
 
 According to DuBois racial classifications tend to follow physical traits, but 
ascriptive characteristics do not, and cannot, explain such group features as cohesiveness 
and continuity.  In this he sees that differences transcend race and represent more fully 
“spiritual, psychical,” distinctions that bind people together.  The group is therefore 
composed of individuals that share “first, their race identity and common blood; 
secondly, and more important, a common striving together for certain ideals of life” 
(DuBois 2003, 159).  For this purpose African Americans work for race solidarity in that 
they acknowledge their interconnectedness and interdependency.  Then perceptions and 
real-life experiences most often lead to the development of a sense of interdependence or 
linked fate, identification with one’s social group, as well as a black consciousness that 
results in solidarity and collective action to advance racial group goals.   
                                                             
9.  W.E.B. DuBois. “The Conservation of Races.” (1897) In Social Theory: Roots and  
Branches, 157-161.  Edited by Peter Kivisto. (Los Angeles, California: Roxbury 
Publishing Company (2003). 
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Figure 2.1 Determinants of African-American Partisanship: 1996, 2004 
In the diagram above, perceptions of linked fate influence African American (race) 
evaluations and affective attitudes, as well as individual decisions about which of the two 
main political parties works harder to promote racial group interests.  Most importantly, 
the model shows three focal effects on partisanship: race, class, and gender.  As can be 
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seen, race has a direct influence on partisanship; race also influences class and gender 
effects on partisanship, where class denotes a strong relationship that influences party 
choice in different ways for the racial group.  
Race matters for African Americans as a group.  Nonetheless, what may be a 
valid account of the centrality of race to partisanship within the African American racial 
group may not necessarily depict the relationship between race/ethnicity and political 
partisanship for other groups of minority status.  Therefore, an important element of this 
extension of Dawson’s (1994) study is looking across other groups to see how the effects 
specified above apply particularly to African Americans and broadly to other 
racial/ethnic groups included in this examination. A comparative population of African 
Americans, White Non-Hispanics, Hispanics, Asians, and Black Caribbeans are also 
included in the analysis.  Even though perceptions of linked racial fate tend to be more 
explicit among individuals constituting the African American racial group, such 
perceptions may also be inferred from the political attitudes and actions of other 
population groups.  My position is that a “sense” of linked fate is important to individuals 
in all groups represented, but in different ways.  To this degree the investigation will 
further explore that phenomenon.  
Additionally, the present research study takes into account the integral role of 
race, class, and gender in structuring political partisanship.  Race, economic class 
position, and gender are sociopolitical constructs that determine individual life chances, 
or the opportunity to attain meaningful goals in life.  They form the basis for imposing 
inequalities resulting from structures of superior-subordinate relationships, that include 
white-black or men-women, and signify sociopolitical conflict and interests that 
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differentiate the two main political parties’ platform agendas, and their administrative 
agenda when in control of the Executive and Legislative departments of government.  As 
such race, class, and gender tend to serve as the basis for divisions, and for the allocation 
of resources (Kendall 1997).  For African Americans race, class, and gender are 
sociopolitical factors that play an integral part in explaining their positions relative to 
second-class citizenship; denial of the American promise of life, liberty, property and of 
the protections thereof; and confinement along the periphery of the social, economic, and 
political order. 
Among African Americans I expect to see an interaction between race and class 
in which a decreasing effect of race corresponds to the increasing effect of economic 
class, if the importance of race has declined, as Wilson supposes. This would then 
decrease psychological Democratic partisan identifications and thereby yield weakened 
political preference attitudes, or stronger political independence. Such a finding would 
support the “class” perspective advanced by Wilson (1980), and might also offer a 
relevant explanation for the pattern of partisan fluctuations that began in the post 1960s 
(Hajnal and Lee 2007; Luks and Elms 2005).  On the other hand, if the Black Utility 
Heuristic serves as the principle factor for deciphering political messages, and as a 
strategic causal component within the decision calculus of African Americans, then 
individuals should correctly identify the political party that is most responsive to racial 
group interests in accordance with the racial group standard.  This finding would support 
the race perspective as articulated by Willie (1979), and further demonstrate the 
significance of linked racial fate as applied by Dawson (1994) in his study.   
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Furthermore, I expect African-American women to demonstrate a keen sense of 
linked fate based on both race and gender that prompts them to support the racial group 
political standard—the Democratic Party.  Because of their unique historical and 
contemporary status disadvantages, particularly regarding income, African American 
women are expected to more closely affiliate with the political party viewed as best 
addressing issues of most importance to the racial group.  They are expected to more 
closely affiliate with the Democratic Party than African American men and women of 
other racial/ethnic groupings within the United States. The distinctive plight of African 
American women and men is reviewed in the historical chapters that follow. 
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CHAPTER 3 
BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF AFRICAN AMERICAN 
PARTISANSHIP, 1863 - 1964 
The Democrat won’t have us, and the Republicans don’t want us.  Is there 
anything to do but impotently wring our empty hands? ... May God write 
us down as asses if ever again we are found putting our trust in either the 
Republican or Democratic Parties.   
W. E. B. Du Bois10  
Historically, most African Americans consider themselves Democrats, and anecdotal 
evidence further substantiates this claim.  Nonetheless, their partisan roots lay in the 
Republican Party, and from “Emancipation in 1863 up until 1912 Negroes voted the 
Republican ticket as a matter of religion” (DuBois 1922). This chapter bears historical 
evidence for the conceptual framework laid out in the previous chapter.  While race, 
class, and gender are integrated factors explaining African American ties to the 
Republican Party initially, and then subsequently to the Democratic Party, 
interdependence of fate and task interdependence makes race the prime factor explaining 
African American partisan preferences. In what follows I review African American 
political partisanship over the course of three historical periods, which I identify as the 
Radical Reconstruction Period from 1863 to 1877; the Post-Reconstruction Period from 
1877 to 1936; and the New Deal Coalition Period from 1936 to 1964.
                                                             
9.  W.E.B. DuBois, “Kicking Us Out,” in The Crisis: A Record of the Darker 
Races 24, no. 1 (May 1922): 11. New York: National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People.  
 33
3.1 OVERVIEW 
  In spite of his denunciation of the two main political parties W.E.B. DuBois, 
editor of Crisis from 1910 to 1934—a publication dealing with “Negro” life (Rudwick 
1958), along with a contingency of other prominent black leaders urged a mass exodus 
from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party.  Still, majority of African Americans 
continued to identify with the Republicans as late as 1928 (Nowlin 1931; Brisbane 1970).  
For others, particularly the northern contingency that heeded this call, attachment to the 
Party of Lincoln began to wane as early as 1920 when they made a notable shift to the 
Democratic Party.  This shift was a response to the Democrats’ decision to allow African 
Americans to attend their 1924 Democratic National Convention.  African Americans 
were also allowed to hold offices at the convention (Jackson 2008).  In addition, this 
partisan shift rejoins various strategies embraced by the Republicans to distance 
themselves from black constituents.  These included the “lily-white” movement, a 
political faction whose aim was to exclude blacks and “black and tan” societies; 
reduction of black patronage; relegation of blacks to only token partisan roles; and 
support of policies resulting in political subjugation of the race (Brisbane 1970).  By the 
mid-1930s the African American racial group began a partisan realignment from the 
Republicans to the Democrats, which culminated in the mid-1960s. 
African Americans’ views about the two main political parties typically point to 
established patterns of racial group solidarity.  According to Dawson (1994) racial group 
solidarity is predicated on perceptions of shared historical experiences, a linked racial 
fate and adversity with respect to black life chances or the likelihood of obtaining 
important goals in life.  More than perceptions of a shared or common history of 
oppression and subordination, Shelby (2005) insists that solidarity relies on a shared 
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commitment to resist racism and the negative aspects of such experiences. In short, group 
solidarity is grounded in fundamental principles of how things should be done by 
institutions of government, and by the political parties when in control of said 
government.  In what follows African Americans’ commitment to withstand racial 
injustices by appealing to both governmental and linkage institutions are examined.   
3.2 BACKGROUND: AFRICAN-AMERICAN ANTI-SLAVERY STRATEGIES 
 
 Throughout the course of U.S. history African Americans engaged the polity for 
basic civic values—liberty, justice, equality, and civil rights.  Toward this endeavor they 
employed numerous conventional strategies including legal actions; petitions, various 
other forms of protest—boycotts, sit-ins, lobbying, marches, and conventions; the 
independent Black Church; and, the independent Black press.  At times they sought 
recourse by calling for resistance through the use of unconventional methods as well.  
Whether by way of conventional or unconventional means, African Americans looked for 
ways to elevate their station in life, to gain practical relief, and to secure full recognition 
of their right to American citizenship and the protections thereof.  Prior to the American 
Revolutionary War and subsequent ratification of the United States Constitution, African 
Americans sought emancipation and full rights and privileges of citizenship.  In a number 
of court cases individuals challenged the practice of slavery in the colonies.  Of 
interesting note are three related cases filed in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts on 
behalf of Quock Walker (1781-1783); the Mum Bett (1781)11 case; and, Ned Griffin’s 
appeal to the North Carolina General Assembly (1784).  The Quock Walker case reached 
                                                             
 10.  The Massachusetts Constitution, Judicial Review and Slavery, The Mum Bett 
Case. Accessed May 1, 2012. http://www.mass.gov. 
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the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1783.  The initial issue before the court 
presented in 1781 was a promise of emancipation upon reaching age twenty-five prior to 
the death of Walker’s owner, but violated by his mistress’ second husband.  Judgment 
delivered by Chief Justice William Cushing applied the principle of judicial review to 
render the practice of slavery a violation of the 1780 state constitution.  Cushing’s 
reasoning held [in part]: 
…These sentiments [that are favorable to the natural rights of mankind] 
led the framers of our constitution of government - by which the people of 
this commonwealth have solemnly bound themselves to each other – to 
declare – that all men are born free and equal; and that every subject is 
entitled to liberty, and to have it guarded by the laws as well as his life and 
property.  In short, without resorting to implication in constructing the 
constitution, slavery is in my judgment as effectively abolished as it can 
be by the granting of rights and privileges wholly incompatible and 
repugnant to its existence.  The court are therefore fully of the opinion that 
perpetual servitude can no longer be tolerated in our government, and that 
liberty can only be forfeited by some criminal conduct or relinquished by 
personal consent or contract.  And it is therefore unnecessary to consider 
whether the promises of freedom to Quako, on the part of his master and 
mistress, amounted to a manumission or not.   
Chief Justice William Cushing 
Supreme Judicial Court, Massachusetts 
The Quock Walker Case, 178312    
  
The Massachusetts case of Brom and Bett v. Ashley (1781) also tackled the 
practice of slavery within the Commonwealth. Bett fled after sustaining permanent injury 
to her face at the hands of her master’s wife, and solicited legal assistance from Attorney 
Theodore Sedgwick to file her freedom suit.  The court ruled in favor of plaintiffs Bett 
and Brom awarding them freedom and a just compensation of 30 shillings in damages.  
                                                             
 11. John Cushing, “The Cushing Court and the Abolition of Slavery in 
Massachusetts: More Notes on the ‘Quock Walker Case,’” 5 The American Journal of 
Legal History 118 (1961). 
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The Mum Bett (Elizabeth Freeman) and Quock Walker cases shed light on the injustices 
of servitude by testing the Massachusetts State Constitution (1780); subsequently as a 
result, in part, of these cases the slave trade ended in the Commonwealth in 1788. 
Correspondingly, African Americans’ commitment to freedom was shown in their 
response to the revolutionary cause.  They fought on both sides in the American 
Revolution as each promised freedom for their service.  Ned Griffin, the slave of William 
Kitchen, was promised freedom to fight in his master’s stead; however, upon Ned’s 
return Kitchen refused to honor his pledge.  Griffin petitioned the state legislative body 
and was granted his freedom: Ned Griffin Freedom by the North Carolina General 
Assembly, 4 April 1784,13 and the right to vote, An Act for Enfranchising Ned Griffin, 
Late the Property of William Kitchen (17 April 1784).14  
  Besides appealing to institutions of government, African Americans demonstrated 
their self-determination from the pulpit. With the 1816 establishment of the African 
Methodist Episcopal (AME) church by Richard Allen, Absalom Jones, and others in 
Philadelphia “an autonomous black religious movement” began. 15   The independent 
Black Church gave African Americans a new forum for political expression. Though not 
every church allowed the conveying of such thought, the colonial era marked the 
beginning of using the pulpit to propagate a message of hope that reminded African 
                                                             
 12.  NC Archives GASR, April-June 1784 (Box 3, location 3A-464). 
 
 13.  An Act for Enfranchising Ned Griffin, Late the Property of William Kitchen 
Colonial Records, Acts of the North Carolina General Assembly, 1784 (April 19, 1784 - 
June 03, 1784; Volume 24), 543-649. 
 
 14.  Lockard, Joe, Antislavery Literature Teaching Guide: Early African 
American Antislavery Sermons (Arizona State University, December 2006), 4. Accessed 
May 1, 2012. http://antislavery.eserver.org/antislavery-teaching-guides/early-african-
american-antislavery-sermons.  
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Americans of their interconnectedness, whether bound or free, because of their race.  
Pastor Richard Allen actively protested against any new form of government that would 
not extend that freedom won in the American Revolution to all. As delegates to the 1787 
Constitutional Convention deliberated in Philadelphia, Allen, Jones and others staged a 
prayer protest.  However, when the framers of the Constitution of the United States failed 
to take the more honorable course of freedom and justice for all, the black religious 
movement spread and the independent Black Church became a haven for civil rights 
protest.  
 African Americans also utilized the press to circulate, for example, the Freedom 
Petition of New Hampshire Slaves, an appeal for freedom to the New Hampshire state 
legislature from Nero Brewster and other natives of Africa forcibly enslaved. 16   In 
addition, the press brought attention to racial inequality and provided a means to 
articulate grievances and wrongs against the race, to seek redress, and to report news and 
information about African Americans’ vital statistics and achievements. Freedom’s 
Journal, the first African American owned and operated newspaper, challenged editorials 
and other attacks against the race published in the mainstream press.  A weekly New 
York publication from 1827 to 1829, the Freedom’s Journal, was “circulated in eleven 
states, the District of Columbia, Haiti, Europe, and Canada” (Danky and Hady 1996-
2012).  The independent Black press, like the Black Church, grew tremendously calling 
on African Americans to work together for relief from their common plight.  In 1829 the 
newspaper published four articles by David Walker, a free black activist, to promote his 
anti-slavery message in which he urged slaves to use resistance. Pamphlets of his appeal, 
                                                             
 16.  Printed in the New Hampshire Gazette, State Journal, and General Advertiser 
24, no. 1233 (15 July 1780). 
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often smuggled into Southern ports by black sailors, were to be read primarily by slaves; 
however, slave owners read them as well.  Some states responded by enacting legislation 
banning both blacks from learning to read, and the distribution of anti-slavery 
propaganda.  Some states also offered a bounty for Walker’s capture and/or death (Danky 
and Hady 1996-2012).  
 During the 1830s abolitionist organizations also increased. Though often headed 
by white males like the American Anti-Slavery Society founded in 1833 by William 
Lloyd Garrison, the Female Anti-Slavery Society, founded by Lucretia Mott, also joined 
the movement in that same year and included African American and White women.17  
Since the colonial period women used numerous tactics such as protests, boycotts, 
meetings, conventions to give voice to anti-slavery and pro-women’s suffrage sentiments. 
In 1833 black and white women also joined to found the Boston Female Anti-Slavery 
Society.  Similarly, interracial and mixed (female and male) associations were established 
in New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. Interracial women societies 
formed to address common experiences, including discrimination, disenfranchisement, 
and second-class status.   
 African American women were primarily concerned about the abolition of slavery 
and about the state of the racial group.  They agreed that women’s suffrage was 
important; however, black women wanted freedom first then suffrage.  Many white 
women, on the other hand, just wanted the right to vote like their male counterparts. 
                                                             
 17.  Women also joined male-dominated anti-slavery associations after passage of 
the 1850 Fugitive Slave Law to serve and promote their common cause. [Wilbur H. 
Siebert, The Underground Railroad in Massachusetts (Worchester, Massachusetts: 
American Antiquarian Society, 1935), 50.] 
 
 
 39
Some of the suffragists did not know how they felt about the abolition of slavery, while 
others like the Grimke sisters, Sarah and Angelina, of South Carolina (later Rhode 
Island); Lucretia Mott of Pennsylvania; and Elizabeth Cady Stanton of New York were 
both abolitionists and suffragists. Differences also emerged over the order of priority 
given to these two issues, abolition and suffrage.  The resulting conflict between black 
and white women, and between men and women or abolition versus suffrage, included 
women’s rights advocates Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony with Sojourner 
Truth against “former allies like Lucy Stone, Antoinette Brown Blackwell, Wendell 
Phillips, and Frederick Douglass” 18  who favored abolition first and foremost. 
Correspondingly, divergence among white women surfaced over which factor held the 
greatest significance: race or gender.  This conflict inevitably led African American 
women to establish separate associations in the fight against racial and gender 
discrimination.  For instance, in 1913 Ida B. Wells-Barnett founded the Alpha Suffrage 
Club in Chicago, the first suffrage club for black women.19  Nevertheless, women took 
tremendous risks on behalf of both the abolition and suffrage movements, especially 
during historical periods when it was socially unacceptable for a woman to speak in 
public, or to serve on committees, for example, having equal status with men.  Oftentimes 
women, particularly African Americans, were violating societal taboos for the sake of 
civil liberties and equal rights.     
                                                             
 17.  Nancy A. Hewitt, “Abolition & Suffrage,” Public Broadcasting Service. 
Accessed May 17, 2012. 
http://www.pbs.org/stantonanthony/resources/index.html?body=abolitionists.html. 
 
 18.  “Ida B. Wells-Barnett,” U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park 
Service. Accessed May 4, 2012. http://www.nps.gov.  
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 Some African Americans claimed independent leadership in the abolitionist 
fraternity as shown in the National Negro Convention Movement, which operated from 
1830 to 1864.  The National Negro Convention Movement brought attention to issues of 
particular importance to the race such as purchasing land and securing passage for the 
relocation of African Americans. Since all did not desire colonization, the movement also 
sought improvement of black livelihood in the United States.20  While a great number of 
local, state, and national conventions were spawned by the movement during this period, 
of particular note is A National Convention of Colored Citizens in the United States 
(1843) that convened in Buffalo, New York to consider issues of civil rights and the 
security of American citizenship.  Read during the course of this conference, An Address 
to the Slaves of the United States of America authored by David Walker (cited above) 
was rejected by a small majority of delegates “on these grounds: 
1. That the document was war-like, and encouraged insurrection;  
2. That if the Convention should adopt it, that those delegates who lived near the 
borders of the slave states, would not dare to return to their homes.”21        
 In his Preface to Walker’s appeal Henry Highland Garnet (1843) stated: “and 
now in compliance with the earnest request of many who heard it and in conformity to 
the wishes of numerous friends who are anxious to see it, the author now gives it to the 
public praying God that this little book may be borne on the four winds of heaven, until 
                                                             
20.  Libraries at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Electronic Texts in 
American Studies, Accessed May 4, 2012. http://digitalcommons.unl.edu. 
  
    21.  Garnet, Henry Highland, "An Address to the Slaves of the United States of 
America, Buffalo, N.Y., 1843" Electronic Texts in American Studies, Paper 8 (Libraries 
at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 1843). Accessed 4 May 2012. 
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/etas/8. 
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the principles it contains shall be understood and adopted by every slave in the Union.”22  
Then in his own 1848 address to the Female Benevolent Society of Troy, New York 
entitled The Past and Present Condition, and the Destiny, of the Colored Race,23 Henry 
Highland Garnet demonstrated just how well-informed African Americans were of their 
situation.  Garnet reviewed a myriad of contributions by Africans to the western world; 
surveyed the origin and expansion of the slave trade; discussed the end of slavery in the 
British empire, Haiti, Mexico, French and Swedish possessions; and, warned of the 
expansion of slavery into Texas as a result of the Mexican War. Most importantly, Garnet 
called for racial solidarity despite differences over colonization (Africa or Canada), and 
over whether to call themselves: “Africans,” “colored,” “African-American,” or “black.” 
Instead, Henry Highland Garnet advocated an alternative strategy to overthrow the 
shackles of bondage, education (Garnet 1848). 
Subsequently, an immediate reaction to passage of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Law 
prompted a proliferation of abolitionist societies like the Boston Vigilance Committee of 
Massachusetts, composed of blacks and whites, men and women, whose principle aim 
was to provide medical and legal aid, passage to Canada, transitory housing/hiding, 
citizen petitions to government, and/or public notice of the arrival of slave hunters 
(Jackson 1850: 6-32).24  The Committee further advocated state laws that would prohibit 
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 23. "The Past and the Present Condition, and the Destiny, of the Colored Race 
(1848)." In Electronic Texts in American Studies, Paper 13. Edited by Henry Highland 
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public officials from assisting in the recapturing of fugitive slaves. Classified in this 
fugitive slave status were prominent abolitionists, Frederick Douglass and William Wells 
Brown25 who propagated their message of emancipation both in the United States and 
abroad. Accordingly, Martin R. Delany advanced his message of Black Nationalism in 
The Condition, Elevation, Emigration, and Destiny of the Colored People of the United 
States, Politically Considered (1852).  He advocated colonization in the Caribbean, 
Central or South America, or East Africa; and toward this goal, Delany helped organize 
the National Emigration Convention of Colored People that convened in August of 1854 
in Cleveland, Ohio.  Delany, a pre-Civil War abolitionist and the first African American 
to reach the rank of Major in the Union Army, led an expedition to Liberia and the Niger 
River Valley in West Africa in 1859 where he negotiated treaties with local tribes on 
behalf of the emigration movement.26  
3.3 THE DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN PARTY SCHEME AND SLAVERY 
 
 On the contrary, the Democratic Party, favored predominantly in the South, repeatedly 
pledged to maintain the social, cultural, economic status quo, and particularly the perpetuation of 
slavery. Democrats supported the Fugitive Slave Law passed by the United States Congress in 
1850 (9 Stat. 462).  This law gave Southern slave owners the right to recapture escaped slaves, 
even if they had relocated to Northern states. So, European supporters of William Wells 
Brown paid for his freedom before allowing him to return to the United States fearing 
that his former slave owner would reclaim him (Wesley 1944: 39).  Accordingly, after 
                                                             
25.  According to Charles H. Wesley "The Participation of Negroes in Anti-
Slavery Parties" Journal of Negro History 29, no. 1, (January 1944): 39, William Wells 
Brown was a member of the Liberty Party that advocated the abolition of slavery and 
equal rights to black citizens. 
 
26.  Mark Roth, “Martin Delany, ‘Father of Black Nationalism,’” Pittsburgh Post-
Gazette, February 6, 2011). Accessed May 10, 2012. [post-gazette.com] 
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publication of his autobiography The Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass: An 
American Slave (1845) Frederick Douglass found sanctuary in London, England, and 
returned to the United States after friends raised the purchase price for his manumission 
from Thomas Auld.27  
Often tracing their roots back to the Democratic-Republican Party of Thomas 
Jefferson and James Madison, the Democratic Party emerged from various factions 
united by Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren during the campaign period of the 1828 
presidential election (Silbey 2002).  Like Jefferson, Jackson viewed government 
interference with citizens’ rights as an encroachment on liberty itself.  This is the basis 
for the Democrats’ formal statement on chattel slavery.  
The liberal principles embodied by Jefferson in the Declaration of 
Independence, and sanctioned in the constitution, which makes ours the 
land of liberty, and the asylum of the oppressed of every nation, have ever 
been cardinal principles in the democratic faith; and every attempt to 
abridge the present privilege of becoming citizens, and the owners of soil 
among us, ought to be resisted with the same spirit…28  
 
The Party’s most cherished values of liberty and property form their basis for citizenship 
(Locke 1689). Yet, because enslaved African Americans were classified as human chattel 
their official status as a species of property meant they had no legal claim to the liberal 
values of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” (or property). Democrats repeated 
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28.  Excerpt taken from the “1840 Democratic Party Platform,” (6 May 1840) in 
Gerhard Woolley and John T. Peters, The American Presidency Project [online], (Santa 
Barbara, California, 1999 – 2011.  Accessed May 3, 2012. 
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their position on slavery [and states’ rights] in each platform from 1840 to 1856 (Woolley 
and Peters 1999-2011).   
Resolved, That we reiterate with renewed energy of purpose the well 
considered declarations of former Conventions upon the sectional issue of 
Domestic slavery, and concerning the reserved rights of the States…That 
Congress has no power under the Constitution, to interfere with or control 
the domestic institutions of the several States, and that such States are the 
sole and proper judges of everything appertaining to their own affairs, not 
prohibited by the Constitution; that all efforts of the abolitionists, or others, 
made to induce Congress to interfere with questions of slavery, or to take 
incipient steps in relation thereto, are calculated to lead to the most alarming 
and dangerous consequences; and that all such efforts have an inevitable 
tendency to diminish the happiness of the people and endanger the stability 
and permanency of the Union, and ought not to be countenanced by any 
friend of our political institutions.    
Democratic Party Platform of 1856 
June 2, 1856 
 
Stephen A. Douglas, Lincoln’s Democratic opponent in the 1860 presidential 
election, advocated a philosophy of popular sovereignty that espoused states’ rights, and 
the right to own slaves as a natural part of ordered society. For Lincoln and Douglas, both 
from Illinois, this campaign pit the two in a rematch after having faced each other in the 
1856 state congressional election, won by Douglas.  Differences over the institution of 
Slavery and the powers and duties of Congress persisted.  The 1860 Democratic Party 
Platform called on the U.S. Supreme Court to settle party differences over constitutional 
issues.  The Party platform further “Resolved, that the enactments of the State 
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Legislatures to defeat the faithful execution of the Fugitive Slave Law, are hostile in 
character, subversive of the Constitution29, and revolutionary in their effect.”30   
Formed in 1854, the Republican Party emerged as the Democratic Party opponent 
in the U.S. two-party political scheme. Republicans distinguished themselves from both 
Abolitionists that supported immediate freedom and racial equality for the slave 
population, and Democrats that supported the indefinite continuation of slavery and its 
expansion into newly acquired territory.  Even though tension between separate wings of 
the Republican Party emerged over questions about the dissolution of domestic slavery as 
an American institution, the Party seemed to prefer its gradual extinction.  Drawing from 
natural rights philosophy as espoused by Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of 
Independence (1776), the 1856 Republican Party doctrine stated:    
[W]ith our Republican fathers, we hold it to be a self-evident truth, that all 
men are endowed with the inalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit 
of happiness, and that the primary object and ulterior design of our Federal 
Government were to secure these rights to all persons under its exclusive 
jurisdiction; that, as our Republican fathers, when they had abolished 
Slavery in all our National Territory, ordained that no person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, it 
becomes our duty to maintain this provision of the Constitution against all 
attempts to violate it for the purpose of establishing Slavery in the 
Territories of the United States by positive legislation, prohibiting its 
existence or extension therein. That we deny the authority of Congress, of 
a Territorial Legislation, of any individual, or association of individuals, to 
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30.  Excerpt taken from the “1860 Democratic Party Platform,” in Woolley and 
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give legal existence to Slavery in any Territory of the United States, while 
the present Constitution shall be maintained.31  
      Republican 1856 Party Platform 
 June 18, 1856 
 
While Republicans used natural rights philosophy to advance an anti-slavery campaign; 
they also stated their belief that the “due process” provision of the U.S. Constitution, 
Amendment 5 (1789), granted legal protection for all persons in the United States. They 
further recognized sovereign powers conferred on Congress to prohibit the territories 
from engaging in “those twin relics of barbarism—Polygamy and Slavery.”32  
In 1860 the Republican Party slated Abraham Lincoln as their presidential 
candidate.  A moderate, Lincoln personally opposed slavery as wrong morally because he 
believed that it was improper for one human being to own another.  However, he 
supported the notion that slavery had a right to exist where the U.S. Constitution was 
silent, and allowed its existence originally (Basler 1858).  So, he did not have to 
compromise his personal beliefs when advancing a Republican Party platform that 
favored states’ rights to control “domestic institutions” such as slavery.  The 1860 
Republican platform further reaffirmed their philosophical roots, the right and duty of 
Congress to thwart the extension of slavery into territories procured from Mexico during 
the war, and opposition to reopening the slave trade under the flag of the United States of 
America (Woolley and Peters 1999-2011).   
Despite advancing an anti-slavery platform the Republican Party won the 1860 
election. Nonetheless, regional conflicts and mounting tensions over slavery ended in the 
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American Civil War, fought from 1861 to 1865 (Franklin and Moss 1988).  In the midst 
of the War Between the States, President Abraham Lincoln issued Executive Order: 
“Proclamation 93 – Declaring the Objective of the War Including Emancipation of Slaves 
in Rebellious States on January 1, 1863” on September 22, 1862.  According to Lincoln, 
this Order was rendered in accordance with constitutional powers of the President, 
Article II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution as duly noted:33  
And by virtue of the power and for the purpose aforesaid, I do order and 
declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated States and 
parts of States are, and henceforward shall be, free; and that the Executive 
Government of the United States, including the military and naval 
authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of said 
persons.  
Abraham Lincoln 
The Emancipation Proclamation 
September 22, 1862 
 
This strategic move by President Lincoln not only clarified the objective of quelling the 
confederate rebellion to preserve the Union, it also established slavery as an important 
goal connected to the war, provided a legal basis for manumission, and set the stage for 
future abolition of the institution of Slavery.  
 Now the fate of slaves was directly linked to salvation of the Union.  
Keenly aware of this, Frederick Douglass approached the administration to renew 
his call for the conscription of black troops into the Union Army.34  In January 
1863 Massachusetts Governor John Andrew was given authority to amass a 
                                                             
33.  Excerpt from Abraham Lincoln, The Emancipation Proclamation in Woolley 
and Peters. (September 22, 1862). 
 
34.  Douglass called for the use of “colored” troops to fight against the southern 
confederacy as early as 1861; however, they were not recruited until after Lincoln’s 
executive order, the Emancipation Proclamation, was issued.   
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contingency of black soldiers for the war effort.  Recruiting soldiers for service, 
Frederick Douglass enlisted two of his own sons to the Massachusetts 54th 
Regiment of Colored Troops. Later that year he met President Lincoln beginning 
“an unusual friendship” that gave Douglass direct access to the President of the 
United States.  In spite of unequal treatment of black soldiers versus white 
soldiers regarding pay, promotions, and punishment (often death or enslavement) 
when captured by the Confederates, Douglass urged African Americans to enlist.  
“Only through black participation in the war, he believed, could abolition and full 
citizenship for Negroes be established” (Connery 2005). Upon visiting the White 
House in July of 1863 Douglass shared his sentiments about the maltreatment of 
black troops fighting for the country.35 After this meeting the War Department 
drafted an “Order of Retaliation” General Orders No. 252 dated July 30, 1863 to 
which President Lincoln affixed his signature,36  and on which the imprint of 
Frederick Douglass is clearly seen. 
ORDER OF RETALIATION   
It is the duty of every government to give protection to its citizens, of 
whatever class, color, or condition, and especially to those who are duly 
organized as soldiers in the public service. The law of nations and the 
usages and customs of war as carried on by civilized powers, permit no 
distinction as to color in the treatment of prisoners of war as public 
enemies. To sell or enslave any captured person, on account of his color, 
and for no offence against the laws of war, is a relapse into barbarism and 
a crime against the civilization of the age. 
                                                             
35.  Douglass’ concern stems from the November 1862 capture of four black 
Union troops in South Carolina who were summarily executed as approved by 
Confederate Secretary of War James A. Seddon and President Jefferson Davis. 
 
36. The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Edited by Roy P. Basler, et al.  
(New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1953-55), 6:357. 
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The government of the United States will give the same protection to all 
its soldiers, and if the enemy shall sell or enslave anyone because of his 
color, the offense shall be punished by retaliation  upon the enemy's 
prisoners in our possession. 
 
It is therefore ordered that for every soldier of the United States killed in 
violation of the laws of war, a rebel soldier shall be executed; and for 
every one enslaved by the enemy or sold into slavery, a rebel soldier shall 
be placed at hard labor on the public  works and continued at such labor 
until the other shall be released and receive the treatment due to a prisoner 
of war. 
 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 
 
3.4 PERIOD OF RADICAL RECONSTRUCTION, 1863 – 1877 
Neither Slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for 
 crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist 
 within the United States… 
The Thirteenth Amendment  
Signed by Abraham Lincoln 
February 1, 1865 
 
The period of Radical Reconstruction is distinguished by conflicting policies 
about the proper resolution of emancipated citizens in the United States.  On the one 
hand, Radical Republicans, dominant in the U.S. Congress and sometimes critical of 
President Lincoln, advocated policies to abolish slavery; establish civil rights and 
liberties for emancipated citizens; and efforts to assist them in acclimating to life in a free 
society. Frederick Douglass, adviser to the President, favored these Radical Republican 
policies.  On the other hand, Southern Democrats preferred their pre-Civil War status 
quo.  Slavery was viewed as a mechanism for both controlling the “Negro” population, 
and maintaining order.  Once the bonds were removed many in the South believed that 
the states needed to enact legislation with the sole purpose of keeping blacks in check 
(Franklin and Moss 1988).  While Abolitionists supported the immediate manumission of 
slaves, others promoted either a gradual termination of the institution of Slavery, or its 
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continuation indefinitely.  These various positions led to conflicting policies during the 
period of Radical Reconstruction. 
Inasmuch as Lincoln’s Executive Order – Proclamation 93 ensured the 
emancipation of slaves in the rebellious states of the confederacy, provided the Union 
won the war, but it did not abolish the institution of Slavery in the United States.  Hence, 
some eight hundred thousand persons of color remained enslaved (Franklin and Moss 
1988).  Moreover, after the American Civil War ended President Lincoln faced a myriad 
of questions about the legal status of emancipated citizens, and “Negro” suffrage.  He 
hoped that once freed the former slave population would choose to leave the United 
States; however, their substantial presence, especially in the South, meant that he had to 
resolve the “Negro problem” (Franklin and Moss 1988).  Even though Lincoln’s 
administration and a number of benevolent societies provided relief services for fugitive 
slaves during the Civil War (DuBois 1901), after the war full emancipation came in the 
form of legislative and constitutional initiatives championed by the Radical Republicans.     
In 1865 the Thirteenth Amendment (13 Stat. 744-775) abolished slavery in the 
United States.  Following ratification of the Amendment, Congress created The Bureau of 
Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands (13 Stat. 507-509).  The Freedmen’s Bureau 
was tasked with the responsibility of helping Southern blacks and whites make the 
transition from a slave, to a free society.  Among other things, the Bureau was charged 
with providing temporary relief services such as food rations, health care, assistance with 
labor contracts, and educational opportunities for formal schooling.37  W.E.B. DuBois, 
great-grandson of Elizabeth Freeman (Mum Bett) and a spokesman for African 
                                                             
37. “Freedmen's Bureau Act (1865),” U.S. Congress, U.S. Statutes at Large, 38th 
Congress, Session II, chapter 90, (1865): 507-509. 
 Americans’ rights, wrote an historical account of the Bureau’s efforts to assist 
emancipated slaves for the Atlantic Monthly 
on major societal issues. In his assessment DuBois (1901) noted that the Freedmen’s 
Bureau was patterned after a Port Royal, South Carolina (sea island) experiment that was 
known for successfully turning slaves into free workingmen; however, in the Bureau’s 
case it was perhaps, destined for failure from the onset in view of the times.  Nonetheless, 
he credited the Bureau with some success in starting “the black peasant proprietor, and it 
secured the recognition of black freemen befor
success came in establishing 4,000 free public black schools in the South including Fisk 
University in Nashville, Tennessee and Hampton Institute in Hampton, Virginia
assistance of benevolent societies like the American Missionary Association and 
individuals primarily in the North
Americans were critical of the Freedmen’s Bureau, as reported in the following press 
article.     
The laborer on the plantations is, to a very great extent, in the clutches of 
his employer. If he goes to the Bureau's agent, he finds there an officer 
who rides with his employer, who dines with him and who drinks 
champagne with him. He is not likely to receive impartial justice at the 
hands of such a prejudiced officer. Most of the agents think their particular 
business is to furnish the planters with cheap 
cost the laborers on the plantations. They are in fact the planter's 
guards. It is therefore perfectly useles
the Freedmen's Bureau for relief. He knows in advance that the Bureau 
will send him back to his unjust or exacting employer. He will not be 
assisted to get his pay or to get redress but will be told to go back to his 
master and do his work.
                                                            
38. W. E. B. Du Bois, "The Freedmen's Bureau." 
354-365. Quote found on page 363.
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(1901), a Boston publication of commentary 
e courts of law.”38  The Bureau’s greatest 
.  Still, when local agents failed to deliver, African
hands and to retain at any 
s for the poor laborer to look at 
  
The New Orleans Tribune
October 31, 1866
 
Atlantic Monthly 87 (1901): 
 
, with the 
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On April 9, 1866, Congress passed a Civil Rights Act (14 Stat. 27-30), over 
President Andrew Johnson’s veto.  It was intended to protect citizens from Black Codes. 
The first such code passed in Mississippi in 1865 imposed restrictions on “all free men, 
freed Negroes and mulattos” from voting, sitting on juries, testifying against white men, 
carrying weapons in public places, and working in certain occupations.39  The 1866 Civil 
Rights Act stated that all persons born in the United States were citizens “without regard 
to race, color, or previous condition.”  Under the Act African Americans could:  
Make and enforce contracts, sue and be sued, give evidence in court, and 
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property. Persons 
who denied these rights to former slaves were guilty of a misdemeanor and upon 
conviction faced a fine not exceeding $1,000, or imprisonment not exceeding one 
year, or both. 
1866 Civil Rights Act 
14 Stat. 27-30 
 
Consequently, the Fourteenth Amendment of 1868 (14 Stat. 358-359) gave 
citizenship to “all persons born or naturalized in the United States.”  The Amendment 
further provided legal protections, and made applicable to the states provisions of the 
U.S. Constitution, Amendment 5 (1789), that prohibited the national government from 
depriving any person of “life, liberty, and property without due process of law.”  Further 
protection of citizens’ rights came in the form of the Fifteenth Amendment, 1870 (16 
Stat. 40-41), when all male citizens were thereby enfranchised without regard to “race, 
color, or previous condition of servitude.”  Correspondingly, the Civil Rights Act of 1875 
(18 Stat. 336), intended to strengthen the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibited denial to 
any person “the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities 
                                                             
39.  Laws of the State of Mississippi, Passed at a Regular Session of the 
Mississippi Legislature, held in Jackson, October, November and December, (1865): 82-
93; Jackson, (1866): 165-167. 
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and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theatres and other places of 
public amusement.”40  The Act adjudged unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
the 1883 Civil Rights Cases41 that addressed consolidated lawsuits filed on behalf of 
African Americans.  The Court ruled that Congress overstepped its authority in banning 
the practice of racial segregation by individual citizens; Congress had no power to 
regulate private rights.  
In addition, Radical Republican reconstruction policy required confederate states 
to create new constitutions that granted equal legal protections for black and white 
citizens alike.  African Americans’ responded to both passage of the Fifteenth 
Amendment, and these new southern reconstruction governments.  According to Eric 
Foner, “former slaves flocked to the ballot boxes and the more ambitious sought political 
office.  By 1877 about 2,000 black men had won local, state, and federal offices in the 
former Confederate states” (1993: xi).  Nevertheless, African American politicians were 
neither accorded substantive power within the Republican Party organization, nor 
executive control over any governments despite a majority population in several states of 
the former Confederacy.  Still the Fifteenth Amendment opened the way for seventeen 
African Americans, known as “the Symbolic Generation,” to serve in the U.S. Congress 
between 1870 and 1887 as shown in Table 3.1 that follows.42  
                                                             
40.  “Civil Rights Act” (1875) 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 
41.  Civil Rights Cases (109 U.S. 3; 3 S. Ct. 18; 27 L. Ed. 835) were consolidated 
to challenge the practice of racial segregation: United States v. Stanley, United States v. 
Ryan, United States v. Nichols, and United States v. Singleton. 
 
     42.  The symbolic generation of African Americans in the U.S. Congress, 1870–
1887, Accessed May 3, 2012 from: Black Americans in Congress. http://baic.house.gov. 
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Black congressional members experienced racial discrimination, a lack of 
political power to advance their legislative agenda, isolation from Republican Party 
leadership, and low-ranking committee assignments.  Often at odds with the South 
Carolina state Republican Party, Robert C. De Large, a wealthy resident from Charleston, 
was elected to the 42nd Congress (1871 – 1873).  De Large drew sharp criticism over 
remarks made in response to accusations of corruption levied against black South 
Carolina politicians by Democrat Samuel Cox of New York.  In his response De Large 
insisted that the only fault of the black politicians was trusting white Republicans. “While 
there may have been extravagance and corruption resulting from the placing of improper 
men in official positions, these evils have been brought about by the men identified with 
the race to which the gentleman from New York belongs, and not by our race.”43  De 
Large also raised speculations about advocating a partisan shift among African 
Americans because of his affiliation with Martin R. Delany, a member of the Democratic 
Party, and because of an 1870 campaign speech in which he stated, “I hold that my race 
has always been Republican for necessity only”44 (McCarthy 1999). 
                                                             
43.  Quoted in the Congressional Globe, 6 April 1871, Appendix, 42nd Cong., 1st 
session, A230–231. 
 
44 . Williamson, Joel. After Slavery: the Negro in South Carolina During 
Reconstruction, 1861–1877 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965, 359).  
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Table 3.1 The Symbolic Generation: African Americans in the U. S. Congress, 1870-1887 
MEMBER POSITION STATE TERM 
 
Blanche Kelso Bruce Senator Mississippi 1875-1881 
Richard Harvey Cain Representative South Carolina 1873-1875; 1877-1879 
Robert Carlos De Large Representative South Carolina 1871-1873 
Robert Brown Elliott Representative South Carolina 1871-1874 
Jeremiah Haralson Representative Alabama 1875-1877 
John Adams Hyman Representative North Carolina 1875-1877 
Jefferson Franklin Long Representative Georgia 1871-1871 
John Roy Lynch Representative Mississippi 1873-1877; 1882-1883 
Charles Edmund Nash Representative Louisiana 1875-1877 
James Edward O’Hara Representative North Carolina 1883-1885 
Joseph Hayne Rainey Representative South Carolina 1870-1879 
Alonzo Jacob Ransier Representative South Carolina 1873-1875 
James Thomas Rapier Representative Alabama 1873-1875 
Hiram Rhodes Revels Senator Mississippi 1870-1871 
Robert Smalls Representative South Carolina 1875-1879; 1882-1883; 
1884-1887 
 
Source:  Black Americans in Congress, Member Profiles. Accessed May 11, 2012.   
[http://baic.house.gov/member-profiles/profile.html?intID=34] 
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In the 1874 congressional election Democrats gained control of the U.S. House of 
Representatives. Their victory was possible partly because of a split in the Republican 
Party along racial lines between the Lily White, and the Black and Tan Republicans 
(Pohlmann 2008) regarding the “Negro” question.  The split gave rise to a new breed of 
Republicans in the late 1870s that were weary of the racial justice agenda of the radical 
element of the Party. This new breed of Republicans mostly represented the interests of 
northern industrialists who promoted national unity and economic progress (Silbey 
2002). Their emergence marked the beginning of the end for Radical Republicans as 
southern states were readmitted with full privileges of citizenship for all white citizens 
(Brisbane 1970).  State constitutions were promptly revised.  Throughout the South 
policies known as Jim Crow laws were enacted to strip African Americans of all civil and 
political rights.  
In 1876 Republican candidate, Rutherford B. Hayes faced Democratic candidate, 
Samuel J. Tilden, governors of Ohio and New York respectively, in one of the most 
controversial contests in American electoral history.  African Americans feared a win by 
Tilden would mean a reversal of their status, and the return of domestic slavery.  Once 
the votes were tallied, Governor Tilden had won the popular vote; however, the final 
decision left to the Electoral College resulted in neither candidate winning a majority, so 
the House of Representatives did not select the president in accordance with the U.S. 
Constitution (Article II, Section 1).  Conflict erupted between the Democrats and the 
Republicans and a compromise solution, perhaps corrupt, gave Governor Hayes the 
presidency (Pohlmann 2008; Franklin and Moss 1988; Brisbane 1970). Once inaugurated 
President Hayes promptly ended Reconstruction of the South, terminated military 
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occupation, and returned complete governmental control to the states, thereby fulfilling 
the 1876 Republican/Democratic compromise agreement (Franklin and Moss 1988).  
After this election the Radical Republicans’ domination of Congress ended and white 
supremacy resumed. 
3.5 PERIOD OF POST-RECONSTRUCTION, 1877 – 1936 
“There is no discrimination in the state’s requirements for voters to pass a 
literacy test and pay poll taxes, as these were applied to all voters.” 
Henry Williams v. State of Mississippi 
170 U.S. 213 (1898) 
 
The questionable compromise of the 1876 presidential election, settled in favor of 
Republican Rutherford B. Hayes appeared, at first glance, to be a win for African 
Americans as well.  Unfortunately, return of self-governance to the South proved to be 
most problematic.  Democrats in the South immediately addressed their focal “Negro” 
problem with illegal, extralegal and systemic methods that served “to nullify the political 
strength of Negroes or to disfranchise them altogether.” 45  Other tactics involved 
intimidation, violence, and acts of terrorism.  Post-Reconstruction unraveled the civil and 
political rights and liberties promised by Radical Republican initiatives, and relegated to 
the African-American population a status of second-class citizenship.  Regrettably, as 
Marcus D. Pohlmann (2008) contends, the U.S. Supreme Court played a substantial role 
in legitimizing a number of southern strategies intended to disenfranchise both black and 
poor white citizens.46   
                                                             
45.  Franklin, John Hope and Alfred A. Moss, Jr.  From Slavery to Freedom: A 
History of African Americans (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1988), 231. 
46.  The most notable cases included: the Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 
(1873); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 
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 Just prior to the end of the period of Radical Reconstruction, the Mississippi Plan 
(1875) legally recognized intimidation as a means to prevent African-American 
participation in the political process.  In addition, the State created a new constitution, 
thereby replacing the Reconstruction document that required full rights of citizenship to 
freed persons of color.  In so doing, Mississippi disenfranchised most African Americans 
and established its own legal basis for voter registrations, electoral requirements, 
participation in the political process, serving on juries, and running for political offices 
(Franklin and Moss 1988; Brisbane 1970).  Mississippi resident Henry Williams, an 
African American, brought suit in the case of Henry Williams v. State of Mississippi, 170 
U.S. 213 (1898) [cited above] to contest both the 1890 state constitution and state code of 
1892 in which passage of a literacy test served as the qualifying condition for voting.  
Williams contested on grounds that these state provisions violated his Fourteenth 
Amendment rights to equal protection of the law. The U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling 
upheld Mississippi’s use of the device; discrimination did not constitute grounds for 
invalidating provisions of the state law.  
Other southern states followed Mississippi’s lead by creating new constitutions 
and adopting similar strategies like the requirement of property qualifications for voting 
eligibility, Louisiana’s Grandfather Clause, the Poll Tax, the Literacy Test for voter 
registrations, and the White Primary system (Brisbane, 1970).  Each was developed with 
the express intent of disenfranchising African Americans. Southern states’ tactics to deny 
black political participation further hindered the election of African Americans to local, 
state, and federal offices.  Without federal intervention southern states rolled back the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
214 (1875); and, United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883). Accessed May 3, 2012. 
Black Americans in Congress, http://baic.house.gov/historical-essays/ 
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clock on African Americans’ civil rights accomplishments.  George W. Murray of South 
Carolina, a U.S. Congress Member from 1893–1895 and from 1896–1897, entreated 
legislators thusly: “I beg all true men to forget party and partisanship and right the great 
wrongs perpetuated upon humble and unoffending American citizens…I declare that no 
class of people has ever been more misrepresented, slandered, and traduced than the 
black people of the South.” 47  After 1901 African Americans were systematically 
eliminated from the United States Congress.     
With the onset of the Twentieth Century African Americans faced the problem of 
how to respond to discrimination, disenfranchisement, and disparity.  Some migrated 
from the South to the North some made the exodus to western states like Kansas and 
Nebraska. Still, others remained in the South.  Regardless of their location African 
Americans encountered racial oppression.  Moreover, controversy emerged in the form of 
three ideological perspectives of how to improve the livelihood of African Americans.  
These included Booker T. Washington’s economic self-reliance through industrial 
education, W.E.B. DuBois’ organized determination and aggressive action, and Marcus 
Garvey’s black nationalism. Although they differed in approach, each theory advanced 
the importance of African American racial group solidarity.  Booker T. Washington 
pushed for equality through academic and vocational education, as provided by his 
Tuskegee Institute in Tuskegee, Alabama.  While Washington espoused openly an 
accommodationist philosophy of racial separation with reconciliation as articulated in his 
Atlanta Compromise Speech of 1895,48 he also advocated surreptitiously racial equality 
                                                             
47.  Congressional Record, 5 October 1893 (House, 53rd Cong., 1st sess.): 2161. 
 
48.  Booker T. Washington, “Atlanta Exposition Speech” (18 September 1895). In  
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and integration by financing litigation challenging disenfranchisement and segregation.49   
Controversy erupted when other black leaders like Frederick Douglass and W.E.B. 
DuBois, suspicious of Washington’s motives, suggested the speech represented instead 
his terms to surrender on behalf of the Black race: political power, civil rights, and a 
higher “liberal arts” education for the race.  
 On the contrary, Jamaican-born Marcus Garvey believed that the U.S. white 
citizenry would never accept African Americans as equal socially. So, Garvey promoted 
a kinship with their ancestral homeland—Africa, and return of the African diaspora.  
Establishing the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), and hosting its first 
convention in 1920, Garvey urged blacks to go “back to Africa.”  With massive support 
within the black community for his separatist movement: 
 Garvey established the Black Star Steamship Line in 1919 to encourage 
trade among black communities in North America, the Caribbean, and 
Africa, and promote immigration to the West Indies, Central America, and 
Africa. Shares of the Black Star Line were sold to supporters, and three 
months after the company was incorporated, Garvey bought the first of 
three ships, which were to sail under the command of a black captain with 
an all-black crew. But the Black Star Line turned out to be a disastrous 
business venture and closed down in 1922. Although it did not accomplish 
any of its objectives, the steamship company was a potent symbol for the 
masses of dispossessed black men and women who had invested their 
money, hope, and pride in it. "Oh! ye of little faith. The Eternal has 
happened. The Negro incorporated a steamship enterprise by the name of 
the Black Star Line; he placed $500,000 of common stock on the market at 
$5 a share, and in ten weeks he sold so many shares to his own people that 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
African American Odyssey: Booker T. Washington Era. Accessed May 1, 2012. 
http://memory.loc.gov/) 
 
49.  August Meier, "Toward a Reinterpretation of Booker T. Washington." The 
Journal of Southern History 23, no. 2 (May 1957): 220–227. 
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he was able on the 31st of October to take over the first steamship ever 
owned by the race in modern times."50  
The Negro World 
December 6, 1919 
 
 On February 12, 1909 Mary White Ovington with Oswald Garrison Villard and 
William English Walling established the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP) to promote racial integration.51  W.E.B. Dubois was the only 
African American to serve on the NAACP Executive Committee when established in 
1910.  DuBois was named Director of Publications and Research with the primary 
responsibility of editor of the association’s Crisis magazine, and used his position to 
condemn lynching, promote racial integration, and demand equality and justice for 
African Americans.52  It is not surprising then that one of the first NAACP initiatives was 
to lobby Congress to pass anti-lynching legislation. The association also employed 
various strategies such as lobbying and protesting to pressure the polity on behalf of the 
racial group; to petition for equal rights for blacks in employment, and in the armed 
services; and to raise public awareness of the plight of African Americans.  Like Quock 
Walker, Mum Bett and other prior efforts to seek redress for wrongs against the race 
                                                             
  50.  Marcus Garvey, "Negroes of the World, The Eternal Has Happened." The 
Negro World, 6 December 1919 [editorial]. 
51.  Originally, Mary White Ovington named the organization The National 
Committee for the Advancement of the Negro People.  Amanda Wiesenhofer suggests 
that Ovington’s motivation was William English Walling’s coverage of the 1908 race riot 
in Springfield, Illinois, birthplace of Abraham Lincoln, the Great Emancipator.  Amanda 
Wiesenhofer, "Springfield Race Riot of 1908: Preserving a Memory," Constructing the 
Past 2 no. 1 (2001): Article 7. http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/constructing/vol2/iss1/7 
 
52.  Ida B. Wells-Barnett, an abolitionist and suffragist who helped develop a 
number of African American women and reform organizations, previously called for 
legislative reforms with her Southern Horrors: Lynch Law in All Its Phases (1892) and A 
Red Record (1895) of lynching statistics.   
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through the judiciary, the NAACP accessed the courts to test cases that infringed on the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.  A number of landmark Supreme Court cases 
resulted in NAACP victories.  They included Guinn v. United States 238 U.S. 347 (1915) 
in which the Court ruled the Oklahoma grandfather clause a constitutional violation of 
the Fifteenth Amendment; Buchanan v. Warley 245 U.S. 60 (1917) ruled local 
governments’ racial zoning unconstitutional; Moore v. Dempsey 261 U.S. 86 (1923) in 
which the Court considered that mob-dominated trials held in Arkansas violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 The Republican Party prevailed from the end of Reconstruction until the 
beginning of the New Deal coalition era of the 1930s when Democrat Franklin D. 
Roosevelt defeated Republican Herbert Hoover in 1932.  Notable exceptions during this 
period of Republican Party dominance were Republican President Theodore Roosevelt’s 
(1901–1909) “Square Deal” and Democratic President Woodrow Wilson’s (1913–1921) 
“New Freedom” administrations.  Roosevelt and Wilson were each distinguished, not as 
partisans but as Progressive reformers; they ushered in the political philosophy of 
American Liberalism or Progressivism.  They also used similar tactics by befriending and 
courting black voters during their election campaigns, and then by betraying their 
loyalties during their terms in office.  Neither Roosevelt nor Wilson offered genuine 
assurances to advance black livelihood like that provided their white counterparts.  
Instead, African Americans either lagged behind in, or were excluded from, improved 
economic situations, employment opportunities, housing conditions, and recreational 
facilities.     
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 Moreover, African Americans were also often in jeopardy of violence and 
victimized without the assurance of federal protection (Franklin and Moss 1988; Brisbane 
1970).  President Wilson required the re-segregation of federal facilities and the civil 
service after about fifty years of integration (Pohlmann 2008); segregation of the armed 
forces, which according to Wilson was for the safety and security of African Americans; 
and systematic exclusion of the African American population from the benefits and 
privileges of full citizenship (Franklin and Moss 1988; Brisbane 1970). Nonetheless, the 
28-year absence of African Americans from the United States Congress ended with the 
election of Oscar S. De Priest, a Republican from the state of Illinois, whose term 
spanned from 1929 to 1935 with the aid of Ida B. Wells-Barnett of Chicago.  His loss to 
Democrat Arthur Mitchell in the 1934 congressional election 53  reflected a “larger 
political trend occurring in Chicago and many other northern cities; African Americans 
were changing their allegiance from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party.” 
Serving from 1935 to 1943, Arthur Mitchell was the first African American Democrat 
elected to Congress.54   Succeeded by Democrat William L. Dawson (1943 – 1970), 
Chicago sent the third African American to Congress in the twentieth century. As 
Democrats, Mitchell and Dawson were considered heirs of the New Deal legacy.  
3.6 PERIOD OF THE NEW DEAL COALITION, 1936 – 1964 
Partisan realignment that began in the 1920s gained momentum during President 
Roosevelt’s 1936 reelection bid.  Notable shifts in political party identifications within 
the African-American community emerged as allegiance to the Republican Party of 
                                                             
53.  “Negro Opposes De Priest.” New York Times, 29 October 1934, 2. 
 
54.  Black Americans in Congress: Member Profiles. Republican Representative 
Oscar S. De Priest, and Democratic Representatives Arthur Mitchell and William 
Dawson. Accessed May 4, 2012. http://baic.house.gov/member-profiles. 
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Lincoln began to wane (Weiss 1983).  A number of factors contributed to these 
defections.  They included: Herbert Hoover’s failure to address substantive issues of 
importance to the race, 55  and to grant much needed federal emergency assistance; 
African-American perceptions of policy congruence with Roosevelt as a consequence of 
his first term in office; Roosevelt’s handling of relief efforts in response to the 
devastating economic crisis brought on by the stock market crash of 1929.  Additionally, 
the arrival of African Americans migrating from the South to Northern slums necessitated 
relief that was provided only since Roosevelt took office.  Finally, the emergence of a 
“new black electorate,” consisting of coming-of-age and first-time voters in 1936, joined 
the ranks of the Democratic coalition to support the reelection of President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt (Franklin and Moss 1988; Weiss 1983; Brisbane, 1970; Campbell, et al. 1960).  
However, not everyone was convinced that leaving the Republican Party for the 
Democratic Party was in the best interest of the race.  According to Nancy Weiss (1983) 
the first national survey documenting African American political party identifications 
reported that some citizens were still reluctant to embrace the Democratic Party in 1937.  
Moreover, 71 percent of the “Black elite” made up primarily of professionals, business 
and civic leaders still maintained attachments to the Republican Party.  
 Democratic dominance of the presidency prevailed during the New Deal era. 
African Americans increased their support for the Democratic Party and for the Roosevelt 
administration, mainly because they paid at least a modicum of attention to racial group 
                                                             
55.  In 1929 the NAACP, under the leadership of Walter White, successfully 
blocked President Herbert Hoover’s nomination of Judge John J. Parker to the U.S. 
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(February 2009). Accessed May 4, 2012.  
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concerns. New Deal programs provided African Americans the opportunity to escape 
their captured status within the Republican Party, even though Roosevelt sought to 
appease the southern wing of the Party by not pushing Congress to move forward with 
anti-lynching and other civil rights legislation (Frymer 1999).  Roosevelt also 
strategically encouraged black loyalty for the Democrats when he enlisted their advice 
and assistance in various departments of the federal bureaucracy.  According to Franklin 
and Moss (1988) Roosevelt’s “Black Cabinet” consisted of leaders within the community 
who were highly skilled and qualified for federal service.  These notable leaders 
included: Robert L. Vann, Special Assistant to the U.S. Attorney General; William H. 
Hastie, Assistant Solicitor, Department of the Interior; Robert C. Weaver, racial advisor, 
Department of the Interior; Eugene Kinckle Jones, advisor on Negro affairs, Department 
of Commerce; Mary McLeod Bethune, Director, Negro Affairs of the National Youth 
Administration; Edgar Brown, advisor on Negro affairs, Civilian Conservation Corps; 
Frank S. Horne who worked with federal housing programs; and, William J. Trent, Racial 
Relations Officer, Federal Works Agency. 56  In addition, a number of other African 
Americans served in various capacities within the federal bureaucracy.  This relationship 
allowed the administration to entertain issues of most importance to the race like housing, 
employment, trade skills and education, as well as relief assistance and benefits in 
exchange for African Americans’ loyal support at the polls.   
 While the NAACP, particularly its Legal Defense Fund (LDF), continued legal 
strategies to represent African Americans against injustices during the New Deal era, Asa 
Philip Randolph, labor organizer and president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car 
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Porters that he founded in 1925, proposed a new strategy to improve African Americans’ 
conditions, the March on Washington Movement. Randolph’s plan entailed a show of 
racial solidarity among African Americans, along with sympathetic whites, as they 
converged on the nation’s capitol to demand an end to racial discrimination in the armed 
forces and in civilian employment, to include the federal service.  However, this proposal 
was not well received by President Roosevelt, primarily because it would draw 
international attention to the plight of African Americans.57 Bowing to the pressure of a 
massive march on the District of Columbia, Roosevelt solicited a meeting with Randolph 
to address his demands.  In exchange for calling off the march, President Roosevelt 
issued Executive Order 8802 – Prohibition of Discrimination in the Defense Industry on 
June 25, 1941.  The Order stated, “…I do hereby reaffirm the policy of the United States 
that there shall be no discrimination in the employment of workers in defense industries 
or government because of race, creed, color, or national origin,” (Roosevelt 1941). The 
Order, in requiring the federal bureaucracy and all defense-related contracting agents to 
employ nondiscriminatory hiring practices, provided opportunities for employment 
within the federal service among African Americans, and a temporary Fair Employment 
Practices Committee (FEPC) to enforce the Order.58  
 African Americans persisted in their fight for full citizenship and the protection 
thereof.  In 1942 the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) was founded on the campus of 
                                                             
57.  The Roosevelt administration solicited support against Adolph Hitler’s ethnic 
cleansing and mistreatment of the Jews in Europe during WWII; publicity about 
discrimination against African Americans would dilute their cause and bring shame and 
embarrassment upon the United States.  
  
58.  The FEPC disbanded after the end of WWII during President Truman’s 
administration. 
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the University of Chicago by an interracial group of students.  Initially membership was 
mostly northern and white, but eventually became mostly African American.  Its 
inception marked the beginning of a mass movement for civil rights in the United States, 
and the organization spread throughout the country. Distinguished by their use of bold 
new strategies and methods, CORE pioneered non-violent civil disobedience to combat 
racism and to dismantle Jim Crow racial segregation, primarily in the South. They helped 
organize the 1956 Montgomery Bus boycott and the 1963 March on Washington; they 
orchestrated lunch counter sit-ins, served as Freedom Riders, and as Foot Soldiers 
bearing the brunt of violent opposition against firemen’s hoses, police officer’s Billy 
clubs and attack dogs; violence in response to CORE’s peaceful protests for justice and 
equality.59    
During the New Deal era the civil rights movement gained momentum with 
increased support from white liberals, and a realization among Democrats that they needed 
support from the African American electorate, who typically mobilized as a voting bloc, to 
win elections.  The 1940 Democratic Party Platform only alluded to support for African 
Americans (Frymer 1999). Nonetheless, on July 19, 1944 the national Democratic Party 
Platform included a plank addressing racial equality. “We believe that racial and religious 
minorities have the right to live, develop and vote equally with all citizens and share the 
rights that are guaranteed by our Constitution.  Congress should exert its full constitutional 
powers to protect those rights,” (Woolley and Peters 1999-2011).  Accordingly, the 1948 
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Democratic Party Platform spelled out the Party’s civil rights agenda and support of 
President Harry S. Truman’s efforts to promote equality for all citizens.60 
The Democratic Party is responsible for the great civil rights gains made 
in recent years in eliminating unfair and illegal discrimination based on 
race, creed or color…The Democratic Party commits itself to continuing 
its efforts to eradicate all racial, religious and economic 
discrimination…We again state our belief that racial and religious 
minorities must have the right to live, the right to work, the right to vote, 
the full and equal protection of the laws, on a basis of equality with all 
citizens as guaranteed by the Constitution…We highly commend 
President Harry S. Truman for his courageous stand on the issue of civil 
rights…We call upon the Congress to support our President in 
guaranteeing these basic and fundamental American Principles: (1) the 
right of full and equal political participation; (2) the right to equal 
opportunity of employment; (3) the right of security of person; (4) and the 
right of equal treatment in the service and defense of our nation. 
 
Democratic Party Platform 
July 12, 1948 
 
 At the 1948 Democratic National Convention held in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 
Hubert Humphrey [D, MN] spoke in favor of the Party’s civil rights plank, sparking 
controversy among southerners. 
Mr. Chairman, fellow Democrats, fellow Americans:  
I realize that in speaking in behalf of the minority report on civil rights as 
presented by Congressman De Miller of Wisconsin that I'm dealing with a 
charged issue -- with an issue which has been confused by emotionalism 
on all sides of the fence… Now let me say this at the outset that this 
proposal is made for no single region. Our proposal is made for no single 
class, for no single racial or religious group in mind. All of the regions of 
this country, all of the states have shared in our precious heritage of 
American freedom. All the states and all the regions have seen at least 
some of the infringements of that freedom -- all people -- get this -- all 
people, white and black, all groups, all racial groups have been the victims 
at time[s] in this nation of -- let me say -- vicious discrimination… Oh, 
yes, I know, other political parties may have talked more about civil 
rights, but the Democratic Party has surely done more about civil rights… 
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This convention must set out more specifically the direction in which our 
Party efforts are to go… My friends, to those who say that we are rushing 
this issue of civil rights, I say to them we are 172 years late. To those who 
say that this civil-rights program is an infringement on states’ rights, I say 
this: The time has arrived in America for the Democratic Party to get out 
of the shadow of states' rights and to walk forthrightly into the bright 
sunshine of human rights…My good friends, I ask my Party, I ask the 
Democratic Party, to march down the high road of progressive democracy. 
I ask this convention to say in unmistakable terms that we proudly hail, 
and we courageously support, our President and  
leader Harry Truman in his great fight for civil rights in America!61 
 
Herbert Humphrey 
July 14, 1948 
 
On July 26, 1948 President Truman issued Executive Orders 9980 and 9981.  
Executive Order 9980 - Regulations Governing Fair Employment Practices within the 
Federal Establishment - prohibited discrimination in employment practices on the basis 
of race, color, religion, or national origin in executive departments.  To enforce this 
order, Truman required each department to appoint a Fair Employment Officer to 
implement fair employment policies.  In addition, he ordered the U.S. Civil Service 
Commission to establish a Fair Employment Board, and provide administrative remedies 
for persons seeking relief because of discrimination arising from employment within the 
executive branch of the federal government.  Moreover, at the insistence of A. Philip 
Randolph, Truman signed Executive Order 9981 - Establishing the President's Committee 
on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services (Truman 1948).  The 
Order stated:  “It is hereby declared to be the policy of the President that there shall be 
equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard 
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to race, color, religion, or national origin.”62 Harry S. Truman became the first twentieth 
century president to effect legislation for black civil rights, even though he faced strong 
congressional opposition. With these actions a large percentage of African Americans 
shifted allegiance from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party.  In the 1948 
presidential election 77 percent of African American voters supported Truman; “a 
majority of Blacks reported that they thought of themselves as Democrats.”63    
So, when the Republicans won the 1952 election they had an opportunity to make 
good on twenty years of pledged commitment to remedy the plight of African Americans. 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, retired U.S. Army General and World War II hero, won the bid 
for the Republicans in their presidential election against Democrat Adlai Stevenson. 
When the Republican Party met for their 1952 national convention in Chicago, Illinois, 
they berated the Democrats for using prejudice based on class, race, and religion as 
grounds for their argument against discrimination, for non-enforcement of Federal 
legislation, and for not fulfilling campaign promises, especially after having held the 
executive for such an extensive period.  Denouncing Democrats as bigots, the 
Republicans vowed to make appointments to federal positions without regard to race, 
religion, or national origin.  They also pledged both federal action to abolish lynching, 
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poll taxes, and segregation in the District of Columbia, and federal legislation to enforce 
“just and equitable treatment in the area of discriminatory employment practices.”64  
President Eisenhower, who won 39 percent of the African American vote 
(Jackson 2008), executed a number of the 1952 Republican platform planks.  For 
instance, upon assuming the presidency, Eisenhower enforced Truman’s Executive Order 
9981, which desegregated the U.S. armed forces, (Pohlmann, 2008).  Beginning in 1953 
the District of Columbia had begun desegregating hospitals, hotels, movie theaters and 
other entertainment venues, recreational facilities, restaurants, and public schools.  
According to Franklin and Moss, the President hoped that Washington, D.C. would serve 
as a “model” for the nation.  In addition, high profile appointments of African Americans 
to federal positions included J. Ernest Wilkins, Assistant Secretary of Labor, E. Frederic 
Morrow, Administrative Assistant, Executive Office of the President, and Scovel 
Richardson, Chairman, United States Parole Board, as well as a number of staff 
appointments within the House of Representatives and the federal bureaucracy, and the 
appointment of Governor of the Virgin Islands.65   
Then again, when the landmark decision handed down by the Supreme Court in 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) held that segregated public 
school systems were an unconstitutional violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Eisenhower, while promising to obey the Court’s judgment, did not use his executive 
authority to enforce a policy of immediate desegregation.  Even after the Court’s ruling in 
Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) that desegregation should be implemented with “all 
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deliberate speed,” the President remained somewhat passive.  Nevertheless, in 1957 
Eisenhower federalized Arkansas National Guard troops and deployed additional U.S. 
Army soldiers66 to ensure the safety of the “Little Rock Nine” as they desegregated 
Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas (Pohlmann 2008).   
President Eisenhower signed Executive Order 10590 “Establishing the President's 
Committee on Government Employment Policy,” 67  on January 18, 1955. The Order 
replaced Truman’s Executive Order 9980 (1951) regarding fair employment practices in 
the federal service, as amended.  Then on January 26, 1955 Eisenhower’s cabinet was 
presented with a Report of the Attorney General on the Administration’s Efforts in the 
Field of Racial Discrimination.68  U.S. Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr. submitted 
this background report of the Eisenhower administration’s efforts to eliminate 
segregation and discrimination in education; transportation; the armed forces; hospitals; 
employment practices; facilities operated by or under the jurisdiction of the Department 
of the Interior; airport facilities; the District of Columbia; and, housing.  Subsequently, in 
                                                             
66.  In accordance with Executive Order 10730 – Providing Assistance for the 
Removal of an Obstruction of Justice within the State of Arkansas, signed by President 
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personal communiqués69 with the Reverend Billy Graham, Eisenhower mulled over the 
civil rights issue, as seen below in a portion of his March 22, 1956 letter:   
I have urgently been thinking about the matters we discussed in our 
conversation…I refer particularly to that part of our talk that dealt 
with…ministers…promoting both tolerance and progress in our race 
relations problems…they could discuss the mounting evidence toward 
elimination of racial difficulties, even all reasonable men appreciate that 
eventual and complete success will not be attained for some years…As I 
told you, my mind constantly turns to the ease with which effective steps 
might be taken in the adult as compared to the juvenile field.  Of course 
the kind of evidence that we should like to see pile up is the kind that 
would convince Federal District judges in the several localities that 
progress is real.  All of us realize, I think, that success through conciliation 
will be more lasting and stronger than could be attained through force and 
conflict. 
 
Eisenhower went on to suggest to Graham a gradual desegregation plan in which “a few 
well-qualified” African Americans could begin to run for local elected offices like school 
boards, city and county commissioners; and to seek entrance into public university 
graduate programs.   
 Despite the President’s expressions of concern to Reverend Graham about how to 
address the problems of American race relations, Eisenhower would not confer with 
African American leaders.  On June 4, 1957 E. Frederic Morrow, Administrative 
Assistant in the Executive Office of the President, sent a memorandum to L. Sherman 
Adams, Chief of Staff, at his request.  In this memo Morrow notes that African-American 
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leaders like A. Philip Randolph and Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. had come to the 
White House to see President Eisenhower; other leaders had sent requests, but all were 
denied.  Morrow detailed the impact of Eisenhower’s refusal, to talk to the Black leaders, 
on African-American citizens.  
I can state categorically that the rank and file of Negroes in the country 
feel that the President has deserted them in their current fight to achieve 
first-class citizenship via Civil Rights legislation, etc.  Despite the 
unprecedented record of this Administration in the field of human rights, 
Negroes are so emotionally involved in this struggle that they are unable 
to estimate what gains have been made…I can understand this feeling, and 
it is only because I am a staff member of the Administration and have 
been an eye witness to its efforts that I can look at these protests 
objectively rather than emotionally. There is tremendous unrest among the 
Negro population.  Tensions are great, emotions are at high pitch…I feel 
the time is ripe for the President to see two or three Negro leaders, and to 
let them get off their chests the things that seem to be giving them great 
concern.  I feel…the President seeing these men will have a great effect 
upon the morale, sentiments, and attitudes of Negro citizens.  Their 
present feeling is that their acknowledged leadership is being ignored, 
snubbed, and belittled by the President and his staff.   
 
…Even in the predominantly white audience in Minneapolis at the 
Republican Workshop three weeks ago, the questions from the floor were 
on the matter of the President’s refusal to see the Negro leaders and to 
assure them of his interest in their problem…70  
 
Morrow further recommended that President Eisenhower give audience to A. 
Philip Randolph, Martin L. King, Jr., and Roy Wilkins.  If agreed, Morrow would prepare 
these leaders on proper protocol for this meeting.  The proposed meeting with President 
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Eisenhower took place on June 23, 1958.71  In attendance were: Dr. Martin Luther King, 
Jr., President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC); A. Philip 
Randolph, International President, Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters; Roy Wilkins, 
President, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP); and, 
Lester B. Granger, Executive Secretary, National Urban League.  These leaders 
acknowledged that the 1957 Civil Rights Act (CRA) (Pub. L. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634) 
signed by Eisenhower was a positive step to protect voting rights, and the first such 
enactment since passage of the 1866 and 1875 Civil Rights legislation during the 
Reconstruction era (Pohlmann 2008).   
However, King, Randolph, Wilkins, and Granger wanted the President to actively 
enforce the 1957 CRA. They also made a number of civil rights recommendations to the 
President which included: convening of a White House Conference on compliance with 
the Court’s decision to end school segregation; requesting a Civil Rights law to 
strengthen the 1957 CRA and to extend the Civil Rights Commission beyond its 
expiration date; instructing the Department of Justice to actively protect citizens’ rights to 
register for the vote, and against acts of terrorism; and, executing a principle prohibiting 
use of federal aid to promote segregation in “education, hospitals, housing, or other 
                                                             
71.  Memorandum for the Record, Meeting of Negro Leaders with the President 
on June 23, 1958, Memo dated June 24, 1958 (66 pages).  
http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/civil_rights_eisenhower
_administration/1958_06_23_Meeting_of_Negro_Leaders  
 
 
 76
grants-in-aid to state and local governments.”72  Subsequently, Eisenhower signed the 
Civil Rights Act (Pub. L. 86-449) on May 6, 1960.  This legislation penalized 
obstructions to citizens’ rights to register and to vote; required preservation of registration 
and voting records; extended duration of the Civil Rights Commission; and, criminalized 
the use of explosives.73   
In spite of efforts toward gradual racial conciliation, African American 
perceptions of President Eisenhower and the Republican Party were that they did not 
offer immediate resolutions to eliminate terrorist activities and civil rights violations that 
they faced daily.  They clamored for: Justice and Equality NOW!  They could not wait 
any longer; they increasingly sought redress for wrongs against the race.  On the eve of 
the 1960s novelist and playwright, James Baldwin declared, “To be a Negro in this 
country and to be relatively conscious is to be in a rage all the time.”74  This is what 
President Eisenhower could not understand; he thought the anger of the African 
American population was aimed at him personally.  Upon meeting with King, Randolph, 
Wilkins, and Granger he learned that African Americans impatiently longed to cast off 
the shackles of second-class citizenship.  Henceforth, African Americans continued to 
press forward for full rights of citizenship, for justice and equality, and for redress of 
wrongs against the race.   
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Hereafter race was thrust into the forefront of national American politics.  During 
the presidential contest between Senator John F. Kennedy [D, MA] and Vice President 
Richard M. Nixon in 1960 the Democratic Party vowed to “seek to create an affirmative 
new atmosphere in which to deal with racial divisions and inequalities which threaten 
both the integrity of our democratic faith and the proposition on which our nation was 
founded—that all men are created equal.”  Democrats pledged to work for full 
employment of all citizens, especially those “over 40, minority groups, young people, and 
women.” To accomplish this, the Party would work to “remove artificial and arbitrary 
barriers to employment” as well as to other notable areas, such as housing, education, and 
transportation, in which blatant discrimination occurred.  In addition, the Democratic 
Party promised to establish a permanent Commission on Civil Rights, and to use 
executive orders, legislation, and legal actions from the Attorney General to terminate 
racial discrimination.  They further promised to: enforce the 1957 and 1960 Civil Rights 
laws signed by Eisenhower to secure voting rights; establish a Fair Employment Practices 
Commission; prohibit discrimination based on race, color, creed, or national origin in 
every state and locality; and, secure equal access to voting, housing, education, 
employment, and public facilities.75      
Similarly, the Republicans vowed to eliminate discrimination on the basis of race, 
color, creed, and national origin.  They held that: 
This nation was created to give expression, validity and purpose to our 
spiritual heritage—the supreme worth of the individual. In such a nation—
a nation dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal—racial 
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discrimination has no place. It can hardly be reconciled with a 
Constitution that guarantees equal protection under law to all persons. In a 
deeper sense, too, it is immoral and unjust. As to those matters within 
reach of political action and leadership, we pledge ourselves unreservedly 
to its eradication.76  
 
Republicans focused on the removal of injustices and the enforcement of legislation and 
Supreme Court rulings, and continued progress in advancing civil rights for all.  They 
further asserted that their platform did not consist of mere promises; instead, they vowed 
to resolve problem areas of a practical nature that could be accomplished realistically.  
These included voting, public schools, employment, housing, as well as public facilities 
and services.   
Despite Republican Party promises of progress, Kennedy defeated Nixon in the 
general election by a slim margin.  It was during this 1960 election that the Democratic 
Party began to grasp the importance of both African American support at the polls, and 
solidarity of the racial group in the electoral arena.  For instance, African Americans 
voted as a bloc; which was reported as the “black” vote.  In addition, the struggle for civil 
and economic rights tended to unite disparate elements of the civil rights movement.  
Regardless of class, gender, age or region, African Americans were determined to 
achieve the goals of the movement. Perhaps two key gestures may have played a 
significant role in the black swing vote for Kennedy rather than Nixon during the 1960 
general election.  First, when Dr. King was sentenced to four months of hard labor in the 
Georgia State Penitentiary at Reidsville, a pregnant Coretta Scott King appealed to both 
Vice President Richard Nixon, a proponent of the 1957 Civil Rights Act, and Senator 
John Kennedy, an opponent of the Act for any aid they could provide. Neither Nixon nor 
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Kennedy wanted to estrange Southern whites, and each was courting Northern blacks.  
Nixon was nonresponsive to her plea, while Kennedy, under advice, telephoned to offer 
his assistance.  At his request Kennedy’s brother, Robert F. Kennedy intervened and King 
was released.  It was this one gesture of concern that prompted African Americans to 
support the Democratic Party. Their expectation was that the Democrats/Kennedy would 
also support their cause for civil and economic rights.  Nixon garnered only 32 percent of 
the black vote in 1960 (Jackson 2008). 
Initially, President Kennedy and U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy seemed 
more receptive when African-American leaders broached the issue of civil rights; 
however, the President’s hesitation to take a stand on the issue early in his administration 
drew mixed perceptions.  Like Eisenhower, Kennedy was quite cautious about becoming 
an activist president, especially with regard to advancing a civil rights agenda.  On March 
6, 1961 President Kennedy issued Executive Order 10925 to establish the President’s 
Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity; a policy of nondiscrimination in 
government employment; and compliance responsibilities of government contractors and 
subcontractors, including labor unions and representatives of workers.  Most importantly 
the Order required sanctions and penalties for noncompliance. The Order also granted 
powers and stipulated duties of the President’s Committee on Equal Employment 
Opportunity as well as federal contracting agencies (Kennedy, 1961).  It was not until 
November 20, 1962, however, that Kennedy issued Executive Order 11063 to establish 
equal opportunity in housing.  The Order required executive bureaucratic involvement in 
the “provision, rehabilitation, or operation of housing and related facilities” to prevent 
discrimination because of race, color, creed, or national origin, and “to use their good 
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offices and to take other appropriate action permitted by law, including the institution of 
appropriate litigation, if required, to promote the abandonment of discriminatory 
practices with respect to residential property and related facilities heretofore provided 
with Federal financial assistance” (Kennedy, 1962).   
Consequently as the black civil rights movement continued to gain momentum, 
three events in the early 1960s played a pivotal role in forcing the President’s hand: the 
1960 Greensborough, North Carolina lunch counter sit-ins; the 1961 Freedom Rides 
organized by the Congress for Racial Equality; and the 1963 protests in Birmingham, 
Alabama (McAdam 1982). On June 11, 1963 President Kennedy finally took a position 
and delivered his now historic speech on civil rights, at the insistence of his Attorney 
General.  In his speech, Kennedy vowed to ask the U.S. Congress to enact “necessary 
measures…giving all Americans the right to be served in facilities which are open to the 
public--hotels, restaurants, theaters, retail stores, and similar establishments.”77  Most 
importantly, Kennedy broadened the issue of race to incorporate all Americans, and 
asked them to grant to African Americans the kind of equality and justice they enjoyed, 
and expected for themselves (Pohlmann 2008). 
My fellow Americans, this is a problem which faces us all--in every city 
of the North as well as the South. Today there are Negroes unemployed, 
two or three times as many compared to whites, inadequate in education, 
moving into the large cities, unable to find work, young people 
particularly out of work without hope, denied equal rights, denied the 
opportunity to eat at a restaurant or lunch counter or go to a movie theater, 
denied the right to a decent education, denied almost today the right to 
attend a State university even though qualified. It seems to me that these 
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are matters [that] concern us all, not merely Presidents or Congressmen or 
Governors, but every citizen of the United States.78 
 
President John F. Kennedy 
June 11, 1963 
 
 Subsequently, Kennedy sent a proposed Civil Rights Act79 to Congress in the summer of 
1963; however, he was assassinated before its passage.  On September 10, 1963, 
Kennedy issued his Executive Order 11118 – Providing Assistance for the Unlawful 
Obstruction of Justice in the State of Alabama.  Herein the President authorized the 
Secretary of Defense to utilize the armed services to enforce the laws of the United 
States, court orders regarding desegregation of public schools, and “to suppress unlawful 
assemblies, combinations, conspiracies, and domestic violence which oppose, obstruct, or 
hinder the execution of the law or impede the course of justice under the law within that 
State” (Kennedy 1963). 
As U.S. Attorney General, Robert Kennedy also exercised the authority of his 
office to address the problem of racial segregation and to protect demonstrators. In 1961 
Freedom Riders initiated a campaign to test compliance with the Supreme Court ruling in 
Sarah Keys v. Carolina Coach Company, 64 MCC 769 (1955) which banned segregated 
interstate travel by bus.80  Dr. King and the Reverend Ralph Abernathy, pastor of First 
Baptist Church in Montgomery, Alabama, supported the Freedom Riders who defied the 
                                                             
78.  President John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to the American 
People on Civil Rights, June 11, 1963. Ibid.  
 
79.  Portions of this proposal included legislative drafts prepared by Democratic 
Party Representative Adam Clayton Powell of New York.  Accessed May 3, 2012. Black 
Americans in Congress: http://www.baic.house.gov/  
 
80.  The NAACP initially tested this Supreme Court ruling in 1955 when Rosa 
Parks refused to surrender her seat in accordance with Jim Crow laws.  The test resulted 
in the Montgomery Bus Boycott of 1956. 
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Jim Crow segregated interstate transit system.  King, Abernathy, the 1500 member 
congregation of First Baptist Church, the Freedom Riders, and other civil rights 
demonstrators required protection from angry white mobs.  Kennedy was forced to send 
federal marshals and troops to quell the mobs on May 21, 1961.  Afterward, on May 29, 
1961, Robert Kennedy issued a petition for the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) 
to implement and enforce ICC rulings prohibiting Jim Crow in interstate travel.81  
On August 28, 1963 the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom was held. 
Organized by A. Philip Randolph and a coalition of six civil rights organizations, the 
event had a massive response with more than 200,000 in attendance. This civil rights 
coalition included: the Congress of Racial Equality (James Farmer), the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference (Martin Luther King, Jr.), the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee (John Lewis), A. Philip Randolph (Brotherhood of Sleeping Car 
Porters), the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (Roy Wilkins) 
and the National Urban League (Whitney Young, Jr.).  They demanded passage of a 
meaningful civil rights legislation, unlike the 1957 and 1960 laws enacted during the 
Eisenhower administration; the end of racial discrimination in public schools, and in 
public and private employment.  They further demanded a set hourly minimum wage, 
protection against police brutality for demonstrators, and self-governance for 
Washington, D.C.   
                                                             
81 .  Supreme Court cases and Interstate Commerce Commission rulings 
addressed desegregation of interstate travel and public facilities.  Sarah Keys v. Carolina 
Coach Company, 64 MCC 769 (1955) challenged segregated bus travel; NAACP v. St. 
Louis-Santa Fe Railway Company, 298 ICC 355 (1955) confronted segregated public 
transportation via railroads and train terminals; and, Boynton v. Virginia, 364 US 454 
(1960) banned segregated terminals, restaurants, and restrooms (See also: Marcus D. 
Pohlmann 2008). 
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While initially opposing the march, President Kennedy relented and voiced his 
support for the march when he realized that it would proceed over his objection.  A 
number of labor unions also supported the jobs march, but the Congress of Industrial 
Organization (CIO) was not in support, and white supremacist groups like the Ku Klux 
Klan opposed the march because it promoted racial equality.  Clearly, the March on 
Washington demonstrated massive support from various segments of American society 
regardless of race, class, gender or region for black civil rights, as well as a number of 
disparate African American associations. At the March John Lewis, much like W.E.B. 
Du Bois, warned African Americans against relying on either of the political parties to 
accomplish their goals. 
The revolution is at hand, and we must free ourselves of the chains  of 
political and economic slavery. The nonviolent revolution is saying, "We 
will not wait for the courts to act, for we have been  waiting hundreds of 
years. We will not wait for the President, nor the Justice Department, nor 
Congress, but we will take matters into our own hands, and create a great 
source of power, outside of any national structure that could and would 
assure us victory." For those who have said, "Be patient and wait!" we 
must say, "Patience is a dirty and nasty word." We cannot be patient, we 
do not want to be free gradually, we want our freedom, and we want it 
now. We cannot depend on any political party, for the Democrats and the 
Republicans have betrayed the basic principles of the Declaration of 
Independence.82 
John Lewis 
August 28, 1963 
 
Lewis summed up the sentiment of so many lifetimes of struggle; patience was no longer 
an option.  According to King “The hundreds of thousands who marched on Washington 
marched to level barriers.  They summed up everything in a word—NOW.  What is the 
content of NOW?  Everything, not some things, in the President’s civil rights bill is part 
                                                             
82. John Lewis, “Text of Speech to be delivered at Lincoln Memorial.”  August 
28, 1963. Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee Papers, Martin Luther King, Jr. 
Library and Archives. http://www.thekingcenter.org/king-library-archive. 
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of NOW.”83   Finally, Congress enacted substantive legislation to protect the rights of 
citizens in accordance with the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  On July 
2, 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act into law. 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
 
Throughout the course of U.S. history African Americans demonstrated, 
regardless of their economic class or social status—bound or free, men or women, a full 
awareness of their interconnectedness because of race.  This consciousness was further 
reinforced by perceptions of their interdependence of both fate and task. At each twist 
and turn on the road to justice and equality, and whenever racism raised its ugly head, 
African Americans rose to the challenge.  They persistently pressed forward to advance 
racial group interests in accordance with the American promise of democratic 
principles—life, liberty, and property, which they valued.  Their tenacity was seen in 
efforts to invoke the executive, legislative, and judicial departments of government to act 
on their behalf.  Likewise, they appealed to linkage institutions—the press, advocacy 
groups, and the political parties—to influence favorably public opinions and policies.  At 
times, when the establishment did not heed their cry for justice and equality, they 
launched their own platforms to advance the African American racial group agenda.  For 
instance, the Black Church, from its inception, was a consistent haven from which they 
advanced political discourse, and frontal attacks against oppression, subjugation, and 
discrimination.   
                                                             
83.  King, Martin L. “In a Word—Now,” New York Times Magazine, September 
29, 1963. 
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Although historically a majority of African Americans identified themselves as 
Democrats, this allegiance evolved over time because of their single-mindedness and 
firmness of purpose to remedy both the inequality of segregation, and injustices they 
incurred because of both political parties’ failures to adequately address African 
American racial group interests.  Often black partisanship signaled a racial group 
determination to participate within the polity, and their partisan identifications reflected a 
practical and rational decision to support “the lesser of two great evils.”  Still, from the 
onset African Americans sought recognition from the two main political parties, and to 
function within them.  Originally, African Americans identified with the Republican 
Party, a consequence of Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation.  However, this party 
affiliation began to diminish as Republicans failed to act upon the entitlements of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866, and to protect African Americans’ inalienable rights to life, 
liberty, and property in accordance with the United States Constitution.  While 
Republicans supported and implemented a number of devices to distance themselves 
from their “captured” African American constituents, Democrats schemed to lure them 
into Roosevelt’s New Deal coalition.  Subsequently, the Democratic Party emerged as the 
political party that not only discussed civil rights, the Party also enacted legislation in a 
feeble attempt to reverse some cruelties of racial inequality in the United States.  Even 
though Franklin Roosevelt failed to advance policies to protect against Southern horrors, 
like lynching, bureaucratic actions that included relief for the black population during 
Roosevelt’s administration proved detrimental to the Republican Party. This caused some 
African Americans to realign with the Democratic Party, which was especially apparent 
during the 1936 presidential election.  
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Over time, realignment of the African American electorate seemed to cause even 
the most reluctant Democrats to realize that the link between race and party garnered 
electoral victory.  Democrats at least considered requests and demands made by African 
American leaders, and provided at least a modicum of relief. With the emergence of the 
civil rights protest movement African Americans pushed for immediate legislation to 
grant them the basic democratic values to which all citizens were entitled, and the 
protections thereof.  As a result, because of bipartisan efforts, Congress passed and 
Democratic President Lyndon B. Johnson signed into law the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  
Among those members in Congress striving for substantive civil rights legislation was a 
new generation of African Americans that used their political clout to keep civil rights on 
the governmental agenda, and to support legislation that addressed issues of most 
importance to the African American racial group.  Most of these Congress Members 
served in an official capacity within their national party organization, received validation 
and support during their campaigns as Democrats, and were duly elected on the basis of 
their Democratic partisan associations.   
As the next chapter makes clear, African Americans’ support for the Democratic 
Party continued and became more intense during the historical periods covered from 
1965 to 2008.  The impact of major legislation like the 1965 Voting Rights Act also 
transformed voter registration and turnout within the African American community.  
Devotion to passage of major civil rights legislation as well as the extension of civil 
rights and implementation of voting rights policies, mainly under the Democratic Party 
label, added strength to a sense of linked fate weaved into African American racial group 
Democratic partisan identifications.  
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CHAPTER 4 
FROM PROLONGED PROTEST TO FULL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, 1964-2008 
The principal value of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the value above 
 all things, is the recognition finally—by the Congress of the 
 United States—that the Negro is a constitutional citizen… 
 
Roy Wilkins 
June 23, 1964 
 
Ever since passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act there has been considerable cohesion and 
solidarity among African Americans relative to partisanship. The mid-1960s culminated 
their realignment, from the Republican Party of Lincoln to the Democratic Party, a shift 
that began during the New Deal coalition era. This chapter continues the review, begun 
previously in Chapter 3, of tactics employed by African Americans to secure and enjoy 
basic democratic values, and the protections thereof.  Moreover, this chapter examines 
partisan policy outcomes, particularly issues that were of most importance to African, and 
other oppressed, Americans such as decent housing, civil and voting rights, equal 
employment and fair wages; and, how such policies ultimately established African 
American attachments to the Democratic Party.  Most importantly, the present chapter 
considers the force of race, or racial group influence, on individual political party 
identifications.  Here the significance of race, and the relationship between race, class, 
and gender are essential to understanding both the sense of attachment to, and the 
magnitude of African Americans’ relationship with, the Democratic 
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Party. Toward this endeavor two historical periods delineate African Americans’ passage 
from prolonged political protest to full political participation, Civil Rights: 1964–1980, 
and Post-Civil Rights: 1981–2008.   
4.1 BACKGROUND 
 By the 1960s the issue of race had gained national attention.  African Americans 
garnered that attention primarily by virtue of persistent peaceful opposition to racial 
oppression (civil disobedience) using conventional protest methods: marches, sit-ins, 
lobbying, petitions, and boycotts. Nonetheless, when they took to the streets they were 
often met with violent confrontation, like the 1963 encounter between Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr., the Freedom Riders, civil rights anti-segregation demonstrators, and Eugene 
“Bull” Connor, the Commissioner of Public Safety for the city of Birmingham, Alabama  
(McAdams 1982).  Oftentimes televised news reports captured events as they unfolded, 
and commentators styled peaceful protesters as victims.  Cameras showed police 
brutality, vicious attacks by police dogs or by powerful currents of water from fire hoses.  
Still, protesters offered no resistance against such cruelty as they were handcuffed; 
thrown into paddy wagons; and, hauled off to jail where the abuse continued.  Through 
this they gained the world’s attention.    
While imprisoned in Alabama Martin Luther King, Jr. penned his 1963 Letter 
from Birmingham Jail in which he stated his case for the use of civil disobedience thusly:  
Oppressed people cannot remain oppressed forever. The urge for freedom 
will eventually come. This is what has happened to the American Negro. 
Something within has reminded him of his birthright of freedom; 
something without has reminded him that he can gain it… Recognizing 
this vital urge that has engulfed the Negro community, one should readily 
understand public demonstrations. The Negro has many pent-up 
resentments and latent frustrations. He has to get them out. So let him 
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march sometime; let him have his prayer pilgrimages to the city hall; 
understand why he must have sit-ins and freedom rides. If his repressed 
emotions do not come out in these nonviolent ways, they will come out in 
ominous expressions of violence. This is not a threat; it is a fact of history. 
So I have not said to my people, "Get rid of your discontent." But I have 
tried to say that this normal and healthy discontent can be channeled 
through the creative outlet of nonviolent direct action. Now this approach 
is being dismissed as extremist… (82). 84 
Martin Luther King, Jr. 
City of Birmingham Jail  
Birmingham, Alabama 
 
The subsequent August 1963 March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom (Dowd Hall 
2005) demonstrated what King referred to as “the creative outlet of nonviolent direct 
action” to release “pent-up resentments and latent frustrations” (King 1963).   
The March on Washington was a massive political rally that provided a national 
platform for people from different social, economic, and ethnic backgrounds to 
demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the injustices of society, and the unmet promises of 
American democracy. In his “I Have a Dream” speech, Dr. King made a clarion call for 
equality for every oppressed segment of society.  This included inequality based on race, 
class, gender and religion regardless of region.  Protesters demanded reforms of 
governmental policies that helped to perpetuate racism, classism, and sexism.  In “The 
Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past” Jacquelyn Dowd Hall 
(2005) tells the story of how race, class, gender, and region were intricately tied together 
throughout the movement.  Most importantly she “emphasizes the gordian knot that ties 
race to class and civil rights to workers’ rights” (1239).  Women marched also bearing 
placards that demanded decent housing, equal rights, jobs for all, and decent pay, 
                                                             
84.  Martin Luther King, Jr. “The Negro Is Your Brother,” The Atlantic Monthly 
212, no. 2 (August 1963): 78-88. 
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“NOW!” According to Hall these women protesters were “…thus asserting both their 
racial solidarity and their identities as activists and workers and thereby as equals of 
men” (1252).    
By 1964 continued discontent with the status quo and unfulfilled demands for 
change were ultimately expressed through an unconventional method of violent civil 
disobedience: the urban race riot. A desperate reaction to repressive political, economic, 
and social conditions magnified by urban blight, severe poverty, racial discrimination, 
injustices, and unmet expectations of the promises of democracy erupted into full-fledged 
violence.  Not quite a year after King’s message from jail in the city of Birmingham, 
Alabama, inner city rioters also faced police violence and brutality.  Racially charged 
mob activity engendered criminal behavior, including physical and/or verbal attacks, 
pillaging, and destruction.  Tragically, inner city blacks assaulted a number of major U.S. 
urban centers like Harlem, Brooklyn, Rochester, New York; and, Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania, (summer, 1964); Los Angeles (Watts), California (summer, 1965); 
Chicago, Illinois (summer, 1966); Newark, New Jersey; Detroit, Michigan (summer, 
1967).  Accordingly, Doug McAdams (1982) purported that “the level of open defiance 
of the established economic and political order was as great during this period [1966-
1968] as during any other in this country’s history, save the Civil War” (182).85   
4.2 PERIOD OF CIVIL RIGHTS: 1964 - 1980 
 On July 2, 1964 President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the landmark Civil Rights 
Act (Public Law, 88-352), and followed with additional measures to eliminate many 
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forms of discrimination based on race, color, creed, sex, and national origin (Whalen and 
Whalen 1985).  Additional steps to strengthen civil rights came when the Twenty-Fourth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was ratified on January 23, 1964, which eliminated 
the poll tax.   One year after the Civil Rights Act (CRA) was signed into law, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was created (July 2, 1965) in accordance 
with provisions of the 1964 CRA.  The EEOC was charged with enforcing laws against 
workplace discrimination and investigating complaints of discriminatory treatment, filing 
suits of employment discrimination, and adjudicating cases brought by employees of 
federal agencies.86   
 With this momentous legislation Congress strengthened the Fourteenth 
Amendment, thereby recognizing African Americans’ constitutional right to full 
citizenship with the privileges, immunities, and protections thereof, as stated by Roy 
Wilkins (cited above) in his 1964 address to delegates to the 55th Annual Convention of 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (Whalen and Whalen 
1985).  During this period African American pioneers in Congress, namely Adam 
Clayton Powell, Jr. of New York, Charles C. Diggs, Jr. of Michigan, and Augustus 
Hawkins of California participated in the congressional civil rights debates, and helped 
shape fundamental laws like the Civil Rights Act of 1964. “For the first time, African 
Americans made substantive, not merely symbolic, gains within the institution.” 87  
Subsequently, in the November 1964 election in which the President faced Republican 
                                                             
86.  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Accessed May 11, 2012. 
http://www.eeoc.gov. 
 
87.  Keeping the Faith: African Americans Return to Congress, 1929 – 1970, 
Black Americans in Congress. Accessed May 11, 2012. http://baic.house.gov/historical-
essays  
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opponent Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona, Johnson garnered 94 percent of the 
African American vote (Jackson 2008) to win his first elected term as president.  
 Ever pressing forward, 600 demonstrators left Selma, Alabama on Sunday, March 
7, 1965 to protest voting discrimination throughout the state. However, the march quickly 
ceased when protesters confronted Alabama police on the Edmund Pettus Bridge. 
Televised broadcasts of police brutality and violence against peaceful participants in the 
Selma to Montgomery Voting Rights March shocked the American conscience (Baldwin 
2011).  About six months thereafter, President Johnson received from Congress an 
extension of Title I, the voting rights provision, of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which he 
signed into law.  The most comprehensive legislation since the Fifteenth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution, the 1965 Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973aa-6) 
outlawed voting discrimination and gave the U.S. Attorney General authority to bring suit 
on behalf of victims of voting discrimination.   
 Most importantly, the Voting Rights Act (VRA) “suspended literacy tests, 
authorized the appointment of federal voting examiners, and created federal machinery to 
supervise voter registration,” which led to an extraordinary increase in the number of 
African Americans elected to public offices (Fisher 2001: 1096).  In the Act, Congress 
granted broad sweeping powers to the federal government to combat the 
disenfranchisement of African Americans.  This was challenged in the case of South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) on grounds that the VRA violated the Fifth 
and Fifteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, and states’ rights.  Five southern 
states joined South Carolina in opposition to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and its 
prerequisite that changes to state voting laws required prescreening by the U.S. Attorney 
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General.  In an 8-1 decision the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the powers of Congress 
to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, which banned denial of the right to vote based on 
race (Fisher 2001).  Ever since passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act no Republican 
presidential candidate captured more than 15 percent of the African American vote 
(Apple, Jr. 1996). 
 “Yet race riots in Harlem (1964) and Watts (1965) reminded people of the sage 
insights of World War II activists: it was one thing to sit at the counter but another to be 
able to afford a meal. Racism had excluded black people from the accumulation of wealth 
and resources, a historical reality that could not be addressed by legal protection in the 
present” (Baldwin 2011: 7).  Concurrently, in his remarks at the White House Conference 
on Equal Employment Opportunities regarding the riots in south central Los Angeles 
(Watts), California that occurred five days following passage of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, President Johnson noted the overwhelming tie that bound race, class, and gender.88  
If there is one thing I think we have learned from the civil rights struggle, 
it is that the problem of bringing the Negro American into an equal role in 
our society is more complex, and is more urgent, and is much more critical 
than any of us have ever known. Who of you could have predicted 10 
years ago, that in this last, sweltering, August week thousands upon 
thousands of disenfranchised Negro men and women would suddenly take 
part in self government, and that thousands more in that same week would 
strike out in an unparalleled act of violence in this Nation? 
It is our duty - and it is our desire - to open our hearts to humanity's cry for 
help. It is our obligation to seek to understand what could lie beneath the 
flames that scarred that great city. So let us equip the poor and the 
oppressed - let us equip them for the long march to dignity and to 
wellbeing. But let us never confuse the need for decent work and fair 
treatment with an excuse to destroy and to uproot. 
                                                             
88.  Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the White House Conference on Equal 
Employment Opportunities," August 20, 1965. Accessed May 16, 2012. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=27170.  
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Yet beneath the discord we hear another theme. That theme speaks of a 
day when Americans of every color, and every creed, and every religion, 
and every region, and every sex can be trained for decent employment, can 
find it, can secure it, can have it preserved, and can support their families 
in an enriching and a rewarding environment....  
  
President Lyndon B. Johnson 
August 20, 1965 
 
 Subsequently, on September 24, 1965 Johnson issued Executive Order 11246 - 
Equal Employment Opportunity requiring nondiscrimination by federal contractors, 
unless otherwise exempted by the Secretary of Labor in accordance with said Order.  The 
Order further established the policy of Affirmative Action or positive steps to remove 
discrimination against individuals because of their race, color, creed, or national origin 
(Johnson, 1965).89  With this Executive Order Johnson proposed “a moral and policy 
response to the losses, both material and psychological, suffered by African Americans 
during and after the time of slavery” (Chace 2011, 1). Then, on June 13, 1967 the 
President nominated Thurgood Marshall to the U.S. Supreme Court, making him the first 
African American and civil rights advocate,90 to serve in that capacity (Pohlmann 2008).  
 Nevertheless, violent civil disobedience continued in American urban centers.  In 
response, Johnson established the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders on 
July 28, 1967 under the direction of Governor Otto Kerner of Illinois.  He authorized the 
Commission to investigate reasons for the urban violence, and to recommend steps to 
                                                             
89.  “Sex” was added to this list in 1967 with Johnson’s Executive Order 11375. 
 
90.  Justice Marshall served as Director-Counsel of the NAACP-Legal Defense 
Fund from 1940 to 1961.  He was a civil rights advocate who successfully argued cases 
before the U.S. Supreme Court. For example, in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), 
which gained African Americans the right to vote in a Democratic primary election, a 
Texas law was found in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. Accessed June 2, 2012.   
http://www.naacpldf.org/ 
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effectively remedy the situation. Also known as the Kerner Commission, studies of racial 
disorders to American cities showed that 164 civil disorders occurred during the first nine 
months of 1967, of which there were about 130 separate race riots during the ‘long hot’ 
summer of 1967, alone (Kerner Report 1967).  The Kerner Commission Report indicated 
that racial disorders to American cities reflected the profound frustrations and bitterness 
of living in the ghetto.91  In its basic conclusion the Report further indicated that: 
Our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white--separate 
and unequal.  Reaction to last summer's disorders has quickened the 
movement and deepened the division. Discrimination and segregation 
have long permeated much of American life; they now threaten the future 
of every American.  This deepening racial division is not inevitable. The 
movement apart can be reversed. Choice is still possible. Our principal 
task is to define that choice and to press for a national resolution.  To 
pursue our present course will involve the continuing polarization of the 
American community and, ultimately, the destruction of basic democratic 
values.  The alternative is not blind repression or capitulation to 
lawlessness. It is the realization of common opportunities for all within a 
single society.  This alternative will require a commitment to national 
action--compassionate, massive and sustained, backed by the resources of 
the most powerful and the richest nation on this earth. From every 
American it will require new attitudes, new understanding, and, above all, 
new will.  The vital needs of the nation must be met; hard choices must be 
made, and, if necessary, new taxes enacted.  Violence cannot build a better 
society. Disruption and disorder nourish repression, not justice. They 
strike at the freedom of every citizen. The community cannot--it will not--
-tolerate coercion and mob rule.  Violence and destruction must be ended--
in the streets of the ghetto and in the lives of people.  Segregation and 
poverty have created in the racial ghetto a destructive environment totally 
unknown to most white Americans.  What white Americans have never 
fully understood but what the Negro can never forget--is that white society 
is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institutions created it, white 
institutions maintain it, and white society condones it. 
 
                                                             
91.  In The Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders the 
term ghetto” refers to “an area within a city characterized by poverty and acute social 
disorganization, and inhabited by members of a racial or ethnic group under conditions of 
involuntary segregation (New York: Bantam Books, 1968). Accessed May 16, 2012. 
PrimaryDocuments.http://faculty.washington.edu/qtaylor/documents_us/Kerner%20Repo
rt.htm  
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It is time now to turn with all the purpose at our command to the major 
unfinished business of this nation. It is time to adopt strategies for action 
that will produce quick and visible progress. It is time to make good the 
promises of American democracy to all citizens-urban and rural, white and 
black, Spanish-surname, American Indian, and every minority group… 
 
 National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 
The Kerner Report (1967)   
 
Moreover, the Report found that economic, political, social, as well as psychological 
factors had devastating affects on black livelihood; the United States government had to 
remedy the state of African Americans for the sake of all Americans.  To a certain 
degree, the federal government had begun to address the repressive state of African 
Americans, and of other minorities that were similarly situated with passage of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act, the 1965 Voting Rights Act, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, Affirmative Action Policy, and Johnson’s Great Society “War on Poverty” 
programs, many of which resulted from the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (Public 
Law 88-452).92   
 Even though some attention was given to problems ailing the American society, 
Michael Harrington (1962) focused primarily on the impact of poverty on about 25 
percent of the United States population in The Other America: Poverty in the United 
States.93 Racial discrimination was quite prevalent, but poverty did not discriminate on 
                                                             
92.  Programs included: VISTA, the Job Corps, the Neighborhood Youth Corps, 
Head Start, Community Health Centers, Legal Services, Upward Bound and others.  
Hyman Bookbinder, Did the War on Poverty Fail? The New York Times, August 20, 
1989. Accessed June 4, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/1989/08/20/opinion/did-the-war-
on-poverty-fail.html?src=pm  
 
93 .  Reference is to Michael Harrington’s publication about the seemingly 
invisible poor in America. (Michael Harrington, The Other America: Poverty in the 
United States (New York: Touchstone; Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1962; 1997, 63). Dr.. 
Martin Luther King, Jr. also gave a speech about the plight of African Americans 
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the basis of race, color, national origin, gender, religion or creed. Nonetheless, poverty 
had a distinctive hold on African American livelihood, particularly those in the inner 
cities.  According to Michael Harrington “Negro poverty is unique in every way.  It 
grows out of a long American history, and it expresses itself in subculture that is built up 
on an interlocking base of economic and racial injustice.  It is in fact imposed from 
without, from white America.” This link between race and class in the 1960s, according 
to Davarian Baldwin (2011), “could not be severed, especially during a Vietnam War that 
sent largely poor people of color to its bloody front lines.”94  
 In the midst of heightened domestic chaos in American urban centers, Johnson 
made another effort to extend the 1964 CRA by signing the 1968 Civil Rights Act (82 
Stat. 73) into law on April 11, 1968.  Of particular note was Title VII, or the Fair Housing 
Act, which banned discrimination in the sale or rental of a dwelling because of race, 
color, creed, or national origin; prohibited advertisement of preference in the sale or 
rental of a dwelling; and promoted the enjoyment of fair housing rights. However, no 
federal enforcement provisions were given.  So, to strengthen Title VII, the 1968 Fair 
Housing Act, (82 Stat. 81) was enacted by Congress to prohibit discrimination based on 
“race, color, religion, or national origin in the sale or rental of most housing” (Fisher 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
entitled, The Other America.  The event, sponsored by the Grosse Pointe Human 
Relations Council, was held at Grosse Pointe High School in Grosse Pointe Farm, 
Michigan on March 14, 1968. Accessed June 2, 2012. 
http://www.gphistorical.org/mlk/mlkspeech/index.htm.  
 
94 .  Davarian L.  Baldwin, Africana Age: African & African Diasporan 
Transformations in the 20th Century (A project of the Schomberg-Mellon Humanities 
Summer Institute) (New York: Schomberg Center for Research in Black Culture, The 
New York Public Library, The Civil Rights Movement, 2011), 8. Accessed June 2, 2012. 
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2001) under the authority of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development for 
enforcement and compliance responsibilities. Unfortunately, Dr. King’s assassination 
preceded passage of the Fair Housing Act, and urban unrest continued.  Still, litigation 
ensued as civil rights advocates proceeded to push for enforcement of the 1968 Fair 
Housing Act;95 as well as the integration of public accommodations provided in the 1964 
Civil Rights Act, which were upheld in the Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 
U.S. 241 (1964), and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).    
 Nevertheless, massive political, economic, and social discontent resulting from 
escalating the war in Vietnam while reportedly de-escalating; racially related civil 
disorder and racial tensions; anti-war, students’, women’s, and civil rights protests; 
migrant workers’ demonstrations; and, broad-based multi-racial political coalitions of 
disgruntled and activist groups (and gangs)96 spelled the end.  After his first elected term 
as president, Johnson would not seek the Democratic Party nomination for the 1968 
presidential campaign. Despite such turmoil during his administration, Lyndon Johnson 
was the first president since the American Civil War to alleviate problems based on race, 
class, and gender.  His “Great Society” administrative agenda demonstrated a 
commitment to address both questions and issues of particular importance to African 
Americans. Johnson’s principal aim was to transform American society by integrating 
racial and ethnic minorities, the poor, and other citizens traditionally confined to the 
                                                             
95.  Rights of minorities cannot be delegated to voters for approval, Hunter v. 
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); “Private social clubs” may not prohibit white owners 
from leasing homes to African Americans, Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 
(1969); Segregation in public housing projects prohibited, Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 
284 (1976). 
 
96.  Reference is to the original “Rainbow Coalition.” Amy Sonnie and James 
Tracy, Hillbilly Nationalists, Urban Race Rebels and Black Power: Community 
Organizing in Radical Times (Melville House Publishing, 2011).  
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periphery of U.S. society.  His efforts resulted in increased expenditures of federal 
monies to improve housing, healthcare, early childcare education, libraries, hospitals, 
sanitation, transportation services, recreational facilities, and the general welfare of all 
such citizens.  Subsequently, the issue of black civil rights subsided and black insurgency 
declined (McAdams 1982).  Neither party’s platform offered a civil rights plank in 1968, 
even though they each mentioned continued efforts to promote equality and to prohibit 
discrimination. Many conservative Republicans and white southern Democrats who 
opposed major civil rights legislation had grown weary of Johnson’s ‘governmental 
schemes’ to promote equality of outcome, rather than equality of opportunity.   
 This helped the Republican Party regain control of the presidency with Richard 
M. Nixon’s 1968 victory over vice President Hubert Humphrey (and Governor George 
Wallace of Alabama), and his 1972 victory over Senator George McGovern of South 
Dakota. Like his Republican predecessor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Nixon’s domestic 
policy agenda, New Federalism, sent mixed signals regarding black civil rights.  His was 
a balancing act in which he furthered equal opportunities for African Americans, in 
accordance with Johnson’s vision, in his “Philadelphia Plan.” He also requested the U.S. 
Supreme Court to delay school desegregation, even though he ultimately did more to 
desegregate public schools in the South than any predecessor since the 1954 Brown v. 
Board of Education ruling.  Furthermore, he seemed bent on appeasing the South while 
placating African Americans. Nonetheless, Nixon’s domestic programs came at a time 
when racially related civil disorders in American urban centers were on the decline.         
 Nixon’s efforts to alleviate discriminatory practices came in the form of his move 
to advance black enterprise through Executive Order 11458 – Prescribing Arrangements 
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for Developing and Coordinating a National Program for Minority Business Enterprise 
(March 5, 1969).  The Order called for use of the Small Business Development Center 
model to establish Minority Business Development Centers (Nixon 1969).  In addition, 
on October 13, 1971, Nixon issued Executive Order 11625 – Prescribing Additional 
Arrangements for Developing and Coordinating a National Program for Minority 
Business Enterprise.  He required the Secretary of Commerce, and federal departments 
and agencies, to provide the opportunity for socially and economically disadvantaged 
persons to own and operate a business enterprise.  Furthermore, Nixon’s order of 
participation in the Minority Business Enterprise federal contracting program was 
intended for, but not limited to, “Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Spanish-speaking Americans, 
American Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts” (Nixon 1971).   
Moreover, after completing a comprehensive assessment of employment and 
union membership rates of nonwhite workforces within certain cities during Nixon’s 
administration, the Department of Labor found evidence of blatant discrimination within 
the industrial and craft unions.  This review paved the way for the controversial 
Philadelphia Plan [Order].  First applied to workers in the City of Philadelphia, the Plan 
was extended to other cities in which similar discriminatory practices were obvious.  
According to Paul Marcus (1970) the purpose of the Plan was to extend Johnson’s 1965 
Executive Order 11246 which prohibited employment discrimination.  The Philadelphia 
Order also included a policy of affirmative action and required compliance 
responsibilities in adherence to goals and timetables reported on all personnel actions: 
recruitment, selections, promotions, demotions, discipline, reductions, terminations, 
training and development for each covered class—race, color, creed, sex, national origin.  
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Concurrently, on August 8, 1969, Nixon signed Executive Order 11478 – Equal 
Employment Opportunity in the Federal Government, to prohibit workplace 
discrimination based on race, color, creed, sex, national origin, handicap, or age.  The 
Order further promoted equal employment opportunity through a “continuing affirmative 
action program in each executive department and agency.”  This affirmative action policy 
was applied to, and required to be, “an integral part of every aspect of personnel policy 
and practice in the employment, development, advancement, and treatment of civilian 
employees of the Federal Government” (Nixon 1969). Henceforth, affirmative action 
meant civil rights (Hoff 2009).  Yet, African Americans continued their support for the 
Democrats. 
When race emerged to the forefront of American politics during the 1960s its 
effects produced enduring changes in the partisan alignment of identifications (Carmines 
and Stimson 1989). The most noticeable shifts to the Republican Party among population 
groups within the electorate were whites, Southerners, self designated conservatives, and 
both younger and older cohorts (Norpoth 1987; Petrocik 1987; Black and Black 1989; 
Gurin, Hatchett and Jackson 1989).  Social status group factors, especially differences in 
educational background, were also prominent forces in explaining increased Republican 
Party preferences among white citizens during the period spanning the 1960s (Miller 
1992).   On the other hand, despite bipartisan support required for passage of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and Nixon’s affirmative action plan, since the mid-1960s African 
Americans identified overwhelmingly with the Democratic Party (Stanley and Niemi 
1991).  
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4.3 FROM CIVIL RIGHTS LEADERS TO CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATORS 
Primarily because of favorable governmental action (McAdams 1982), African 
Americans became increasingly attached to the Democratic Party.  Civil rights legislation 
opened access to electoral office, which African Americans realized predominately 
through their association with the Democrats.  With the elections of Chicago 
representatives Oscar De Priest (1929-1935), a Republican, and his successors, 
Democrats Arthur Mitchell (1935-1943) and William Dawson (1943-1970), African 
Americans returned to Congress.  They did not see themselves as civil rights leaders; they 
saw themselves as legislators (Singh 1998: 51).  Members of the House of 
Representatives included: Charles Diggs of Detroit (1955-1980), John Conyers, Jr., of 
Detroit (1965-Present), Louis Stokes of Cleveland (1969-1999), William L. Clay, Sr., of 
St. Louis (1969-2001), Shirley Chisholm of Brooklyn, the first African American woman 
elected to Congress (1969-1983), George W. Collins of Chicago (1970-1972) who, after 
his untimely death, was succeeded by his wife Cardiss Collins (1973-1997), the first 
African American widow to succeed her husband in Congress, and Yvonne Brathwaite 
Burke of California (1973-1979), the first woman to apply for, and receive maternity 
leave while serving in Congress.  Edward W. Brooke, III was elected to the U.S. Senate 
in 1966 (1967-1979).  His election ended an eighty-five year absence of African 
American Senators.97 With the exception of Representative Oscar De Priest of Illinois 
and Senator Edward Brooke of Massachusetts, these newly elected Members of Congress 
were all Democrats.  
                                                             
97.  The two previous black Senators, Hiram Revels and Blanche K. Bruce (both 
of Mississippi), were elected by state legislatures. John H. Fenton, “Brooke, A Negro, 
Wins Senate Seat,” New York Times, November 9, 1966: 1. Accessed May 11, 2012. 
http://baic.house.gov/member-profiles 
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This new generation of legislators demonstrated their intent to participate fully in 
the business of Congress.  In 1971 thirteen Members of the House of Representatives, 
shown in Table 4.1 below, founded the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC). “The central 
function of caucuses is to bring together legislators with shared interests, backgrounds, 
and policy goals” (Singh 1998: 58).  According to Robert Singh formation of the CBC, as 
well as other caucuses in Congress, served to provide internal cohesion while employing 
a strategy of “strength in numbers” to advance their legislative agenda.  The CBC 
confined to African Americans has been under attack for not opening its membership.  
The issue of maintaining this race-based congressional caucus emerged when white 
Fortney (Pete) Stark, representing a substantial African American district, asked to join 
the CBC in 1975. Then Chair Charles Rangel rendered the decision as follows, “The 
caucus symbolizes black political development in this country.  We feel that maintaining 
this symbolism is critical at this juncture in our development” (Houston 1975: B18).  
Still, the question of having racial caucuses continued. Some Republicans viewed the 
Democratic African American and Hispanic caucuses as promoting racial divisions, and 
therefore inconsistent with promoting policies to achieve a “colorblind” society. 98  
                                                             
 
98.  Most recently Representative Tom Tancredo[R, CO] challenged the existence 
of the Democratic CBC and Congressional Hispanic Caucus, even though the 
Republicans have similar counterparts.   
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Table 4.1 Founding Members of the Congressional Black Caucus 
 
 
MEMBER POSITION STATE TERM 
 
Shirley A. Chisholm Representative New York 1969-1983 
William Lacy (Bill) Clay, Sr. Representative Missouri 1969-2001 
George Washington Collins Representative Illinois 1970-1972 
John Conyers, Jr. Representative Michigan 1965-Present 
Ronald V. Dellums Representative California 1971-1998 
Charles Coles Diggs, Jr. Representative Michigan 1955-1980 
Walter Edward Fauntroy Delegate District of 
Columbia 
1971-1991 
Augustus Freeman (Gus) Hawkins Representative California 1963-1991 
Ralph Harold Metcalfe Representative Illinois 1971-1978 
Parren James Mitchell Representative Maryland 1971-1987 
Robert Nelson Cornelius Nix, Sr. Representative Pennsylvania 1958-1979 
Charles B. Rangel Representative New York 1971-Present 
Louis Stokes Representative Ohio 1969-1999 
 
Source:  Black Americans in Congress, Member Profiles. Retrieved 7 June 2012.          
[http://baic.house.gov/member-profiles/profile.html?intID=34] 
 
4.2 POST-1970: TRANSITION FROM PROTEST TO POLITICS 
Protests that reached a feverish pitch in the mid- to late-1960s began to subside in 
the early 1970s (McAdams 1982) as African American legislators took up the cause for 
justice and equality in Congress while civil rights advocates, especially the NAACP-
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Legal Defense Fund, continued to focus their challenges within the courts.  Likewise, 
African American political participation became noticeable as they began serving in an 
official capacity within Democratic Party conventions, and within national, state, and 
local party organizations. They obtained appointments to various political positions; and, 
they campaigned for elected offices at every level of government. These were 
opportunities and political clout available to them only since their association with the 
Democratic Party.  In 1970 there were 1,469 African American elected officials.  These 
consisted of 10 Federal; 169 State; 92 County; 623 Municipal; 213 Judicial/Law 
Enforcement; and, 362 Education elected officeholders. The number of African 
Americans elected to public office increased steadily; in 1975 there were 3,503 black 
elected officials (Fisher, 2001, 1094). 
By 1976 the Republican Party platform called for “vigorous enforcement of laws 
to assure equal treatment in job recruitment, hiring, promotion, pay, credit, mortgage 
access and housing.” This, they asserted, could be accomplished without the use of 
quotas. Instead, the Republicans offered to “provide alternative means of assisting the 
victims of past discrimination to realize their full worth as American citizens. Wiping out 
past discrimination requires continued emphasis on providing educational opportunities 
for minority citizens, increasing direct and guaranteed loans to minority business 
enterprises, and affording qualified minority persons equal opportunities for government 
positions at all levels.”99 This aided the continued shift to the right among conservatives 
and white southerners who increasingly identified with the Republican Party, and rejected 
concentrated efforts to enforce equality based on the use of governmental schemes, such 
                                                             
99.  Excerpt taken from the “1976 Republican Party Platform,” in Woolley and 
Peters, 1999-2011. Accessed May 11, 2012. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/. 
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as affirmative action, preferential treatment, and quotas; however, what the Republicans 
failed to recall was that Richard Nixon ordered these set-asides.  
Even though the Democratic Party platform was devoid of a civil rights plank, 
Governor Jimmy Carter of Alabama won the 1976 presidential election with more than 
90 percent support from African American voters.  Carter initiated some gestures to 
retain this African American base.  He appointed Patricia Harris as Secretary of Housing 
and Urban Development, and Andrew Young as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.  
Carter also appointed African Americans to a number of ambassadorships, and to 
undersecretary and assistant secretary positions within the federal bureaucracy (Franklin 
& Moss, 1988). Unlike Eisenhower, Carter maintained an open door policy with respect 
to the African American community, and leaders.  On August 8, 1980 President Carter 
issued Executive Order 12232 – Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs).  
He ordered steps for increased participation of HBCUs in the federally sponsored 
programs (Carter 1980).   Yet, despite such efforts, African-American perceptions held 
that the President had not done enough to address issues of particular interest to them.   
They called for the Carter administration to provide more attention to, and appropriations 
for, day-to-day concerns like housing, relief and assistance for the poor, the employed 
and unemployed, and for the disparate impact of federal policies on persons of color. 
One major concern within the community was the economic state of African 
Americans.  For instance, they were less likely to narrow the extensive income gap 
between themselves and White Americans.  In his “Economic Perspectives” column on 
“Income in the Black Community,” a report for Black Enterprise, Andrew Brimmer 
(1978) cited a number of indicators explaining the black-white income gap based on 1976 
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– 1978 income data from the U.S. Census Bureau.  The first indicator showed that 
“blacks’ actual income was about 61.2 percent of the level that would have been recorded 
if they shared fully and proportionately in the nation’s economy” (62).  Furthermore, 
there was a disproportionate median income level between blacks and whites.  “The 
median income of the 7.8 million black households was $7,902, and for whites it was 
$13,289…the median income of black households was 59.9 percent of that for units 
headed by whites” (62).  Brimmer attributed this income gap to restrictions placed on 
African Americans that denied them access (education, occupation, training) and, hence, 
the ability to acquire marketable skills.  
 Moreover, African Americans perceived their economic disadvantages as 
vestiges of past discrimination and deprivation.  Inequities in the distribution of wealth 
based on household economy further provoked unequal black-white employment patterns 
and unemployment rates during the Carter administration.  Likewise, the U.S. economy 
was sluggish in the 1970s, and this allowed for perceptions of historical hardships as a 
primary contributing factor explaining the lack of progress in narrowing black-white 
income gaps (Brimmer 1978).  According to Franklin and Moss (1988), “so many black 
families within the decade of the 1970s were unemployed and on welfare that it was quite 
likely that the nation would spawn an entire generation of blacks who had simply never 
worked to support themselves.  The implications of such a possibility were almost too 
frightening to contemplate.”100  
Still, the number of middle class and affluent African Americans increased 
noticeably giving way to what William J. Wilson (1980) viewed as a widening economic 
gap within the African American community.  Years of discrimination and oppression 
                                                             
100.  Franklin and Moss 1988, 468. 
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had produced a large underclass that could neither keep up with, nor compete in, an 
increasingly technologically advanced society.  Gurin, Hatchett and Jackson (1989) also 
noted that the civil rights period produced a larger middle class, but found that a much 
larger under-class also emerged.  In addition, this period paved the way for speculations 
about how the income gap among middle- and under-class African Americans would 
affect racial group solidarity, and about how the significance of race would decline 
perhaps as class became more important in shaping black life prospects.  This was the 
condition of Black America as delegates gathered for the national Republican and 
Democratic conventions of 1980.  The Republican Platform response held: 
Our fundamental answer to the economic problems of black Americans is 
the same answer we make to all Americans—full employment without 
inflation through economic growth. First and foremost, we are committed 
to a policy of economic expansion through tax-rate reductions, spending 
restraint, regulatory reform, and other incentives…During the next four 
years we are committed to policies that will: Encourage local governments 
to designate specific enterprise zones within depressed areas that will 
promote new jobs, new and expanded businesses, and new economic 
vitality; Open new opportunities for black men and women to begin small 
businesses of their own by, among other steps, removing excessive 
regulations, disincentives for venture capital, and other barriers erected by 
the government; Bring strong, effective enforcement of federal civil rights 
statutes, especially those dealing with threats to physical safety and 
security which have recently been increasing… 101 
 
The Republican Party Platform of 1980 
July 15, 1980 
 
Similarly, the 1980 Democratic Party platform pledged to ensure justice and equality 
under the law for all citizens; and advanced an extensive civil rights plank in which they 
vowed to address the “economic inequities facing minorities.” The Party further 
expressed support for a national holiday to commemorate the birthday of slain civil rights 
                                                             
101.  Excerpt from “The 1980 Republican Party Platform,” in Woolley and Peters 
1999-2011. Accessed May 11, 2012. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/. 
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leader, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. (MLK).102 Even so, Jimmy Carter lost his reelection 
bid for the presidency; this was primarily a consequence of the national economy.  
Nonetheless, he still garnered over 90 percent support from African American voters 
(Franklin and Moss, 1988).  His Republican opponent, Governor Ronald Reagan of 
California, won the 1980 election and was soundly reelected in his 1984 campaign 
against Carter’s former vice president Democrat Walter Mondale.   
4.3 POST-CIVIL RIGHTS, 1981 – 2008 
Ronald Reagan, a pronounced conservative, opposed major civil rights legislation, 
especially the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act because he saw 
these enactments as an encroachment on states’ rights, a doctrine he fully supported.103  
Reagan also opposed the MLK national holiday, even though he signed the legislation 
once presented to him by the U.S. Congress.  Moreover, Reagan supported tax exemption 
status for Bob Jones University in South Carolina, and other private schools openly 
practicing racial segregation.  He revoked Carter’s Executive Order 12232 that called for 
increased participation of Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) in 
federally sponsored programs.  With his Executive Order 12320 – Historically Black 
Colleges and Universities (September 15, 1981), Reagan instead ordered the Secretary of 
Education to develop federal plans to assist HBCUs.  The Order also required the 
                                                             
 
102.  Taken from “The 1980 Democratic Party Platform,” Ibid.  
  
103.  Governor Reagan’s campaign began with a speech delivered at the Neshoba 
County Fair.  Prior to Reagan’s appearance, the Mississippi County was most noted for 
the 1964 lynching of three civil rights workers: James Chaney, Andrew Goodman, and 
Michael Schwerner. Reagan used this platform to make his declaration, “I believe in 
states’ rights.” This was a code appealing to many southern white voters (Bob Herbert. 
“Righting Reagan’s Wrongs?” The New York Times, 13 November 2007. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/13/opinion/13herbert.html.)  
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Secretary to encourage private sector institutions to strengthen and improve HBCUs 
management, financial structure and research, rather than the federal bureaucracy 
(Reagan, 1981).  Additionally, apart from his appointment of Samuel R. Pierce, Jr. to a 
Cabinet post, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Reagan primarily 
held to naming African Americans to traditional federal appointments.  For instance, 
HUD had become a standard “black” position since Robert C. Weaver was first chosen 
by President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1966, and Patricia R. Harris was later selected by 
President Jimmy Carter in 1977 (Franklin & Moss, 1988).  Intent on pressing his agenda, 
African American Reagan appointees were held to a minimum perhaps because Reagan 
was determined to fill his ‘New Federalism’ administration with persons that espoused 
his brand of conservative philosophy.  
Reagan’s presidential platform agenda demonstrated that he was just so out of 
touch with the African American citizenry.  During his first term, Reagan established an 
administration whose policies were perceived to threaten the legal and socio-economic 
gains made by African Americans during the civil rights era (Gurin, Hatchett and Jackson 
1989).  In Michael Dawson’s (1994) perception “having consistently bypassed and 
denounced the recognized leadership of the black community, [Reagan] was viewed as 
extraordinarily hostile to black aspirations” (117).  Julian Bond, former chair of the 
NAACP, also noted that Ronald Reagan “was a polarizing figure in black America.  He 
was hostile to the generally accepted remedies for discrimination.  His appointments were 
of people as equally hostile.  I can't think of any Reagan policy that African Americans 
would embrace" (Pianin and Edsall 2004, A01).  Still, at the time of his presidency 
Reaganonmics was expected to improve the economic class situations of all Americans 
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without regard to race.  President Reagan issued Executive Order 12432 – Minority 
Business Enterprise Development on July 14 1983 that called for federal agencies to 
develop plans requiring contractors and grantees to employ minority business enterprises 
(Reagan 1983).   
Using data from the Statistical Abstract of the United States (1986) Franklin and 
Moss (1988) gave an account of black economic situations in 1985, during the era of 
Reaganomics.  They reported that unemployment rates among blacks fell short of those 
among whites 16.2 percent to 6.2 percent.  Even more startling was unemployment 
among black youths, ages 16 to 19, which increased to an all-time high of 50 percent.  
African Americans also trailed White Americans “in every meaningful classification, 
whether by age, education, sex, or occupation” (1988: 477).  Hence, reports of economic 
improvements resulting in an emerging and increasing entrepreneurial and middle-class 
group were only diminished by the correspondingly significant growth of the under-class 
among African Americans (Gurin, Hatchett & Jackson 1989; Pinkney 1986; Wilson, 
1980).   
It is, therefore, no small wonder then that Democratic attachment among African 
Americans had increased in intensity by Reagan’s 1984 election.  He made clear in his 
Republican—conservative—position that African Americans were not welcome. The late 
1980s produced even stronger identifications with the Democratic Party.  Using 1988 
data collected by the Center for Political Studies, Beck and Sorauf (1992) confirmed the 
distinctive political partisan preferences of the African-American electorate.  They were 
more likely to identify with the Democratic Party (64 percent), than their white 
counterparts (31 percent).  Moreover, the strength of African American Democratic Party 
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identifications was 40 percent greater than identifications among White Americans at 
only 14 percent.  Beck and Sorauf (1992) attributed the direction and strength of African 
American partisan attachments to the importance of race.  They argued that race 
continued to be the primary factor explaining political preference attitudes among 
African Americans regardless of the presence of any other sociological variables 
generally associated with the formation of party identifications.   
Concurrently, in his Uneasy Alliances: Race and Party Competition in America 
(1999), Paul Frymer held that:   
Race, nonetheless, remains an overriding issue for African Americans in 
ways not comparable to most other Americans’ ethnicity or occupational 
group.  Racial discrimination and residential segregation continue to 
plague African Americans regardless of social and economic class, 
severely affecting the quality of education and social services available to 
the black community (1999: 147).104 
 
Frymer’s explanation of “electoral capture,” occurred whenever a group remained with 
the political party because there was no other choice.  The relationship between the 
African-American racial group and the two main U.S. political parties was seen as one of 
tenancy or possession. Their capture resulted from the African American racial group’s 
lack of resources necessary to make themselves a viable force within the competitive 
two-party system.  First captured by the Republican Party of Lincoln, the race group 
eventually became a static component of the Democratic Party.  Frymer argued that while 
chief African American racial group concerns were removed from the national party 
agenda, such issues remained of critical importance.  In this regard the Democratic Party 
failed to engage substantive policy initiatives to bring African Americans in parity, and to 
                                                             
104.  Frymer, Paul Uneasy Alliances: Race and Party Competition in America 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
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safeguard their civil rights and liberties.  Since they had no feasible alternative, they 
therefore remained Democratic Party captives.  Often viewed as the most loyal 
constituents, mass black political choices favoring Democrats also suggests their 
application of procedural rationality, which was greatly influenced by the significance of 
race and its impact on the personal lives and economic well being of African Americans 
particularly, and of the racial group when considering other population groups’ status in 
the United States. 
The significance of race was also quite noticeable in the 1988 presidential 
campaign that set Reagan’s vice president George H.W. Bush against former 
Massachusetts Governor Michael S. Dukakis.  Neither party platform included a plank 
pledging civil rights protections for African, or other, Americans.  In his address 
accepting the presidential nomination at the Republican National Convention (August 18, 
1988), George Bush stated, “I want a kinder and gentler nation” (Woolley and Peters, 
1999 - 2011).  Interestingly, during his run for election Bush employed Republican 
political strategist Lee Atwater as his campaign manager.   Known for his uncouth tactics, 
Atwater devised a plan to discredit Dukakis as a soft on crime liberal as opposed to Bush, 
a tough on crime conservative.  At the forefront of this attack was Dukakis’ support for a 
prison furlough program that went horribly wrong when Willie Horton, a black man 
imprisoned for murder, raped a white woman and stabbed her white male companion 
while on his weekend leave (Tucker 2008).  In an attack ad Horton was demonized; his 
mug shot was altered to portray him as very dark and foreboding (McAndrews 2001).  
Horton’s published image was perceived as an assault against African-American men, 
and validation of White Americans’ fears of the big, black ‘Boogie Man.’ While Bush 
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and Atwater denied any association with this political attack against Dukakis; they were 
nonetheless viewed as the main culprits.  Bush, unable to cast off the Willie Horton 
debacle, would not gain confidence among African Americans.   
 In the 1988 general election nearly 90 percent of African Americans voted for 
Dukakis (Roper Center, 1988); however, Bush won the election.  Perceptions of the Bush 
administration among African Americans remained cautious.  For instance, Bush issued 
Executive Order 12677 – Historically Black Colleges and Universities (April 28, 1989) 
that established an Advisory Commission within the Department of Education whose aim 
was to increase participation of HBCUs in federally sponsored programs (Bush 1989).  In 
addition, the President appointed Morehouse College President Dr. Louis Sullivan to the 
cabinet post of Secretary of Health and Human Services.  Contrarily, Bush designated 
David Souter for appointment to the U.S. Supreme Court.  Souter was an opponent of 
affirmative action policy, which continued to be an important issue within the African 
American community (McAndrews 2001).  Likewise, Bush selected African American 
conservative Clarence Thomas to replace Thurgood Marshall on the U.S. Supreme Court.  
He then refused to recall Thomas’ nomination despite allegations of sexual harassment.  
Moreover, Bush vetoed the 1990 Civil Rights Act calling it a quota bill, and then signed a 
similar legislation, the 1991 Civil Rights Act, thereby allowing the use of de facto racial 
quotas if derived from "business necessity."  Yet, he refused a recommendation to outlaw 
race-based scholarships. While Bush seemed to have sent mixed signals, in the 
perceptions of African Americans he just got it wrong in word and in deed (McAndrews 
2001).   
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In spite of a faltering economy, increasing tension and unrest in major cities, high 
unemployment, and a rising deficit, President George H.W. Bush ran for reelection in 
1992 against former Governor William Jefferson “Bill” Clinton of Arkansas.  The 
Republicans held firm to their conservative philosophy of minimal action to redress racial 
discrimination while applauding the President.    
Asserting equal rights for all, we support the Bush Administration's 
vigorous enforcement of statutes to prevent illegal discrimination on 
account of sex, race, creed, or national origin. Promoting opportunity, we 
reject efforts to replace equal rights with quotas or other preferential 
treatment.  
 Republican Party Platform of 1992  
August 17, 1992 
 
The 1992 Democratic Party platform rebuffed President Bush with the following: 
We don't have an American to waste. Democrats will continue to lead the 
fight to ensure that no Americans suffer discrimination or deprivation of 
rights on the basis of race, gender, language, national origin, religion, age, 
disability, sexual orientation, or other characteristics irrelevant to ability. 
We support … affirmative action; stronger protection of voting rights for 
racial and ethnic minorities, including language access to voting; and 
continued resistance to discriminatory English-only pressure groups. We 
will reverse the Bush Administration's assault on civil rights enforcement, 
and instead work to rebuild and vigorously use machinery for civil rights 
enforcement… 
Democrat Party Platform of 1992 
July 13, 1992 
 
Bill Clinton won the 1992 election and went on to win the 1996 campaign against 
Senator Robert “Bob” Dole [R, Kansas].  One of Clinton’s core ideas was opportunity 
and responsibility, or his plan to force welfare recipients to work.   Opportunity and 
responsibility, as described by Clinton, was the "idea that government should both help 
those willing to help themselves and enforce common standards of behavior… We will 
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do with you.  We will not do for you.”105   This platform doctrine appealed to both 
centrists and conservatives alike because it promised workfare instead of welfare.  
Similarly, Dole promised to advance a conservative philosophy if he won the presidency, 
and the Republican platform agreed with his position: "When I am president, only 
conservative judges need apply," Dole stated.106 During the 1996 election conservative 
philosophy regarding civil rights was also clearly expressed in Republican platform 
doctrine.  “We scorn Bill Clinton's notion that any person should be denied a job, 
promotion, contract or a chance at higher education because of their race or gender.  
Instead, we endorse the Dole-Canady Equal Opportunity Act to end discrimination by the 
federal government.  We likewise endorse this year's Proposition 209, the California 
Civil Rights Initiative, to restore to law the original meaning of civil rights” (Woolley 
and Peters 1999-2011).  
The Dole-Canady Equal Opportunity Act of 1995 (H.R. 2128/S. 1085) was 
introduced as a bill to eliminate race- and gender-based preferences in federal 
employment; admissions practices by institutions of higher education; and, the Uniform 
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures practiced by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission.  The term ‘preferences’ was a reference to goals, quotas, 
timetables, set-asides, and other such practices in accordance with affirmative action 
policy.  Instead, Dole countered that his 1995 legislation proposed to enforce equal 
                                                             
105.  Quoted by Bill Clinton in Philip A. Klinkner, Bill Clinton and the New 
Liberalism, Adolph Reed Jr. ed. Without Justice for All (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1999), 15. 
106.  Bob Dole made this statement in Aurora, Colorado (May 28, 1996). It is 
referenced in the Republican Party Platform of August 12, 1996. (See: Woolley and 
Peters, 1999-2011).  
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treatment under the law in accordance with the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  Similarly, the 
1996 California Civil Rights Initiative, also known as Proposition 209, amended the state 
constitution to prohibit discrimination and ban preferential treatment based on race, color, 
ethnicity, gender or national origin in state and local government employment, education, 
and contracts (Lehrer and Hicks, 2010).  While congressional Republican leadership 
backed away from the Dole-Canady Act (1995), the state of California passed its Civil 
Rights Initiative, Proposition 209 in 1996.  The intent of each of these legislations was to 
eliminate affirmative action programs and practices, which were viewed as 
discrimination in the reverse by many Republican conservatives.  Contrarily, because 
affirmative action was still important to many African Americans neither Dole nor the 
Republican Party was perceived favorably.   
On the other hand, most African Americans held a highly favorable perception of 
the Democratic Party, particularly Bill Clinton.  By 1996 electoral support reached an all-
time high of 96 percent (Newport, et al., 2009).  It seemed as though he could do no 
wrong, even when confronted with scandals, investigations, and impeachment.  This is 
partly due to his congeniality; he neither avoided African American leaders nor the 
community.  Additionally, he incorporated greater diversity within his administration 
(Shull, 1999).  In 1993 Bill Clinton attended the Convocation of the Church of God in 
Christ (COGIC) in Memphis, Tennessee.107  The President’s address stated as follows:  
                                                             
107.  During his remarks President Clinton noted that he had also attended the 
Convocation of the Church of God in Christ (COGIC) when they met in Arkansas the 
previous year (1992).  Further, he acknowledged some of the COGIC bishops in 
attendance by name along with his bishops: Bishop Walker and Bishop Lindsey. Clinton 
further stated, “Now, if you haven't had Bishop Lindsey's barbecue, you haven't had 
barbecue. And if you haven't heard Bishop Walker attack one of my opponents, you have 
never heard a political speech. [Laughter]” (Miller Center’s Bill Clinton Speech 
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I have worked hard to keep faith with our common efforts: to restore the 
economy, to reverse the politics of helping only those at the top of our 
totem pole and not the hard-working middle class or the poor; to bring our 
people together across racial and regional and political lines, to make a 
strength out of our diversity instead of letting it tear us apart; to reward 
work and family and community and try to move us forward into the 21st 
century. Thirteen percent of all my Presidential appointments are African-
Americans, and there are five African-Americans in the Cabinet of the 
United States, 2 1/2 times as many as have ever served in the history of 
this great land.108 
Bill Clinton 
November 13. 1993 
 
Those appointees included Hazel O'Leary as Secretary of Energy, Democratic national 
chairman Ronald H. Brown as Secretary of Commerce; 109  former Mississippi 
congressman Mike Espy as Secretary of Agriculture; Jesse Brown, a disabled Marine 
veteran, as Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Arkansas health director Dr. Joycelyn Elders as 
U.S. Surgeon General, and Clifton Wharton, Jr., chairman of TIAA-CREF, as Deputy 
Secretary of State.   
Clinton targeted issues central to African American interests—crime, violence, 
and drugs.  Most importantly, Clinton did not racialize such issues like his predecessor 
George H.W. Bush and the right wing of the Republican Party.  Furthermore, Clinton 
issued Executive Order 12876—Historically Black Colleges and Universities on 
November 1, 1993 “to advance the development of human potential, to strengthen the 
capacity of HBCUs to provide quality education, and to increase opportunity to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Collection, November 13, 1993—Remarks to the Convocation of the Church of God in 
Christ in Memphis, Tennessee). http://millercenter.org/president/clinton. 
 
108.  Presidential Speeches retrieved from the Miller Center’s Bill Clinton Speech 
Collection, November 13, 1993—Remarks to the Convocation of the Church of God in 
Christ in Memphis, Tennessee; available from http://millercenter.org/president/clinton.  
 
109.  Ronald H. Brown was the first African American leader of a major political 
party when named Chair of the Democratic National Committee in 1988 (Ebony 1993). 
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participate in and benefit from Federal programs.”  The Order also established the 
President’s Board of Advisors within the Department of Education (Clinton 1993).  He 
followed with Executive Order 12892—Leadership and Coordination of Fair Housing in 
Federal Programs: Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing (January 17, 1994), to apply to 
all programs and activities under the authority of the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (Clinton 1994). 
In addition, President Clinton seemed to identify with, and understand, the 
African American plight.   A son of the South, he spoke in a manner that was familiar and 
used expressions to which they could relate.  For instance, in his remarks before those 
assembled at the COGIC convocation referenced above, Clinton invoked the name of Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr. to assess how the community had performed since his death. 
If Martin Luther King… were to reappear by my side today and give us a 
report card on the last 25 years, what would he say? You did a good job, 
he would say, voting and electing people who formerly were not electable 
because of the color of their skin. You have more political power, and that 
is good. You did a good job, he would say, letting people who have the 
ability to do so live wherever they want to live, go wherever they want to 
go in this great country. You did a good job, he would say, elevating 
people of color into the ranks of the United States Armed Forces to the 
very top or into the very top of our Government. You did a very good job, 
he would say. He would say, you did a good job creating a black middle 
class of people who really are doing well, and the middle class is growing 
more among African-Americans than among non-African-Americans. You 
did a good job; you did a good job in opening opportunity.   
 
But he would say, I did not live and die to see the American family 
destroyed. I did not live and die to see 13-year-old boys get automatic 
weapons and gun down 9-year-olds just for the kick of it. I did not live and 
die to see young people destroy their own lives with drugs and then build 
fortunes destroying the lives of others. That is not what I came here to do. 
I fought for freedom, he would say, but not for the freedom of people to 
kill each other with reckless abandon, not for the freedom of children to 
have children and the fathers of the children walk away from them and 
abandon them as if they don't amount to anything. I fought for people to 
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have the right to work but not to have whole communities and people 
abandoned. This is not what I lived and died for.  
 
My fellow Americans, he would say, I fought to stop white people from 
being so filled with hate that they would wreak violence on black people. I 
did not fight for the right of black people to murder other black people 
with reckless abandon.  
 
President Bill Clinton 
By the end of his first term, Clinton’s cabinet and court appointments consisted of 
about 20 percent African-American men and women.  He promoted diversity through 
presidential appointments (Shull 1999).  By the same token, when considering both 
terms, Clinton’s civil rights record was scant.  He distanced himself from the issue, and 
when the right wing countered his appointment of Lani Guinier as head of the Civil 
Rights Division of the Department of Justice, he withdrew his nomination.  Similarly, 
Clinton retreated from his pro-affirmative action position with, “mend it, but don’t end 
it,” in response to the Supreme Court’s ruling Adarand Constructors v. Pena 515. U.S. 
200 (1995), which ended federal affirmative action programs.110  Moreover, Clinton’s 
commitment to move from welfare to workfare was a policy consistent with George W. 
Bush’s compassionate conservatism.  Clinton’s welfare reform had a more adverse affect 
on African Americans than any other minority grouping because a greater number within 
the race group had economic situations that placed them below the poverty line or among 
the working poor. 
                                                             
110.  In 1995 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Adarand Constructors v Pena, 515 
U.S. 200 that all affirmative action programs must meet a "strict scrutiny” standard, even 
those approved by the U.S. Congress.  This case was a challenge to the Department of 
Transportation’s Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) program established to assist 
minority contractors in getting contracts for federally funded highway projects.  
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Despite withdrawals from issues central to African American race group interests, 
President Clinton moved to promote an open dialogue on race and reconciliation with 
Executive Order 13050—President’s Advisory Board on Race (June 13, 1997) during his 
second term.  He selected renowned African American historian Dr. John Hope Franklin 
as chair of a seven-member multi-ethnic board which consisted of: Linda Chavez-
Thompson, Suzan Johnson Cook, Governor Tom Kean, Angela Oh, Robert Thomas, and 
Governor William Winter, with Christopher Edley, who served as senior adviser (Clinton 
1997).  According to Dr. Franklin this Race Initiative was the first time that a national 
conversation on race was held in the United States.  Furthermore, the intent was not just 
dialogue; there was sincere hope that action would proceed to improve life situations, and 
the general climate in American communities; to eliminate discrimination in various 
areas, such as education, housing, and employment; and, to improve policies with regard 
to U.S. race relations (Clinton 1997).   
Typically, such conversations either dwelled solely on black-white relations to the 
exclusion of other minorities and white ethnics, or they focused exclusively on the issue 
of African American slavery.111  The Board aimed to address race as discrimination and 
disparities within all American communities, including immigrant communities (Clinton 
1997).  When during a July 14, 1997 press conference Dr. Franklin was told that 
Congressman Newt Gingrich [R, Georgia] opposed issuing an official apology to African 
Americans for slavery,112 he responded thusly: 
                                                             
111.  Unfortunately, according to John Goering (2001) the President’s Advisory 
Board on Race did not include a representative for Native Americans. 
 
112.   President Bill Clinton announced his Initiative on Race in accordance with 
Executive Order 13050 (July 13, 1997) at the Rimac Arena in San Diego, California on 
July 14, 1997.  Members of the President’s Advisory Board on Race were introduced and 
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I think that, whether we do it as a nation or whether we do it as individuals 
or whether Mr. Gingrich will undertake this himself, we are all to 
acknowledge that there is some serious contradiction between the policies 
of this country with respect to race and the fundamental documents and 
sacred statements with respect to our nation -- that is, the Declaration of 
Independence and the Constitution of the United States -- and they are not 
consonant with the policies that have been pursued by this country with 
respect to race.  
 
Whether this will bring anyone out to issue a formal apology, I don't 
know. But anyone who looks at the history of race in this country and 
looks at the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence will know -- 
if they can read and write, they will know -- that there is a very serious 
contradiction, and we have been derelict and responsible for a whole 
history of miscreant activities, not unlike those which we condemned 
England for committing in the 17th and 18th centuries.  
The President’s Advisory Board on Race was to convene for a yearlong dialogue 
scheduled to terminate on September 30 1998.  This was such a massive undertaking and 
the President’s principle goal of racial reconciliation seemed elusive.  As specified in 
Executive Order 13050 (1997) the official goals of the Race Initiative were to: 
1. Promote a constructive national dialogue to confront and work through 
challenging issues that surround race; 
 
2. Increase the Nation’s understanding of our recent history of race 
relations; 
 
3. Bridge racial divides by encouraging leaders…to develop and 
implement innovative approaches to calming racial tensions; 
 
4. Identify, develop, and implement solutions to problems in areas in 
which race has a substantial impact…113 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
allowed to receive questions from the press. (Woolley and Peters, “William J. Clinton: 
Press Briefing by Presidential Advisory Board on Race” 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=48648#ixzz1gOPDRUnp 
 
113.  Goering, John “An Assessment of President Clinton’s Initiative on Race” 
Ethnic and Racial Studies 24 no. 3 (May 3, 2001), 473.  
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Nevertheless, John Goering, in the first analysis of the goals of Clinton’s Race 
Initiative, notes the Board made some accomplishments.  Initiating open national 
dialogues on race was a major feat, primarily because it “took the issue ‘out the closet’ 
where Republicans had intentionally stashed it decades earlier” (2001: 482).  If nothing 
else Clinton’s Initiative on Race further exposed economic racial disadvantages that 
remained unresolved.  The issue of race in America runs deep in hearts and minds; 
government cannot mandate reconciliation for the sake of equality and justice.  In spite of 
Clinton’s poor record on civil rights issues, Goering notes that Bill Clinton’s Race 
Initiative was a brave first try; however, American society has a long road to travel to 
achieve racial reconciliation. By the end of the Clinton administration most African 
Americans held persistent Democratic Party identifications and electoral support.  This 
was seen in the near universal backing for subsequent Democratic presidential nominees: 
vice President Al Gore (95%) in 2000, Senator John Kerry [D, Massachusetts] (93%) in 
2004, and Senator Barack Obama [D, Illinois] (99%) in 2008 (Newport, et al. 2009).  
The 2000 Democratic Party Platform repeated rhetoric promising to act in 
response to discriminatory practices because of race, ethnicity, gender, age, disability, or 
sexual orientations.  Democrats pledged again to enforce civil rights laws; fight for 
inclusion; support fair administration of justice; oppose racial profiling; and, support 
continuation of affirmative action to ensure opportunity.  These planks were reiterated in 
the 2004 presidential campaign with the inclusion of a promise of political equality in 
which each vote cast would be counted.114 Accordingly, the Republican Party Platform of 
                                                             
114.  Political equality (one person, one vote) was a major issue in the 2000 
election campaign between Democrat vice President Al Gore and Republican Governor 
George W. Bush of Texas, particularly in the state of Florida.  Candidate Bush claimed 
that his brother, Florida Governor Jeb Bush, promised he would win the state.  This was 
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2000 committed to uphold the rights of all citizens, and to oppose discrimination on the 
basis of race, gender, creed, age, disability, or national origin, but African American 
distrust for the Republican Party was firmly established as was their capture by the 
Democratic Party.   
In their 2004 National Convention the Republican Party applauded President 
Bush for making education more affordable for students of Historically Black Colleges 
and Universities, and of Hispanic Serving Institutions.  They further claimed support for 
“aggressive, proactive measures to ensure that no individual is discriminated against on 
the basis of race, national origin, gender, or other characteristics covered by our civil 
rights laws.” 115   While opposing affirmative action, which they equated to goals, 
timetables, set-asides, and quotas, George W. Bush and the Republican Party promoted 
instead “affirmative access.” This was defined as “taking steps to ensure that 
disadvantaged individuals of all colors and ethnic backgrounds have the opportunity to 
compete economically and that no child is left behind educationally.”116  Republicans 
knew they had to address the election 2000 debacle that occurred in the state of Florida.  
Many within the African American electorate, as well as other minorities and some white 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
complicated by problems with the voting process, which included both citizens receiving 
incorrect instructions regarding their voting precincts, and accusations of incorrect vote 
counts due to problems with the official state ballot.  
 
115.  Quote is taken from the 2004 Republican Party Platform, August 30, 2004, 
in Woolley and Peters, 1999-2011. 
 
116.  The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (Pub. L. 107-10, 20 U.S.C. 6301), 
signed by President George W. Bush on January 8, 2002 reauthorized the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965 (Pub. L. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27, 20 U.S.C. ch.70) that was 
signed into law by President Lyndon B. Johnson as part of his “War on Poverty.” 
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ethnics perceived that they were denied the right to vote.  The 2004 Republican platform 
supported election reform by the states to ensure voting rights.117 
During his presidency, Bush’s domestic agenda advanced a philosophy of 
compassionate conservatism, which according to Myron Magnet (1999), aimed to bring 
problems facing the poor to the forefront of national politics. This included: supporting 
workfare;118 active neighborhood policing to attack crime; educating urban under-class 
students; implementing test standards in schools; engaging private organizations and 
faith-based institutions for health care and social services.  Even though the Bush policy 
agenda supported issues of particular interest to African Americans as a group, and he 
appointed African Americans to key executive department posts, he could not garner 
significant increases in support for himself and the Republican Party.  His appointees 
included high profile individuals, like retired U.S. Army General Colin Powell as 
Secretary of State, Alphonso Jackson as Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, 
and Roderick Paige as Secretary of Education.  In addition, Condoleezza Rice served as 
Bush’s National Security Adviser before replacing Powell as Secretary of State during his 
second term.  On February 12, 2002 President G.W. Bush issued Executive Order 
13256—White House Initiative on Historically Black Colleges and Universities.  The 
                                                             
117.  The Help America Vote Act (Pub. L. 107-252, 42 U.S.C. 15301 et seq.), 
signed into law on October 29, 2002 by President George W. Bush, required states to 
implement election reform to improve the voting process for all citizens. 
 
118.  Workfare, an important factor in President Clinton’s welfare reform agenda, 
resulted in passage of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWOR) (PL 104-193), also known as the 1996 Welfare Reform 
Act.  The legislation was signed into law on August 22, 1996. 
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Order transferred the White House Initiative from the Office of Postsecondary Education 
to the Office of the Secretary within the U.S. Department of Education (Bush 2002).   
While neither political party offered a civil rights plank, per se, each party’s 2008 
platform rhetoric promised voting rights protections, and to ban discrimination based on a 
litany of traditionally covered classifications.  The Republican Party endorsed equal 
treatment for all, invoking its Lincoln legacy, but reiterated its conservative opposition to 
affirmative action preferences, timetables, set-asides, and quotas.  The Democratic Party 
platform pledged full benefits of citizenship to residents within the District of Columbia, 
which included some 600,000 African Americans.  Additionally, the Party vowed to 
address and resolve matters related to poverty, the housing crisis; and, to promote 
historically Black, Hispanic, and other minority-serving institutions of higher education. 
Election 2008 was historically significant because it ushered in a number of 
“firsts.”  This election represented the first time one of the two main political parties 
nominated an African American for president.  Senator Barack Obama [D, Illinois] 
defeated Senator John McCain [R, Arizona] to become the first U.S. president of mixed 
race descent who identified himself as “black.”  His message of hope and change 
resonated in the hearts of many who, like African Americans, struggled to recover from 
the recession and its disproportionate impact on people of color or just wanted to see a 
change in the Washington, D.C. establishment.  Moreover, African Americans were 
hopeful that this chief executive, unlike any that previously held the office of president, 
would not only address the issue of race in America, but would also initiate substantive 
steps to settle the disparate economic, social, and political experiences of those within the 
racial group.   
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 Likewise, when the Democratic Party held commanding leads in the 2008 election 
and captured a majority in both houses of Congress, it seemed reasonable that these most 
loyal of Democratic supporters could expect genuine attention to race group concerns.  
On the contrary, talk of racial reconciliation and restitution ceased.  Since an African 
American captured the U.S. presidency, there seemed no justification to continue such 
dialogue because obtaining the highest political office was seen as demonstrated 
improvements.  People were weary of talking about race, again; they felt African 
Americans should just get over it.  Yet, in a real sense race became even more significant 
because it became a measure of Barack Obama’s presidential performance. Media posts 
caused racially offensive and stereotypical images of African Americans to resurface.119  
Like Clinton, Obama selected a record number of African Americans, as well as 
other minorities, to various senior executive posts, and promoted diversity through his 
appointment power.  A majority of the President’s appointees were minorities and 
women, many of whom were the first to serve, particularly those appointed to federal 
courts.  Accordingly, many of Obama’s African American appointees were the first to 
assume their assigned executive positions.  Nominees with Senate confirmation included 
                                                             
119.  On 18 February 2009 the New York Post (nypost.com) published a cartoon 
depicting the shooting of a pet chimpanzee in Connecticut after it viciously attacked a 
friend of its owner.  The image of the pet shot by police was accompanied with this 
caption: “They’ll have to find someone else to write the next stimulus bill.”  A picture of 
President Barack Obama signing the bill appeared on the preceding page (pp. 11-12) of 
the Post’s printed edition. In addition, tee shirts bearing Obama’s image as the children’s 
book character, Curious George, were also seen at Republican rallies during the 2008 
election campaign.  While many may see these as merely exaggerated cartoon images 
often presented by political cartoonists, such references of blacks synonymous to 
monkeys or apes bring up historical implications that deny African Americans “their 
basic humanity” (Lucy Madison, “GOP Official Apologizes For Sending Obama Chimp 
Image, Refuses To Step Down” CBS News Political Hot Sheet, 19 April 2011). 
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Eric H. Holder, Jr. as U.S. Attorney General; Lisa P. Jackson, Administrator of the 
Environmental Protection Agency; Susan P. Rice, United States Ambassador to the 
United Nations; and, Charles F. Bolden, Jr., Administrator of the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (whitehouse.gov).  Also, following in the footsteps of each of 
his presidential predecessors since Carter, President Obama issued his White House 
Initiative on Historically Black Colleges and Universities on February 26, 2010.  
Executive Order 13532, Promoting Excellence, Innovation, and Sustainability at 
Historically Black Colleges and Universities “in order to advance the development of the 
Nation's full human potential and to advance equal opportunity in higher education, 
strengthen the capacity of historically black colleges and universities to provide the 
highest quality education, increase opportunities for these institutions to participate in and 
benefit from Federal programs, and ensure that our Nation has the highest proportion of 
college graduates in the world by the year 2020” (Obama 2010).  
Nonetheless, when the housing bubble burst sending the economy into a tailspin 
accompanied by rising unemployment and the lack of job creation, enthusiasm for 
President Obama and the democratically controlled Congress soured within the African 
American community.  As maintained by Dillahunt, et al. (2010) the President provided 
neither a job strategy nor wealth strategy to relieve the economic pains of Black America.   
Obama also committed a major policy blunder, when he failed to heed the Congressional 
Black Caucus, by not targeting economically-disadvantaged communities to receive 
much needed job creation projects in accordance with the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Pub. L. 111-5) also known as the Stimulus Bill.  Furthermore, 
the foreclosure crisis revealed that a disproportionate share of African Americans and 
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other people of color had been “systematically targeted by the financial industry for 
predatory, subprime loans.  In fact, over half of the mortgages to African Americans in 
recent years were high-cost subprime loans” even though many may have qualified for 
regular loans (Dillahunt, et al. 2010: 4). In addressing the foreclosure crisis President 
Obama and Congress did not stand up to the Republicans or to the financial industry.  
This resulted in either failure to enact substantive legislation, or passing legislation that 
was weak and ineffective.   
Obama continued to scramble to advance substantive policies for U.S. economic 
recovery.  However, after the mid-term congressional elections the Republican Party 
gained control of the House of Representatives, while the Senate retained only a slight 
majority for the Democratic Party.  To make matters worse, the Tea Party also emerged 
with electoral successes that made them a force to be reckoned within the Republican 
Party.  This further complicated any hope of bringing remedy to the most economically-
disadvantaged citizens as Republicans and Tea Party advocates alike focused their efforts 
on tax cuts that would virtually eliminate many federally-funded benefits programs (Ali, 
et al., 2011). Economic inequality continued, and income and employment gaps 
remained. As President Obama and the Democratic Party focused their attentions 
elsewhere, his hold on the African American community began to slip.  Nonetheless, 
even though things appeared bleak within their community, the African American 
electorate would remain loyal supporters of the Democratic Party.          
4.4 CONCLUSION 
 
 African-American attachments to the two main political parties remain tenuous at 
best.  The U.S. two-party system leaves them little-to-no leverage to make demands on 
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the Democratic Party, or on the Republican Party.  They find themselves once again cast 
in DuBois’ (1922) dilemma or Frymer’s (1999) state of “electoral capture.”  African 
Americans, well aware that the Republican Party neither wants nor needs them to win 
elections, perceive that the Democratic Party also maintains a suitable distance from 
racial group interests.  This enables the Democrats to widen their appeal to other political 
constituent groups.  Once in power neither Democrats nor Republicans enforce civil 
rights measures and protections or other policies of particular interest to African 
Americans even if promised in their parties’ platforms.  Hence, historical socio-economic 
and political disparities persist, and the Democratic Party maintains its grip on the 
African American electorate.   
 If one were to draw a conclusion from the historical relationship between African 
Americans and the two main political parties, as examined in this chapter, it should be 
that race is important.  The presence of pro-active and effective African-American 
leadership provides cues as to appropriate and inappropriate political choices. Civil rights 
leaders communicated a cohesive message that produced uniformity in partisanship, 
given their options in the U.S. two-party system.  As the prolonged political protest 
movement subsided it gave way to political participation.  Newly elected African 
American politicians were accorded substantive power within the Democratic Party 
organization, and within executive, legislative, and judicial offices at every level of 
government in the United States.  Nonetheless, when issues of most importance to 
African Americans no longer commanded center stage, and the parties became silent on 
matters of most concern to the racial group, shared social, economic, and political 
situations made them keenly aware that their interconnectedness was founded on the 
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basis of race, regardless of class, gender, or other factors typically associated with 
partisanship.  It was the predominant factor explaining their rationality in Democratic 
partisanship, and in African American perceptions of interdependence of fate, and of an 
interdependence of task.  Race, alone, became a dependable measure with which to gauge 
political situations, to unite disparate elements of the racial group, to mobilize as a voting 
bloc, and to engage African American racial group solidarity.    
 In the subsequent chapter the methodological approach for obtaining and 
analyzing the data in accordance with the theoretical framework constructed in the 
second chapter is explained.  The aim of the fifth chapter is to show the appropriateness 
of the research design for investigating African American partisanship in accordance with 
the Black Utility Heuristic and the concept of linked racial fate.  Several hypotheses are 
examined to test the relationship between race and partisanship in the African American 
case.
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CHAPTER 5 
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 
This dissertation revisits a long-standing controversy about the single most important 
determinant of African American partisan predispositions.  In so doing the present 
research study utilizes a modification of the Black Utility Heuristic paradigm advanced in 
the theory of African American racial group interests (Dawson 1994), which addresses 
this question. The principle aim of this research study is to test the reliability of racial 
group cues in framing perceptions about the efforts of the two main political parties to 
address issues of most importance to African Americans. The study topic is identified in 
the first chapter; relevant literature is explored and the conceptual model is formulated in 
the second chapter; while a survey of essential background and historical details are 
covered in chapters three and four. The current chapter focuses on research methods used 
to conduct this study.  Specifically, this chapter explains the methodological approach 
employed to test the extent to which distinctive racial group solidarity and political 
cohesion persist among African Americans in their political party identifications, and as 
compared to other racial and ethnic populations.   
In addition, this chapter includes the following: study procedures, sample 
populations, instrumentations, specifications and definitions of the variables, reiteration
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of the hypotheses, model specifications, and the statistical analytical approach.  
Quantitative research using statistical methods, national survey studies, and individual-
level analysis are used to attain the study goals.  Data gathered from national survey 
research studies are then computed for interpretation of the effect of perceptions of linked 
fate on contemporary political proclivities among African Americans.     
Because race is modeled, in this study, as having a profound impact on African 
Americans’ decisions regarding the two main political parties, it is important to explore 
the extent to which partisan preference attitudes might differ from the African American 
racial group political standard.  Essential to this examination of party as a function of race 
are individual perceptions identifying the political party that better serves African 
American racial group interests, which may also apply to other minority racial and ethnic 
group populations. Still, other social forces also impact decisions about partisanship.  So, 
another component of this investigation of African American political partisanship is the 
integration of race, class, and gender, where race is modeled as the central organizing 
factor.  Nonetheless, it is the amalgamation of these factors in the historical case of 
African Americans that explain how the concept of linked fate influences individual 
attitude formation. The interconnectedness and interdependence of fate as well as task 
interdependence among African Americans signify the properties, and determinants, of 
racial group preference attitudes toward the major U.S. political parties.   
5.1 DATA AND METHODS: STUDY PROCEDURES 
In the present research study I utilize data collected for the 1996 National Black 
Election Study series (Tate 1997), and for the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson, et 
al. 2009).  Most importantly, this dissertation is a modification of Michael C. Dawson’s 
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(1994) black utility heuristic model which was based on data collected for both the 1984 
and 1988 National Black Election Study panel series (Jackson, Gurin, and Hatchett 1984; 
Jackson 1988).  I incorporate the 1996 National Black Election Study in this research 
because it provides continuity in that it updates data for the National Black Election 
Study panel series.  The National Black Election Study (NBES), developed by the 
Program for Research on Black Americans, began in 1984 by the Institute for Social 
Research at the University of Michigan (Jackson 1984; 1988).  The 1996 NBES was 
produced by Ohio State University in Columbus, Ohio and distributed by the University 
of Michigan Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research in Ann Arbor, 
Michigan.  Like the 1984 and 1988 studies in the series, the 1996 National Black Election 
Study is a large-scale systematic survey that has the feasibility of in-depth investigations 
of political attitudes, perceptions, and electoral behaviors within the African American 
population.  Additionally, the 1996 NBES data provides a large, representative national 
sample of adult African Americans.  Prior to collection of the National Black Election 
Study series no other national surveys made possible such comprehensive examination of 
African American politics (Tate 1997).    
Moreover, this investigation employs the 2004 National Politics Study because of 
significant advantages offered by its examination of “individual attitudes, beliefs, 
aspirations and behavior at the beginning of the [twenty-first] century” from a 
comparative perspective (Jackson, et al. 2009, ii).  The Program for Research on Black 
Americans in the Center for Political Studies at the Institute for Social Research, 
University of Michigan, developed the National Politics Study (NPS).  The Study was 
conducted in conjunction with DataStat Inc., a survey research organization located in 
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Ann Arbor, Michigan (Jackson, et al. 2009).  The NPS builds upon methodologies used 
successfully by James S. Jackson in both the 1984 and 1988 National Black Election 
Study panel series.  In addition, the 2004 NPS was developed from work completed for 
the National Survey of American Life (NSAL), 2001 – 2003, (Jackson, et al. 2007), and 
for the National Latino and Asian American Survey (NLAAS), 2001 - 2003 (Alegria, et 
al. 2007) in the Program for Research on Black Americans with the Center for Political 
Studies at the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan.  While providing a 
large, representative national sample of adult African Americans, the 2004 National 
Politics Study was perhaps the first nationally representative, explicitly comparative, 
simultaneous study that surveyed the politics, participation, and preferences of both racial 
and ethnic populations within the United States (Jackson, et al. 2009).  Each of these 
selected survey studies contain comparable questions that are consistent with questions 
included by James S. Jackson in the National Black Election Study panel series for 1984 
and 1988 (See: Appendix A). 
5.2 SAMPLE POPULATIONS  
Sample populations are drawn from national survey data collected for the 1996 
National Black Election Study (Tate 1997), and for the 2004 National Politics Study 
(Jackson, et al. 2009).  Of 1,074 adult African American survey observations read in the 
1996 NBES, a sample of 824 observations are used in the current study.  In addition, of 
3,087 American adult observations from racial and ethnic population groupings in the 
2004 NPS, there are 706 African-Americans, 868 Non-Hispanic Whites, 676 Hispanics, 
466 Asians, and 371 of Black Caribbean descent included in the subsequent analysis.   
 136
5.3 INSTRUMENTATION 
 Survey questions developed for both the 1996 National Black Election Study 
(Tate 1997, Appendix B) and the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson, et al. 2009, 
Appendix C) were extracted for the present investigation.  The 1996 NBES questionnaire 
asks African American citizens to report partisanship; voting preferences; political 
interests; evaluations of presidential, congressional candidates and groups; opinions of 
various issues; values, and a myriad of other attitudes toward the social, economic, and 
political order.  Additionally, the 1996 NBES collected data relative to social 
demography that includes gender, age, education, marital status, income, and occupation 
(Tate, 1997).  Likewise, the 2004 NPS survey contains questions that solicit responses 
about voting preferences, partisanship, organizational membership, immigration, racial 
group consciousness, and governmental policies (Jackson, et al., 2009). 
  The 1996 NBES consists of two components during the 1996 presidential election 
cycle: a pre-election component, and a post-election component.  The survey was 
administered using a random-digit dialing telephone interview from which a stratified 
random sample of all African American households in the United States with telephones 
was drawn.  The pre-election population contains 1,216 respondents.  Eight hundred 
fifty-four of those respondents also completed interviews during the post-election 
component (Tate, 1997).  Besides, 3,339 respondents completed computer-assisted 
telephone interviews (CATI) for the 2004 NPS (Jackson, et al., 2009).  Respondents to 
questions from the 1996 NBES, pre-election surveys, and from the CATI queries 
solicited for the 2004 NPS make up the sample population for this study.  Data from 
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these national surveys are computed using IBM SPSS Statistics 20, (IBM Corporation 
1989, 2011). 
5.4 DEPENDENT VARIABLE SPECIFICATIONS 
 African American political partisanship is modeled as a sequential decision 
problem.  The decision entails either identification with one of the two main political 
parties or an identification of political independence.  The following alternatives are 
presented in the 1996 NBES (Tate 1997) based on the following survey question, 
“Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an 
Independent, or what?” 120  The decision problem is identifying individual partisan 
preference attitudes given this polychotomous response.  The goal is to capture one’s 
party identification, the dependent variable under study in this investigation, or an 
individual’s affective attitude of preference for a particular political party.  Such 
identification with a preferred political party further denotes a psychological attachment 
or sense of belonging to that party exclusively, as opposed to official party membership 
and/or ties to another political party.  These attachments typically explain differences in 
the decision calculus of individuals, and population groups, when choosing from an array 
of alternatives within the political world (Campbell, et al. 1960).  In this study partisan 
identifications reflect either respondents’ self-report of preferences for one of the two 
main political parties, or respondents’ preferences for political independence.   
Given the problem presented by the dependent ‘response’ variable, the 
individual’s task appears to require a decision between alternatives specified in the 
                                                             
120.  Similarly, the question posed to survey respondents in the 2004 National 
Politics Study (Jackson et al. 2009) asks: “Generally speaking, do you usually think of 
yourself as a republican, a democrat, an independent, or something else?” 
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Figure 5.1 The Sequential Party Decision
       Identification Survey Questions for 1996 and 2004 
                                                            
121.  For further information about the sequential decision in logistic regression 
analysis refer to: Hans van Orphem and Arthur Schram “Sequential and Multinomial 
Logit: A Nested Model” Empirical Economics
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value to estimate the probability of a decision to identify with a particular political party 
versus a decision to identify with political independence.123  
5.5 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: SPECIFICATIONS AND DEFINITIONS   
 Variables that influence African Americans’ political partisanship, extracted from 
the 1996 National Black Election Study (Tate, 1997) and from the 2004 National Politics 
Study (Jackson, et al. 2009), appear in Table 6.1 below.124  
 In this study individual perceptions of racial group interests play “a more general 
role in shaping African Americans’ political, economic, and social judgments” (Dawson 
1994, 84).  A major component of these individual perceptions deemed crucial to African 
American racial group politics in this research study is Linked Fate, a measure of racial 
group consciousness or perceptions that what happens to people’s racial group has a lot to 
do with them, where responses are coded as follows: Strongly Agree=1.00, Somewhat 
Agree=0.66, Somewhat Disagree=0.33, and Strongly Disagree=0.00. In addition, the 
significance of social and economic demography in predicting African Americans’ 
political partisanship is examined.  Race, economic class, and gender are modeled as 
indicators of social and economic status. For purposes of investigation status represents, 
in a social context, the location of a population group within the socio-economic 
hierarchy based on economic class affiliations and/or status assignments beyond one’s 
control like race and/or ethnicity, gender, and age. These status assignments typically 
result from ascriptive characteristics where race, gender, and age often determine 
economic class positions.   
                                                             
123.  All models exclude any responses to the ‘or what’ and ‘or something else’ 
decision options of the 1996 and 2004 survey questions. 
  
124.  See also: Appendix A for survey question wording of variables used in this 
study. 
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 In what follows designations of status variables included in this investigation are 
specified. Class is a measure of economic assets like earned household income calculated 
in dollars. The 1996 NBES specifies income categories as: ≤ $10,000; $14,999; $19,999; 
$24,999; $29,999; $39,999; $49,999; $74,999; $89,999; $104,999; or $105,000 and 
more. Income data from the 2004 NPS is imputed with monetary values considered based 
on respondents’ indications of annual family earnings. In addition, status variables 
include: Race (Black) based on responses from adult African Americans to the 1996 
National Black Election Study (Tate 1997), or based on comparative responses from 
population groups surveyed in the 2004 National Politics Study and dummy coded as 
African American, White Non-Hispanic, Hispanic, Asian, and Black Caribbean (Jackson, 
et al. 2009).  Respondent sex (Gender) is a dichotomous variable coded as Women=1 and 
Men=0.  Age represents a respondent’s actual age, measured in years. 
 Analogous to party identification ideology is viewed as a philosophical guide that 
helps adult Americans’ reasoning and choices about objects in the political world 
(Campbell, et al. 1960); it is one’s political outlook.  So, included in the analysis is an 
Ideology variable or summary political ideology scale that appraises the degree of 
individual preferences for liberalism. The decision options are arranged as Liberal=1.00, 
Moderate (Middle-of-the-Road)=0.50, and Conservative=0.00.  Using the 1996 survey 
data to determine the extent to which appraisal of the political parties’ efforts to work on 
behalf of the African American racial group influences the direction of partisanship, a 
measure of perceptions of how hard the Democratic Party works to represent African 
American racial group interests is added, ‘Democrats work on issues Blacks care about’ 
(Dems Work) with corresponding responses: Very Hard=1.00, Fairly Hard=0.66, Not Too 
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Hard=0.33, or Not Hard At All=0.00.  Likewise, a dummy measure for political climate 
is added to examine presidential performance evaluations during the Clinton (1996 
NBES) and Bush (2004 NPS) administrations, where Approve=1.0, and Disapprove=0.0 
in 1996, and Strongly Approve=1.00, Somewhat Approve=0.66, Somewhat 
Disapprove=0.33, and Strongly Disapprove=0.00 in 2004.  Finally, a “sense of well-
being” assesses the nation’s Economy over the past year.  The variable is coded as 
follows: Gotten Better=1.0, Stayed the same=0.5, Gotten Worse=0.0. All of the variables 
used in the analyses for this study appear in Table 6.1; survey questions are presented in 
Appendix A.  
Table 5.1 Determinants of African American Political Partisanship 
 
DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Party  
Linked 
Fate 
Class Race Gender Age Ideology Dems Work 
Best to Help 
Blacks 
Political 
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Group 
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Income    
in 
Dollars 
Blk. 
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Men 
Actual 
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Liberal 
Moderate 
Conservative 
Very Hard, 
Fairly Hard, 
Not too 
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Not Hard at 
All 
Approval 
Ratings: 
Clinton 
(1996), 
Bush 
(2004) 
Gotten 
Better, 
Stayed the 
Same, 
Gotten 
Worse 
 Outcome 
 Variable 
 
Independent (Predictor) Variables 
 
5.6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
 The primary question guiding this research study is: Why do African Americans 
think the way they do politically, and what induces them to change?  The implication is 
that individual African Americans’ attitudes toward the two main political parties are 
 143
related to racial group political orientations.  In this study the relationship between 
individual and group is predicated on the principle of linked, or the interdependence of, 
fate and perceptions of similar life experiences and situations.  African Americans’ 
interconnectedness based on the reality of their common fate is typically accompanied by 
an interdependence of task or shared interests that yield racial group solidarity and 
political cohesion.  There is, therefore, an expectation that “African Americans with 
stronger (black) linked fates are likely to support a political party whose policy 
preferences are perceived as consistent with (black) racial group interests.”  This is the 
analytical objective of the first hypothesis.  
 While the African American racial group is noted for distinctive political 
party identifications, African American women are unique in their own right.   Their 
contemporary and historical experiences and life situations point to the impact of 
race, class, and gender on their livelihood.   It is therefore important to investigate 
how the interaction of multiple identities, particularly race and gender, influence an 
African American woman’s partisanship.  Hence, hypothesis 2 suggests that, “African 
American women are more likely to support the Democratic Party than African 
American men or women of other ethnicities.”  
Also important to this examination of African American partisanship are 
perceptions about which party better serves racial group interests, hence the third 
hypothesis states that “African Americans are more likely to identify with the political 
party that they perceive best helps their racial group.”  Again, the significance of 
perceptions of their interconnectedness suggests that the Democratic, not the Republican, 
Party should be the most rational and efficient choice even in times of political obscurity.  
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The party best serving the interests of the racial group should also best fulfill individual 
goals as well, thereby increasing political cohesion regarding party choice.  At this point 
another important question emerges: Is this merely a “black” phenomenon or does 
Dawson’s Black Utility Heuristic provide a viable (and similar) explanation for political 
partisanship among other U.S. racial and ethnic minority groups?  This is the focus of the 
fourth hypothesis, i.e. similarities and/or differences between African Americans and the 
comparative populations included in this study composed of Non-Hispanic Whites, 
Hispanics, Asians, and Caribbean Blacks.  In the analysis the impact of linked fate is 
examined by the fourth hypothesis thusly: “The more a person views that the fate of their 
racial/ethnic group affects their own fate, the greater the likelihood of support for the 
political party perceived as addressing racial/ethnic group interests.” 
5.7 ANALYSIS OF THE DATA 
Certain socio-demographic attributes like race and class produce significant and 
distinctive political effects; however, only race typically provides a relevant explanation 
for partisanship within the African American community.  Beginning with the 1936 
presidential election of Franklin D. Roosevelt, and particularly since the 1944 
presidential election of Harry S. Truman, most African Americans have indicated 
preferences for, or identifications with, the Democratic Party.  Figure 5.3 illustrates the 
relationship between the dependent variable Party Identification, an attitude of preference 
for a particular political party, and the independent variables included in the statistical 
analytic technique that follows.  
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Figure 5.3 Arrow Diagram: Determinants of African-American Partisanship: 1996, 2004 
The main effects are estimated as race (being black), class (income), and gender 
(being a woman).  This determines the most important factor predicting African 
American partisanship, where race because of the influence of perceptions of linked fate 
is expected to yield greater significance in explaining African Americans’ relationship 
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with the Democratic Party.  In addition, the integration of race, class, and gender in the 
present research study suggests that other factors may compete meaningfully with race in 
determining African American racial group politics.  In the arrow diagram (Figure 5.3) 
presented above seven factors figure directly in the explanation of African Americans’ 
distinctive preference attitudes toward the Democratic Party.  The relationships are tested 
in the subsequent analysis. 
5.7.1 STATISTICAL TECHNIQUE 
Relevant research studies employ multivariate statistical methods to measure the 
impact of group-based determinants on people’s political preferences as found in the 
works of Miller, Wlezen and Hildreth (1999), and Koch (1994).  Multivariate analysis 
consists of appropriate techniques to examine data sets of more than one variable (Abdi, 
2003).  This includes general linear models (GLM) like multiple linear regression 
analysis (MLR) using a least square approach as found in works like Bejarano (2005) and 
Conover (1984).  Whereas other researchers such as Luks and Elms (2005) and Manza 
and Brooks (1999) construct models using special cases of GLM, logistic regression 
analysis. In Dawson’s (1994, 125) research study of African American political 
partisanship multiple regression analysis was employed, while a probit regression 
technique estimated “individual level data with a binary dependent variable.” 
In this study multinomial logistic regression analysis is the statistical method 
employed.  This regression technique is required for several reasons.  First, a logistic 
regression procedure is deemed necessary to identify which independent variable, from 
among the combination of political, economic, and social factors specified herein, best 
predicts party or no-party preferences within the African-American community, and 
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among the other racial and ethnic citizenry (Mertler and Vannatta, 2005).  Further, the 
logistic regression model as represented in this study is a special case whereby a single 
outcome party identification comprises more than two categories; hence, it is a 
polychotomous variable, and therefore violates the assumption of linearity required for 
normal regression analysis (Kennedy 1998). Finally, even though commonly constructed 
as a continuous multi-point summary scale, the party identification variable does not 
clearly fit specifications for continuous classification, as provided in the 1996 National 
Black election Study (Tate 1997) and in the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson et al. 
2009). Based on the survey question wording for each national study, respondents are 
asked to decide their partisanship preferences from an array of alternatives that constitute 
the party identification variable. Hence, multinomial logistic regression is appropriate to 
handle the case of African Americans facing discrete alternatives on a scale, or among 
categories, of preference attitudes; and, to rank the influences of racial group factors on 
personal partisan preferences; such is the case in this investigation.   
5.8 MODEL SPECIFICATIONS 
 Identifying two contrasting outcomes in the sequential decision-making process 
solves the multinomial logistic regression problem. In the subsequent logistic regression 
equations, log is the logit or log odds that the dependent (outcome) variable party 
identification—PartyID, equals one while “a” is the constant or intercept.  The β terms 
are the logistic regression coefficients or parameter estimates for the X predictor 
variables, where β1, β2, … βk represent the partial association between each predictor and 
party identification, net the effect of all other predictors. Therefore, in this model, log 
Pr |  	
 | is equal to the constant a
 
plus the β coefficient times the value of the X 
predictors.  Two logit models are computed in the analysis.  One model contrasts a 
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decision to choose an Independent (no party) political identification with that of a 
Democratic Party preference, the reference category; it is specified as:  
  log 
Pr|  	
 
 |
Pr| 	 
        |
  =  a + β1X1 +++ β2X2 +… + βkXk 
 
The second model contrasts a decision to identify with the Republican Party rather than 
with the Democratic Party.  Hence the form of that multinomial logistic regression 
equation becomes:  
  log 
Pr| 	
  |
Pr| 	 
    |
  =  a + β1X1 +++ β2X2 +… + βkXk  
The logistic regression models test the effect of each of the independent “factors” 
Race [African Americans (1996)] and/or ethnicity [African American, White Non-
Hispanic, Hispanic, Asian, Black Caribbean (2004)], Gender [Women/Men], linked Fate 
[“Happens to Blacks has a lot to do with me” (1996) or “Extent of Respondent’s race fate 
affecting Respondent” (2004)], political Ideology [Liberal/Moderate/Conservative], 
assessments of the Democratic Party’s efforts to address African American interests 
Dems Work [“Democrats work on issues Blacks care about” (1996)], presidential 
performance evaluations for Clinton in 1996 [approve/disapprove] and Bush in 2004 
[strongly approve, somewhat approve, somewhat disapprove, or strongly disapprove], 
appraisal of the nation’s Economy [gotten better/stayed the same/gotten worse] over the 
past year. These variables predict political partisanship among African Americans in the 
1996 NBES (Tate 1997), and when compared to other population groups, as specified 
above, in the 2004 NPS (Jackson et al. 2004).  A control for “covariates” representing the 
actual age (Age) of respondents, and annual family income [Class] are also included in 
the analyses.  
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 Data collected for the 1996 NBES is utilized to construct models for testing the 
first and third hypotheses, while the second and fourth hypotheses are tested using 2004 
NPS data.  Model specifications follow.   
5.8.1 MODEL ONE: THE INFLUENCE OF LINKED FATE ON PARTISANSHIP  
 In Model 1 five predictors determine the outcome (party identification).  They 
measure perceptions of linked racial fate, class based on annual family income earnings, 
gender (Women=1, Men=0), political ideology, and a respondent’s actual age. In the 
analysis that follows this model is used to test the first hypothesis that African Americans 
with stronger (black) linked fates are more likely to support the political party whose 
policies are viewed as consistent with the policy interests of the racial group.  An 
important assumption is that the Democratic Party is the first preferable alternative. 
Using data from the 1996 National Black Election Study (Tate 1997) the logistic 
equations that estimate these relationships assume the following form: 
 
log 
Pr|  	
 
|
Pr| 	 
       |
  = a + β1Fate + β2Class + β3Gender + β4Ideology + β5Age 
 
 
log 
Pr|  	
 |
Pr| 	 
    |
  = a + β1Fate + β2Class + β3Gender + β4Ideology + β5Age 
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5.8.2 MODEL TWO: THE IMPACT OF RACE ON PARTISAN ASSESSMENTS 
 This model explores the extent to which African Americans’ partisan 
identifications reflect a view that Democrats best help the racial group. This is the goal of 
the third hypothesis.  Using data from the 1996 NBES for Model 2, the estimated 
equation becomes: 
log 
Pr|  	
     |
Pr| 	 
  |
 = a + β1Class + β2Gender + β3Ideology + β4Clinton 
           + β5Dems Work + β6Age 
 
log 
Pr|	
 
|
Pr|	 
   |
 = a + β1Class + β2Gender + β3Ideology + β4Clinton 
           + β5Dems Work + β6Age 
 
The two regression output models contrast the influence of the predictor variables: 
income, a class measure; gender; political ideology; Clinton’s presidential performance; 
assessments of how hard the Democrats work to address issues of most importance to 
African Americans; and age.  The results yield contrasts when an Independent 
identification is preferred as opposed to an indication of preference for the Democratic 
Party, or when one opts to identify with the Republican Party rather than with the 
Democratic Party. 
5.8.3 MODEL THREE: TEST OF GENDER DISTINCTIONS BY RACE  
 The third model estimates comparative racial and ethnic survey responses to the 
2004 National Politics Study (Jackson, et al., 2009). This model includes a dummy 
coding to create separate categories for African American women and men, where 
BlackW=1 and BlackM=0.  Also, a dummy coding is utilized to distinguish African 
American women from all other racial/ethnic women under study (EthnicW=1, 
BlackW=0).  The output generated for this model renders the following equations when 
 151
estimating the proposition that African American women have greater feelings of affinity for 
the Democratic Party than women of other ethnicities, and their male counterparts, which 
is the aim of the second hypothesis in this research study. 
log 
Pr|   	
    |
Pr| 	 
  |
 = a + β1BlackW + β2BlackM + β3EthnicW + β4Ideology 
           + β5Class + β6Economy + β7Age 
 
log 
Pr|	
 
|
Pr|	 
   |
 = a + β1BlackW + β2BlackM + β3EthnicW + β4Ideology  
       + β5Class+ β6Economy + β7Age 
 
The independent variables in the overall model include: African American women 
(BlackW), African American men (BlackM), all other racial/ethnic women specified as 
EthnicW, annual family income (Class), the degree of liberalism (Ideology), and a sense 
of well-being based on evaluations of whether the state of the national economy over the 
past year has gotten better, stayed the same, or gotten worse (Economy). A control for the 
actual age of respondents (Age) is also included in the model.  The preceding equations 
are used to assess the predicted probability of a party decision outcome for each of the 
two possible categories (Democrat/Independent) as specified above, as opposed to a 
decision to identify with the Republican Party.  The intercept a represents the probability 
of personal political party identifications when variable gender assumes a value of “0” or 
when the respondent is a man, and the gender variable assumes a value of “1” or the 
probability that “being a woman” means being a Democrat.  Likewise, among women 
when the race of respondent is African American the variable assumes a value of “0” 
whereas when a woman indicates membership in another racial/ethnic category the 
variable, Race, assumes a value of “1” in the analysis. 
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5.8.4 MODEL FOUR: FACTORS THAT DETERMINE PARTISANSHIP 
 Model 4 also estimates comparative racial and ethnic survey responses to the 
2004 National Politics Study (Jackson, et al., 2009).  The model includes a measure of 
linked fate perceptions [‘Extent of Respondent’s race fate affecting Respondent’]; and 
adds a race dummy specified as White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, and Caribbean. A class 
variable is also included in the model indicating annual family income. The outcome 
variable, party identification (PartyID) represents a decision situation based on partisan 
alternatives of Republican Party, Independent (no party), or Democratic Party personal 
preferences. This fourth model examines factors that determine political independence or 
partisanship (Democratic) when compared to a self-report of Republican Party 
affiliations. Most importantly, the model explains the unique contribution of each 
predictor variable in prefiguring the probability of personal partisan preferences among 
population samples represented in the 2004 NPS dataset. Considering the effects of each 
factor in this multinomial logistic regression model, the full equation predicting 
partisanship is as follows: 
log 
Pr|  	
     |
Pr| 	 
  |
 = a + β1Fate + β2Black + β3Hispanic + β4Asian + β5Caribbean 
           + β5Caribbean + β6Income2 + β7Income3   + β8Income4 
           + β9Gender + β10Ideology + β11Bush + β12Economy  
       + β13Age 
 
log 
Pr|	
 
|
Pr|	 
   |
 = a + β1Fate + β2Black + β3Hispanic + β4Asian + β5Caribbean 
           + β5Caribbean + β6Income2 + β7Income3   + β8Income4 
           + β9Gender + β10Ideology + β11Bush + β12Economy  
       + β13Age 
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 Assumptions for each model are tested in the subsequent analyses. If race 
continues to be the most important determinant of African American political 
partisanship the equation is expected to yield a negative relationship between Class and 
PartyID.  On the other hand, if the significance of race declines in determining African 
American orientations toward the two main political parties, the equation should yield a 
positive coefficient to denote the impact of economic class position on African American 
preference attitudes toward the political parties.  Using data collected for the 2004 NPS, 
the impact of race (Black) and income (Class) is measured on party identifications of 
Americans, focusing on black-white distinctions, to test the fourth hypothesis that there is 
a “sense of interconnectedness” and interdependence of fate among individuals 
comprising the racial/ethnic population groupings included in this study.  
 Multinomial logistic regression analyses and other appropriate statistical 
techniques examine interaction effects and significance. Unless otherwise specified the 
.05 level of significance is applicable throughout the study. Findings obtained from the 
data analyses are reported in the subsequent chapter.   The final chapter discusses 
research study results, conclusions, and recommendations for future research.  As much 
as possible I will address each hypothesis in the order in which they appear in this 
chapter.
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CHAPTER 6 
FINDINGS 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide descriptive and inferential findings from 
statistical analyses conducted to explain the relationships among variables employed to 
predict African American political partisanship.  Selected social attributes and 
demography are taken from data obtained for the 1996 National Black Election Study 
(Tate 1997), and for the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson, et al. 2009).  The 
statistical software system used to calculate descriptive and inferential statistics of the 
variables under study is IBM SPSS Statistics 20, (IBM Corporation 1989, 2011). 
6.1 DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS 
 This investigation is guided by four hypotheses designed to elicit specific 
information pertinent to the research study.  The first hypothesis assesses the strength of 
linked racial fate on African Americans’ partisan preferences given the influence of other 
socio-economic and political forces. The second hypothesis looks at whether multiple 
identities will predict distinctive partisan identifications among African American women 
based on gender, or whether race, alone, determines their partisan preferences.  
Hypothesis three explores the effect of individual perceptions of the two main political 
parties and their performance when in government on African American racial group 
partisan preference attitudes, while the fourth hypothesis suggests that this may not be a
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purely Black phenomenon.  Hence, a comparative population is included in the analysis.     
6.1.1 DISTRIBUTION OF PARTY IDENTIFICATIONS  
 Data shows a distinctive pattern of Democratic Party identifications within the 
African American population that is unrelentingly strong.  On average, among African 
Americans included in the 1996 National Black Election Study [NBES] (Tate 1997) 
preference for the Democratic Party (68.7%) clearly precedes reports of self-identified 
Republicans (3.9%) and Independents (19.7%).  Moreover, no less than 69.8 percent of 
African Americans indicated preference for the Democratic Party in the 2004 National 
Politics Study [NPS] (Jackson, et al. 2009), while only 3.8 percent or about 27 out of 706 
African Americans identified with the Republican Party, and 26.3 percent identified 
themselves as political Independents, a marked increase from 1996.   
  Similar to African Americans, Black Caribbeans’ feelings of affinity with the 
Democratic Party (65.8%) is obviously distinctive from self-reports of identifications 
with the Republican Party (7.5%).  Correspondingly, 26.7 percent of Black Caribbeans 
claim political independence, a percentage virtually identical to that of African 
Americans.  On the other hand, political party identifications of other comparable 
population groups included in the 2004 NPS present a clearly discernable contrast from 
their African American counterparts.  On the average there is greater variability in the 
political partisan preferences of Non-Hispanic White respondents with 35.8 percent 
Democratic Party identifications, 34.8 percent identification with the Republican Party, 
and 29.4 percent self-reports of political independence. The distribution of political party 
identifications among Asians yields similar variability; 37.3 percent favor the Democratic 
Party, 23.6 percent prefer the Republican Party, and 39.1 percent identify themselves as 
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Independent.  Likewise, Hispanics’ preference for the Democratic Party (43.6%) was 
significantly higher than Republican Party preferences (20.4%), and closely followed by 
Independent identifiers (35.9%).  Table 6.1 and associated graphics (Figure 6.1) present 
percentages of party identifications among samples from the 1996 NBES and 2004 NPS 
survey respondents. 
Table 6.1 Percentages of Political Party Identifications by Race and Study    
PERCENTAGES OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
Study Race Democrat Independent Republican N 
 
1996 
NBES 
 
Black 
 
68.7 
 
19.7 
 
3.9 
 
1121 
     Total:   
1121 
2004 NPS Black 69.8 26.3 3.8 706 
 White 35.8 29.4 34.8 868 
 Hispanic 43.6 35.9 20.4 676 
 Asian 37.3 39.1 23.6 466 
 Caribbean 65.8 26.7 7.5 371 
 
    
Total:   
3087 
 
 The analysis, to this point, presents the average political partisan identifications of 
citizens by race per national study.  As is clearly illustrated in Figure 6.1 below, 
regardless of the survey examined, the political preferences of African Americans are 
 consistently more Democratic and much less Republican than their racial/ethnic 
counterparts with the exception of Black Caribbeans.  When African American 
preferences average about 69 percent for the Democratic Party, less than 4 percent for the 
Republican Party, and 23 percent for Independent identifications (1996 and 2004). 
Figure 6.1 Percentages of Political Party Identifications, 1996 and 2004 
Interestingly, distinctive preference attitudes toward the two main political parties 
emerge between African American women and men. While they demonstrate similar 
reports regarding identifications with the Republican Party of 4.3 percent men and 4.2 
percent women, their preferences for the Democratic Party and Independent 
identifications reveal marked ge
greater preferences for the Democratic Party (78.0%) than their male counterparts 
(68.2%).  In sharp contrast 27.6 percent of African American men are Independent 
identifiers while only 17.9 percent of women
examination of Independent identifiers suggests they are closer to the Democratic Party
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nder differences.  African American women report 
 claim political independence. Further 
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(60.6% men and 57.7% women) than to the Republican Party (14.1% and 14.3%, 
respectively), thereby suggesting that they are actually “weak” Democratic partisans.  
Still, 28.0 percent of women and 25.4 percent of men indicate that they are “pure” 
Independents. 
 When compared to other population groupings African American women are like 
other women in their preferences for the Democratic Party.  Again, with the exception of 
Black Caribbean respondents, their Democratic partisanship far exceeds that of African 
American men.  Slightly more than 75 percent of African American women on average 
identify with the Democratic Party, as observed in the 2004 data, compared to roughly 60 
percent of African American men.  Contrarily, political independence among the men is 
about 35 percent on average to only about 22 percent among the women, whereas only 
5.4 percent men and 2.9 percent women prefer the Republicans.  Likewise, nearly 71 
percent of Black Caribbean women identify with the Democratic Party, while Democratic 
partisans among Caribbean men follow distantly at about 57 percent on average.   
 No other racial/ethnic population group yields this degree of differences between 
women and men with regard to identifications with the two main political parties.  
Results of the data analyses from cross tabulations of party identifications by gender, 
race, and survey samples are reported in Table 6.2, and associated graphics follow in 
Figure 6.2 for women and Figure 6.3 for men.  The analyses of partisanship present the 
average party identifications by gender and race.  A graphical summary of African 
American partisanship and political independence for each study period is presented in 
Figure 6.4 below.  Clearly African American women are more Democratic, but less 
Independent, than men. 
 Table 6.2 Percentages of Party Identifications by Race and Gender, 2004
PERCENTAGES OF POLITICAL PARTY IDENTIFICATIONS
Race African American
Gender Women 
Democrat 75.5 
Republican 2.9 
Independent 21.6 
N: 449 
TOTAL: 706 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Percentages of Party Identifications for Women by Race, 1996 and 2004 
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 Non-Hispanic 
White 
Hispanic Asian 
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men 
59.9 41.0 29.0 49.3 36.3 41.6 34.4 
5.4 33.1 37.0 17.3 24.4 23.7 23.6 
34.6 25.9 34.0 33.3 39.3 42.0 34.7 
257 495 373 381 295 190 276 
868 676 466 
 
Black Caribbean 
Women Men 
70.6 57.4 
8.1 7.2 
22.1 34.6 
235 136 
371 
 
 Figure 6.3 Percentages of Party Identifications for Men by Race, 1996 and 2004 
Figure 6.4 Summary Percentages of African American Partisanship by Gender
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6.1.2 DISTRIBUTION OF LINKED FATE BY GENDER, RACE, AND PARTY 
 Distributions of linked racial fate reveal distinct gender differences in the way that 
women and men perceive that what “happens to Blacks has a lot to do with me.” Of 1182 
survey responses to the linked fate measure in the 1996 NBES (Tate 1997) 752 (63.3%) 
are women and 430 (36.4%) are men.  Results of cross tabulation analyses appear in 
Table 6.3.  On average, among African Americans that ‘strongly disagree’ with this 
survey question 63.4 percent or 109 of 752 respondents are women, while about 37 
percent or 63 of 430 respondents are men.  On average women (63% or 313 of 752), and 
men (37% or 186 of 430) ‘somewhat disagree’ with the statement regarding race fate 
differ significantly.  Moreover, among respondents reporting agreement with the 
statement about 63 percent of women and only 37 percent of men ‘somewhat agree’ 
while 67.4 percent of women and about 32.6 percent of men strongly agree, on average.  
 In the table below (Table 6.3) category ‘somewhat disagree’ represents close to 
50 percent of responses to this measure of linked racial fate with 499 or about 42 percent 
of total responses. On the other hand, the ‘somewhat agree’ category represented 333 or 
an average of only 28.2 percent of total responses to the linked fate measure (See: Figure 
6.5 below).  Nonetheless, while African American women and men appear to have 
clearly different views about the degree to which linked racial fate is relevant in their 
lives, within-gender groups show little to no variations across categories of the linked fate 
measure. 
 Table 6.3 Percentages of Linked Fate by Gender for African Americans, 1996 
PERCENTAGES OF PERCEPTIONS OF LINKED FATE
Survey 
Question 
“Happens to 
Blacks has a lot 
to do with me” 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Women 
 
63.4   
(109) 
Men 36.6     
(63) 
TOTAL (N): 100.0 
(172) 
  
 
Figure 6.5 Percentages of Linked Fate by Gender among Samples of Adult 
                   African Americans, 1996
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Response Categories 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly Agree 
 
62.7       
(313) 
 
63.1       
(210) 
 
67.4         
(120) 
 
37.3      
 (186) 
 
36.9       
(123) 
 
32.6           
(58) 
 
100.0     
(499) 
 
100.0     
(333) 
 
100.0       
(178) 
 
 
 
TOTAL 
(N) 
 
 
63.6     
(752) 
 
36.4     
(430) 
 
100.0  
(1182) 
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 Likewise, in the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson et al. 2009) survey 
respondents are asked to consider the “extent of Respondent’s race fate affecting 
Respondent.” Cross tabulation analyses point to similarities in perceptions of linked fate 
by gender with only a few significant differences when considering race of respondent.  
Results are reported in Table 6.4.  On average no less than 50.8 percent of women and 
50.3 percent of men report ‘Not Very Much’ linked fate affecting them. On the contrary 
only an average of about 12 percent of women and 14 percent of men perceive that race 
fate affects them to ‘Some’ extent.  Whereas both women (37%) and men (36.1%) 
similarly indicate that the extent to which race fate affects them is ‘A Lot.’  
 Notable variations emerge in results of the impact of race fate on African 
American women, where the analysis yields 17.4 percent (Not Very Much), 18.4 percent 
(Some), with no less than 35.4 percent indicating ‘A Lot,’ as the extent to which race fate 
affects them, on average (See: Table 6.4).  Still, similarities persist when looking at 
gender per racial/ethnic group population where only a couple of exceptions surface.  
These similarities appear in average race fate affects (‘Some’ plus ‘A Lot’) among 
women and men of African American (54% to 59%, respectively), Hispanic (36% to 
34%, respectively), and Caribbean (21% to 29%, respectively) descent.  Interestingly, 
Non-Hispanic White men (57%) and women (44%) show marked differences in the 
extent to which race fate affects them. Contrarily, about 45 percent of Asian women 
indicate some/a lot of race fate affects; Asian men follow distantly at about 21 percent, on 
average. Table 6.4 presents results of the cross tabulation analyses for linked fate by race 
and gender, while Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7 illustrate this relationship among women and 
men by racial and ethnic groups. 
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Table 6.4 Percentages of Linked Fate Perceptions by Race and Gender, 2004 
PERCENTAGES OF THE EXTENT OF LINKED FATE  
Race African American Non-Hispanic 
White 
Hispanic Asian Black Caribbean 
Gender Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men 
Not 
Very 
Much 
 
17.4 
 
25.2 
 
30.2 
 
31.1 
 
17.6 
 
16.9 
 
26.7 
 
13.7 
 
8.1 
 
13.0 
Some 18.4 22.9 25.2 35.4 16.5 13.2 27.2 13.2 12.6 15.3 
A Lot 35.4 36.0 19.1 21.3 19.4 21.0 18.2 7.9 8.0 13.9 
N: 205 
24.2% 
304 28.8% 216 
25.5% 
297 
28.1% 
154 
18.2% 
189 
17.9% 
200 
23.6% 
122 
11.6% 
73 
8.6% 
 
144 
13.6% 
Total: 
 
509 
(26.7%) 
 
513        
(26.9%) 
 
343       
(18.0%) 
 
322      (16.9%) 
 
217      
(11.4%) 
 Figure 6.6 Percentages of Linked Fate by Race among Samples of Women, 2004
 
Figure 6.7 Percentages of Linked Fate by Race Among Samples of Men, 2004
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6.1.3 DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME BY RACE AND GENDER 
 Annual family income is analyzed based on earnings per household in thousands 
of dollars. Results of descriptive statistics show profound differences within income 
levels of African Americans and other representative population groups.  Figure 6.8 
illustrates within-group income differences among African American respondents to the 
1996 NBES, where 66.5 percent of household incomes are below $50,000 per annum.  
Only 24.9 percent of earned incomes are $75,000 and over among African American 
households represented. On the contrary, no gender gaps emerge in observations across 
categories of household income using the 1996 NBES data.  Annual income for African 
American women either equal or exceed the income levels of African American men as 
demonstrated in Table 6.5 below.  
Drawing from data collected for the 2004 NPS African Americans (30.8%), 
Hispanics (40.8%), and Black Caribbeans (31.5%) dominate the lowest annual income 
range of below $25,000, as can be seen below in Table 6.6 and Figure 6.9 that follows.  
This is in sharp contrast to Asian (7.6%) and White (16.2%) reports of household income.  
Asian households also report the highest income of all population groups represented, 
where 48.6 percent have earnings of $75,000 and over.  White family income follows 
with 35.3 percent.  Again, Black Caribbeans’ (22.8%) average household income is 
similar to that of African Americans (22.6%), but Hispanics follow distantly with only an 
average annual income of 18.1 percent at the $75,000 and over range.  Results of these 
descriptive statistics point to a distinct pattern in which the relative household income of 
African Americans, Black Caribbeans, and Hispanics are clearly lower than that of White 
Non-Hispanics and Asians.  This denotes their relatively low position within the social 
 status hierarchy. Tests and results with associated
follow. 
 
Figure 6.8 Distribution of Annual Family Income for African Americans, 1996
2.2
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Table 6.5 Distribution of Household Income for African Americans by Gender 
 
PERCENTAGES OF ANNUAL FAMILY INCOME, 1996  
Family Income Men Women Total: Black 
Up to $10,000 2.2 2.5 2.4 
$14,999 12.9 12.3 12.5 
$19,999 9.7 13.0 11.8 
$24,999 10.4 10.1 10.2 
$29,999 10.2 9.9 10.0 
$39,999 15.4 13.9 14.5 
$49,999 15.4 13.9 14.5 
$74,999 8.4 10.0 9.4 
$89,999 11.7 12.1 11.9 
$104,999 4.2 4.5 4.4 
$105,000+ 1.5 1.5 1.5 
N 403 710 1113 
 
 Table 6.6 Percentages of Annual Family Income by Race, 2004
PERCENTAGES OF ANNUAL FAMILY INCOME
RACE 
<$25,000 
Black 
 
30.8 
White Non-
Hispanic 
 
16.2 
Hispanic 
 
40.8 
Asian 
 
7.6 
Caribbean 
 
31.5 
TOTAL:  3339  
 
 
Figure 6.9 Distribution of Annual Family Income by Race, 2004
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$25,000-
$49,999 
$50,000-
$74,999 
$75,000 
AND 
MORE 
 
24.0 
 
22.6 
 
22.6 
 
23.5 
 
25.0 
 
35.3 
 
24.6 
 
16.6 
 
18.1 
 
16.9 
 
26.9 
 
48.6 
 
21.6 
 
24.1 
 
22.8 
N 
 
751 
 
912 
 
753 
 
498 
 
403 
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6.2 INFERENTIAL FINDINGS 
At this point in the investigation multinomial logistic regression is used to 
estimate the effect of race on decisions about the two main political parties, and to 
explore changes in such effects based on class (income) or perhaps, gender, and other 
sociopolitical factors included in this study using data collected for the 1996 National 
Black Election Study (Tate 1997), and for the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson, et 
al. 2009).  The logistic regression models assume the following formulations.125   
Model 1: 
log 
Pr|  	
 
|
Pr| 	 
       |
  = a + β1Fate + β2Class + β3Gender + β4Ideology + β5Age 
 
log 
Pr|  	
 |
Pr| 	 
    |
  = a + β1Fate + β2Class + β3Gender + β4Ideology + β5Age 
 
Model 2: 
log 
Pr|  	
     |
Pr| 	 
  |
 = a + β1Class + β2Gender + β3Ideology + β4Clinton 
           + β5Dems Work + β6Age 
 
log 
Pr|	
 
|
Pr|	 
   |
 = a + β1Class + β2Gender + β3Ideology + β4Clinton 
           + β5Dems Work + β6Age 
 
Model 3: 
log 
Pr|   	
    |
Pr| 	 
  |
 = a + β1BlackW + β2BlackM + β3EthnicW + β4Ideology 
           + β5Class + β6Economy + β7Age 
 
log 
Pr|	
 
|
Pr|	 
   |
 = a + β1BlackW + β2BlackM + β3EthnicW + β4Ideology  
       + β5Class+ β6Economy + β7Age 
 
                                                             
125.  Explanations for each regression model are given in Chapter 5. 
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Model 4: 
log 
Pr|  	
     |
Pr| 	 
  |
 = a + β1Fate + β2Black + β3Hispanic + β4Asian + β5Caribbean 
           + β5Caribbean + β6Income2 + β7Income3   + β8Income4 
           + β9Gender + β10Ideology + β11Bush + β12Economy  
       + β13Age 
 
log 
Pr|	
 
|
Pr|	 
   |
 = a + β1Fate + β2Black + β3Hispanic + β4Asian + β5Caribbean 
           + β5Caribbean + β6Income2 + β7Income3   + β8Income4 
           + β9Gender + β10Ideology + β11Bush + β12Economy  
       + β13Age 
 
 Results of the statistical analyses solve the multinomial logistic regression 
problem presumed by the party sequential decision-making situations. In the logistic 
regression models specified above, log is the logit or log odds that the dependent 
(outcome) variable party identification—PartyID, equals one while a is the constant or 
intercept.  The β terms are the logistic regression coefficients or parameter estimates for 
the X predictor variables, where β1, β2, … βk represent the partial association between 
each predictor and party identification, net the effect of all other predictors. Therefore, in 
each model, log Pr |  	
 | is equal to the constant a
 
plus the β coefficient times the 
value of the X predictors.  Two logit models are computed in the analysis.  Model 1 and 
Model 2 contrast decisions to choose Republican partisanship or political independence 
with Democratic Party decisions, the reference category. They estimate possible changes 
in African American partisanship. Model 3 and Model 4 contrast decisions to choose 
Democratic partisanship or Independent (no party) political identification with that of 
Republican partisanship, the reference category among comparison population groupings. 
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 6.2.1 INFERENTIAL FINDINGS: MODEL ONE  
 The analysis estimates the association between a polychotomous outcome and 
five predictors using data collected for the 1996 National Black Election Study (Tate, 
1997).  Model 1 assesses the odds that “being Black” mean being a Democrat. The 
logistic regression notation to express this model is: 
log 
Pr|  	
 
|
Pr| 	 
       |
  = a + β1Fate + β2Class + β3Gender + β4Ideology + β5Age 
 
 
log 
Pr|  	
 |
Pr| 	 
    |
  = a + β1Fate + β2Class + β3Gender + β4Ideology + β5Age 
 
In Model 1 the outcome variable, PartyID (Republican, Independent, Democrat), is a 
function of five predictor variables: (black) linked fate, family income (class), gender, 
political ideology, and age.  Multinomial logistic regression analysis is the statistical 
technique used to determine the extent to which this model improves our ability to predict 
accurately the influence of linked racial fate on African American political partisanship.  
Results from the significance test of the model log likelihood are reported in Table 6.7 
below. 
 The initial log likelihood value is 817.720 (intercept/constant-only model).  The 
final log likelihood value 758.110 is the computed measure with all of the independent 
variables (predictors) entered into the logistic regression.  The difference between these 
two measures is the model Chi-Square statistic, where χ2 = 59.611 = 817.720 – 758.110.  
The model Chi-Square value of 59.611 has a significance level of 0.000, concluding that 
there is a significant relationship between the dependent variable, party identification, 
and the set of predictors. 
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 The strength of the relationship is tested using the Pseudo R-Square statistics Cox 
and Snell (R2 = .070), and Nagelkerke (R2 = .096). So, based on the interpretive criteria 
for the Nagelkerke R2, I would characterize the relationship as weak. 126   Still, the 
classification matrix in the multinomial logistic regression output, which is used to 
evaluate the accuracy of this model, predicts accurately 75.7 percent of predicted and 
observed cases of party identifications.  In addition, likelihood ratio test results show that 
the variables linked fate (.032), gender (.041), and political ideology (.000) are all 
significant contributors explaining differences among African Americans in decisions 
about political partisanship.  The output showing the contribution of each variable 
specified in the model to the reduction in error measured by the -2 log likelihood statistic 
is presented in Table 6.8 below.  
Table 6.7 Model 1: Significance Test of the Model Log Likelihood  
 
Model Fitting Information 
 
Model Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept Only 817.720    
Final 758.110 59.611 16 .000 
  
 The number of observations used in the logistic regression analysis consisted of 
824 adults of some African American background, of which 624 or 75.7 percent 
                                                             
126.  With the Cox and Snell measure higher values indicate greater model fit.  A 
problem lies in the inability of this R-Square statistic to reach a maximum value of one 
(1).  Nagelkerke’s R-Square is a modification of the Cox and Snell measure that ranges 
from zero (0) to one (1), making this a more reliable indicator of the strength of the 
relationship. 
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preferred the Democratic Party, 28 or 3.4 percent indicated a preference for the 
Republican Party, and 172 or 20.9 percent considered themselves politically Independent.  
Output for the logistic regression analysis presented in Table 6.9 shows that when all 
covariates in the model equal one, the estimated log odds of an African American 
reporting Republican partisanship in contrast to reports of Democratic partisanship are:   
log 
Pr|  	
 |
Pr| 	 
    |
 = –3.706 + 0.700Fate
.00 - 0.534Fate.33 + 0.110Fate.66   
       – 0.058Class + 0.270Gender
.00 + 1.617Ideology.00    
       – 0.250Ideology
.50 + 0.112Age 
 
Table 6.8 Model 1: Output of Statistical Significance of Each Predictor Variable 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
 
 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood 
of Reduced Model 
Chi-Square127 df Sig. 
Intercept 758.110128   .000 0      . 
Family Income 759.487 1.378 2 .502 
AGE 758.247   .137 2 .934 
Linked Fate 771.893 13.784 6 .032 
Gender 764.521 6.412 2 .041 
Political Ideology 795.343 37.234 4 .000 
                                                             
127.  The chi-square statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between the 
final model and a reduced model. Omitting an effect from the final model forms the 
reduced model. The null hypothesis is that all parameters of that effect are zero. 
 
128.  This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the 
effect does not increase the degrees of freedom. 
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Table 6.9 Logistic Regression Analyses of the Determinants of Republican          
       Partisanship for 824 Adult African Americans in 1996 by IBM SPSS 20 
 
MODEL PARAMETER ESTIMATES 
 
Predictor 
 
β 
 
SE β 
 
Wald’s χ2 
 
df 
 
p 
 
Expβ 
(odds ratio) 
Intercept 
Linked Fate=0.00 
Linked Fate=0.33 
Linked Fate=0.66 
Linked Fate=1.00 
Family Income 
Gender= 0.00 
Gender=1.00 
Ideology=0.00 
Ideology=0.50 
Ideology=1.00 
Age 
 
-3.706 
.700 
-.534 
-.100 
        0b 
-.058 
  .270 
         0b 
1.617 
- .250 
         0b 
  .112 
.879 
.647 
.650 
.626 
      . 
.076 
.403 
      . 
.518 
.680 
      . 
.788 
 
17.760            
1.171            
.674            
.031                  
.            
.583            
.449                  
.          
9.763            
.136                     
.            
.020 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
 
.000 
.279 
.412 
.860 
      . 
.445 
.503 
      . 
.002 
.713 
      . 
.887 
 
 2.013  
   .586  
   .116 
         .                
   .944  
 1.310            
         .                    
 5.040             
   .778                 
         .  
 1.118       
Note: a. The reference category is: DEMOCRAT.  b. This parameter is set to zero 
because it is redundant. 
 
 The effect of the independent regression coefficients (β) on the outcome variable 
(PartyID), tested using the Wald Chi-Square statistic and the associated p-value (at p < 
.05), show that only Ideology=0.00 (Conservative) has a significant effect on the 
probability of Republican Party choices among African Americans in contrast to those 
that identify with the Democratic Party (Table 6.9).  Hence, a person’s decision to 
identify with the Republican Party based on reported conservative ideological 
orientations contrasts significantly from partisan preferences of persons reporting liberal 
proclivities.  After controlling for the other covariates in the model, the likelihood of 
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being a Democrat among persons reporting conservative ideology decreases by a factor 
of 1.617 compared to liberals.  In other words, looking at the odds ratio (Expβ), this 
model predicts that the odds of deciding to identify oneself as a Republican is 5.040 times 
higher for a conservative than for a liberal.  
Table 6.10 Model 1: Logistic Regression Analysis of the Determinants of Political  
       Independence for 824 Adult African Americans in 1996 by IBM SPSS 20 
 
MODEL PARAMETER ESTIMATES 
 
Predictor 
 
β 
 
SE β 
 
Wald’s χ2 
 
df 
 
p 
Expβ 
(odds ratio) 
Intercept 
Linked Fate=0.00 
Linked Fate=0.33 
Linked Fate=0.66 
Linked Fate=1.00 
Family Income 
Gender=0.00 
Gender=1.00 
Ideology=0.00 
Ideology=0.50 
Ideology=1.00 
Age 
 
-.746 
-.612 
-.167 
-.606 
        0b 
-.033 
 .452 
       0b 
-.245 
-.938 
       0b 
.126 
.364 
.338 
.250 
.279 
      . 
.034 
.180 
      . 
.206 
.226 
      . 
.354 
 
4.203 
3.270 
  .447 
4.702  
        . 
  .920 
6.295 
        . 
1.408 
    17.216 
       . 
.126 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
 
.040 
.071 
.504 
.030 
. 
.337 
.012 
. 
.235 
.000 
. 
.723 
 
.543 
.846 
.546 
      . 
.968 
    1.571 
      . 
.783 
.391 
     . 
    1.134 
Note: a. The reference category is: DEMOCRAT.  b. This parameter is set to zero 
because it is redundant. 
 
 Contrarily, the estimated log odds of an African American reporting Independent 
(no party) identifications, as presented in Table 6.10, assumes the following formulation: 
log 
Pr|  	
 
|
Pr| 	 
       |
 = – 0.746 – 0.612Fate
.00 – 0.167Fate.33 – 0.606Fate.66     
          – 0.033Class + 0.452Gender
.00 – 0.245Ideology.00 
               – 0.938Ideology
.50 + 0.126Age 
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According to the model the log odds of Independent identifications 
(Pr | 	
 
 | [.50]) is positively related to gender (Men) at p < .05.  On 
the other hand, the log odds of preference for political independence are negatively 
related to linked fate, and to ideology (p < .05).  These variables reveal a statistically 
significant relationship that clearly distinguishes political independence from Democratic 
partisanship among African Americans. Linked Fate=0.66, representing respondents who 
‘Somewhat Agree’ that what ‘Happens to Blacks has a lot to do with me’ yields a 
significance value of 0.030; Gender=0.00 ‘Men’ is significant at 0.012; Ideology=0.05 
‘Moderate’ results in a significance level of 0.000.  
 Moreover, political ideology yields the highest effect on independent 
identifications. A person reporting ‘Moderate’ ideology is 0.938 times less likely to 
decide to consider oneself as an Independent than to decide to identify oneself as a 
Democrat, while controlling all other covariates in the model.  Perceptions of linked 
racial fate among persons that ‘Somewhat Agree’ that they are affected by what happens 
to African Americans are 0.606 times less likely to decide on political independence than 
to decide on Democratic partisanship, holding all other predictors constant.  Whereas 
after controlling for the other covariates in the model, a man is only 0.452 as likely to 
decide to identify as an Independent as he is to decide to identify with the Democratic 
Party.  The Expβ or odds ratio, reveal that this model predicts the odds of deciding to 
consider oneself as an Independent are only 0.391 times higher for moderates than 
liberals, while for persons who somewhat agree that their individual fates are linked to 
the racial group, as opposed to those that strongly agree, the predicted odds are 0.546 
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times higher.  In addition, the odds of Independent identification are 1.571 times higher 
for African American men than they are for African American women.      
6.22 INFERENTIAL FINDINGS: MODEL TWO 
 Using data collected for the 1996 National Black Election Study (Tate 1997) the 
second model tests the extent to which presidential approval ratings and assessments of 
work of the parties in government influence African American political partisanship.  
Several variables are added to the model previously tested.  The logistic regression 
notation utilized to express the second model is: 
log 
Pr|  	
     |
Pr| 	 
  |
 = a + β1Class + β2Gender + β3Ideology + β4Clinton 
           + β5Dems Work + β6Age 
 
log 
Pr|	
 
|
Pr|	 
   |
 = a + β1Class + β2Gender + β3Ideology + β4Clinton 
           + β5Dems Work + β6Age 
 
In the second model the outcome variable, PartyID, consists of three decision 
alternatives: Republican (0.00), Independent (0.50), or Democrat (1.00). Party 
identification is a function of six variables: family income (class), gender, political 
ideology, approval of Clinton’s job as president, assessments of how hard the Democrats 
work to address racial group issues (Dems Work), and age.  Of 548 respondents included 
in the analysis 415 (75.7%) are Democrats, 17 (3.1%) are Republican, and 116 (21.2%) 
are Independent. Results from the significance test of the model log likelihood follows. 
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Table 6.11 Model 2: Significance Test of the Model Log Likelihood 
Model Fitting Information 
 
 
Model Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept Only 601.880    
Final 520.437 81.443 18 .000 
 
 The intercept-only model yields a -2 log likelihood value of 601.880.  Once the 
computed measure with all of the predictors entered the logistic regression the final log 
likelihood value is 520.437; the model Chi-Square statistic (χ2) is 81.443 with a 
significance level of 0.000, a significant relationship between the dependent variable and 
this set of predictors. The Pseudo R-Square statistics Cox and Snell (R2 = 0.138), and 
Nagelkerke (R2 = 0.190) assess the strength of the relationship, which I would 
characterize as weak.  Nonetheless, the classification matrix in the multinomial logistic 
regression output predicts accurately 77.7 percent of actual and predicted cases of party 
identifications. Table 6.12 presents the logistic regression output of the contribution of 
each variable specified in the model. Likelihood ratio tests show that variables political 
ideology (0.000), Clinton job performance (0.000), and assessments of how hard (Dems 
Work) to address racial group interests (0.003) are all significant contributors explaining 
African Americans decisions about political partisanship.  Further, The SPSS 20 output 
shows that the reduced (intercept only) model result of 520.437 is equivalent to the final 
model because omitting the effect does not increase the degrees of freedom. 
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Table 6.12 Model 2: Output of Statistical Significance of Each Variable 
 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood 
of Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 520.437 .000 0 . 
Family Income 520.449 .012 2 .994 
AGE 521.020 .583 2 .747 
Gender 525.134 4.697 2 .096 
Political Ideology 544.493 24.056 4 .000 
Clinton Performance 545.919 25.482 2 .000 
Dems Work 540.511 20.074 6 .003 
 
 The effect of the independent regression coefficients (β) on the outcome variable 
(PartyID), tested using the Wald Chi-Square statistic and the associated p-value (at p < 
.05), show that Ideology=0.00 (Conservative) has a significant decreasing effect on the 
probability of Democratic Party choices among African Americans in contrast to those 
that identify with the Republican Party (Table 6.13). Hence, a person’s decision to 
identify with the Republican Party based on reported conservative ideological 
orientations contrasts significantly from partisanship among persons reporting liberal 
preferences.  After controlling for the other covariates in the model the likelihood of 
being a Democrat, among persons reporting conservative ideology, decreases by a factor 
of 1.376 compared to liberals.  Still, looking at the odds ratio (Expβ), this model predicts 
that the odds of deciding to identify oneself as a Democrat are only 0.252 times higher 
for a conservative than for a liberal.    
 In addition, decisions to support the Democratic Party are more likely among 
persons approving Clinton’s job as president, whereas support of the Democrats 
 181
decreased by a factor of 2.359 among those disapproving Clinton’s presidential 
performance, after taking into account all other covariates.  In short, African Americans 
disapproving of Clinton’s job were merely 0.095 times more likely to choose the 
Democratic Party than those indicating favorable job ratings.  Interestingly, assessments 
of how hard the Democrats work to address issues of most importance to the African 
American racial group show that both ‘fairly hard’ and ‘not too hard’ (centrist) views 
yielded similar results of a 2.304 (fairly hard) and a 2.244 (not too hard) increase in 
Democratic identifications, after accounting for all other variables in the model.   When 
looking at the odds ratio (Expβ) for each response, the probability of deciding to identify 
with the Democratic Party is 10.009 times more likely for fairly hard judgments and 
9.430 times more likely among persons with feelings that the Democrats do not work too 
hard on behalf of African American racial group interests.  
 Output for the multinomial logistic regression analysis presented in Table 6.13 
shows that when all covariates in the model equal one, the estimated log odds of an 
African American reporting Democratic partisanship in contrast to reporting Republican 
partisanship is:   
log 
Pr|  	
     |
Pr| 	 
  |
 = 2.605 – 0.004Class – 0.257Gender
.00  – 1.376Ideology.00 
             + 0.763Ideology
.50 – 2.359Clinton.00  
 + 0.805Dems Work
.00 + 2.244Dems Work.33   
              + 2.304Dems Work
.66  – 0.077Age 
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Table 6.13 Model 2: Logistic Regression Analysis of the Determinants of Republican   
       Partisanship for 548 Adult African Americans in 1996 by IBM SPSS 20 
 
MODEL PARAMETER ESTIMATES 
 
Predictor 
 
β 
 
SE β 
 
Wald’s χ2 
 
df 
 
p 
 
Expβ 
(odds ratio) 
Intercept 
Family Income 
Age 
Gender= 0.00 
Gender=1.00 
Ideology=0.00 
Ideology=0.50 
Ideology=1.00 
Clinton=0.00 
Clinton=1.00 
Dems Work=0.00 
Dems Work=0.33 
Dems Work=0.66 
Dems Work=1.00 
2.605 
-.004 
-.077 
-.257 
0b 
-1.376 
-.763 
0b 
-2.359 
0b 
.805 
2.244 
2.304 
0b 
1.114 
.105 
1.003 
.538 
. 
.646 
.911 
. 
.581 
. 
810 
.894 
.786 
. 
 
 
 
5.468 
.001 
.006 
.228 
. 
4.537 
.702 
. 
16.462 
. 
.988 
6.293 
8.598 
. 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
 
 
 
.019 
.971 
.939 
.633 
. 
.033 
.402 
. 
.000 
. 
.320 
.012 
.003 
. 
 
 
.996 
.926 
.773 
. 
.252 
2.144 
. 
.095 
. 
2.237 
9.430 
10.009 
. 
 
 
Note: a. The reference category is: REPUBLICAN.  b. This parameter is set to zero 
because it is redundant. 
 
On the contrary, the estimated log odds of an African American reporting 
Independent (no party) identifications, as presented in Table 6.13 above, assumes the 
following formulation: 
log 
Pr|	
 
|
Pr|	 
   |
 = 1.854 – 0.008Class + 0.231Gender
.00 – 1.656Ideology.00 
  – 0.276Ideology
.50 – 0.920Clinton.00   
+ 0.502Dems Work
.00  + 0.844Dems Work.33 
                  + 1.609Dems Work
.66 + 0.262Age 
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Table 6.14 Model 2: Logistic Regression Analysis of the Determinants of    
       Independent Identifications for 548 Adult African Americans 1996   
       by IBM SPSS 20 
 
MODEL PARAMETER ESTIMATES 
 
Predictor 
 
β 
 
SE β 
 
Wald’s χ2 
 
df 
 
p 
 
Expβ 
(odds ratio) 
Intercept 
Family Income 
Age 
Gender= 0.00 
Gender=1.00 
Ideology=0.00 
Ideology=0.50 
Ideology=1.00 
Clinton=0.00 
Clinton=1.00 
Dems Work=0.00 
Dems Work=0.33 
Dems Work=0.66 
Dems Work=1.00 
-.752 
-.004 
.339 
.488 
        0b 
-.279 
-1.039 
       0b 
1.439 
0b 
-.303 
-1.400 
-.694 
       0b 
 
.541 
.043 
.446 
.225 
      . 
.262 
.286 
      . 
.351 
. 
.477 
.513 
.441 
      . 
 
1.932 
.010 
  .580 
4.707  
        . 
  1.133 
13.203 
        . 
16.840 
. 
.404 
7.453 
2.481 
       . 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
.165 
.920 
.446 
.030 
. 
.287 
.000 
. 
.000 
. 
.738 
.247 
.115 
. 
 
 
.915 
.586 
1.048 
      . 
.452 
.202 
      . 
2.120 
. 
.290 
.090 
.211 
     . 
        
a. The reference category is: DEMOCRAT.  b. This parameter is set to zero because it 
is redundant. 
 
According to the model the log odds of Independent identifications 
(Pr | 	
 
 |) is positively related to Dems Work=0.66 (fairly hard) on 
issues of most importance to African Americans at p < .05.  The probability of 
Democratic Party affiliations among persons whose assessments of Democrats working 
‘Fairly Hard’ to help African Americans is 1.609 times more likely than among persons 
whose assessments are that the Democrats work ‘Very Hard’ to address African 
American issues, holding all other predictors constant. The Expβ or odds ratio, reveal that 
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this model predicts the odds of an assessment that Democrats work fairly hard deciding to 
consider oneself as an Independent is 4.999 times higher than a view that the Democrats 
work very hard on racial group issues. On the other hand, the log odds of preference for 
political independence is negatively related to Ideology=0.00 with a significance value of 
0.012 (p < .05).  The probability that conservative political ideology yields decisions 
favoring Independent identification is 1.656 times less likely than Republican 
partisanship when holding constant all other covariates in the model. Based on results of 
the odds ratio, the probability of political independence among conservatives is only 
0.191 times more likely than among liberals.  
6.2.3 INFERENTIAL FINDINGS: MODEL THREE 
 Using data collected for the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson et al. 2009), 
Model 3 considers the extent to which African American women are distinctive in their 
decisions about the two main political parties when compared to African American men 
and women of other ethnicities.  Multinomial logistic regression analysis is employed for 
the purpose of examining respondents’ decisions about partisanship preferences. Party 
identification, a polychotomous outcome variable (Democrat=1, Independent=0.5, 
Republican=0), is the function of seven predictor variables: Black Women (African 
American women=1, All others=0), Black Men (African American men=1, and 0 
otherwise), Ethnic Women (females of Non-Hispanic White, Hispanic, Asian, and 
Caribbean descent=1, African Americans and males of all ethnic groupings=0), political 
Ideology (Liberal=1, Moderate=0.5, Conservative=0), Class (annual family income 
earnings measured in dollars), the Nation’s Economy appraised over the previous year  
(Better=1, About the Same=0.5, Worse=0), and respondent’s Age is measured in years.   
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 The logistic regression model is predicting the natural log of the odds of making a 
decision favoring the Democratic Party, not the Republican Party, or of making a 
decision electing political independence rather than Republican partisanship.  That is,  
log 
Pr|   	
    |
Pr| 	 
  |
 = a + β1BlackW + β2BlackM + β3EthnicW + β4Ideology 
           + β5Class + β6Economy + β7Age 
 
log 
Pr|	
 
|
Pr|	 
   |
 = a + β1BlackW + β2BlackM + β3EthnicW + β4Ideology  
       + β5Class+ β6Economy + β7Age 
 
Where log Pr|	 
   |  and log Pr|	
 
|  represent the 
predicted probability of a Democratic or an Independent decision, each coded as 1.  The 
statistical output reveals that of 2,553 survey respondents in the sample 1259 (49.3%) are 
Democrat, 761 (29.8%) are Independent, and 533 (20.9%) are Republican.  The model 
that includes only the intercept yields a large -2 Log Likelihood statistic of 2348.477 
(Table 6.15); the model that includes the set of predictors also produces a large -2 Log 
Likelihood value of 1371.408, suggesting how poorly Model 3 predicts partisan 
decisions. The model Chi-Square statistic is 977.069, with a 0.000 level of significance. 
In addition, the model yields only a 59.7 percent accuracy of observed and actual cases of 
partisan identification decisions.  
Table 6.15 Model 3: Significance Test of the Model Log Likelihood 
 
Model Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept Only 2348.477 
Final 1371.408 977.069 18 .000 
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With a Cox and Snell R-Square of 0.318 and a Nagelkerke R-Square of 0.364 the 
strength of the relationship between the variables is slightly moderate.  All variables in 
the logistic regression model are significant (p < .05) as demonstrated by the Likelihood 
Ratio Tests displayed in Table 6.16 below.129   
 The analysis produces a contrast between determinants of Democratic and 
Republican partisans, where the resulting logistic regression equation is: 
log 
Pr|   	
    |
Pr| 	 
  |
 = 9.984 − 1.616BlackW − 2.615BlackM − 0.138EthnicW 
  – 0.303Class – 0.049Age − 2.531Ideology
.00 
  – 1.601Ideology
.50 + 0.607Economy.00  
  + 1.872Economy
.50 
Table 6.16 Model 3: Output of Statistical Significance of Each Predictor Variable 
                 Likelihood Ratio Tests 
 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood 
of Reduced Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 1371.408a .000 0 . 
BLACK WOMEN 1402.670 31.262 2 .000 
BLACK MEN 1481.340 109.932 2 .000 
ETHNIC WOMEN 1381.855 10.447 2 .005 
INCOME (CLASS) 1408.063 36.655 2 .000 
AGE 1411.262 39.854 2 .000 
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 1717.323 345.915 4 .000 
NATIONAL ECONOMY 1537.657 166.249 4 .000 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the effect does 
not increase the degrees of freedom. 
 
                                                             
129.  According to the SPSS output (IBM version 20) for the Likelihood Ratio 
Tests “the chi-square statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between the final 
model and a reduced model.” Omitting an effect from the final model forms the reduced 
model.  “The null hypothesis is that all parameters of that effect are 0.” 
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Table 6.17 below shows the logistic regression coefficients, Wald test, and odds 
ratio for each of the predictor variables. As can be seen the Wald Chi-Square statistic 
shows test results of the unique contribution of each predictor included in the analysis. 
Using a .05 criterion of statistical significance, all predictor variables have significant 
partial effects except the variables Ethnic Women and age. The odds ratio (Expβ) for 
African American women indicates that the likelihood of a decision favoring Democratic 
partisanship, rather than Republican partisanship, increases by 0.199, whereas the 
increase is merely 0.073 for an African American man when holding all other predictors 
constant.  However, women of other ethnicities do not contribute significantly to 
predictions of identification with the Democratic Party.  Likewise, a person’s actual age 
is of no consequence when predicting the odds of Democratic partisan identifications in 
contrast to predicting the odds of Republican partisan identifications.   
 On the other hand, class, measured by annual family income, increases the odds 
of choosing the Democratic Party rather than the Republican Party by 0.739, holding 
constant all predictor variables in the analysis.  Democratic preferences among 
conservatives are only 0.080 times higher, while the odds of Democratic Party 
preferences for moderate (middle-of-the-road) ideology increase to 0.202 times higher 
than the odds of Republican Party preferences.  The largest effect on decisions to identify 
with the Democratic Party in Model 3 is attributed to evaluations of whether the Nation’s 
economy is Better, About the Same, or Worse over the previous year.  Among persons 
specifying a ‘Worse’ as opposed to a ‘Better’ evaluation the odds of being a Democrat is 
1.836 times higher than being a Republican. Whereas when holding constant all other 
predictor variables in the analysis, an evaluation of ‘About the Same,’ when compared to 
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an evaluation of ‘Better,’ the odds of a decision to identify with the Democratic Party 
increases to 6.500 times higher than the odds of a decision to identify with the  
Republican Party.    
Variables in the second equation yield logistic regression results when 
respondents decide to indicate an Independent identification.  Output is displayed below 
in Table 6.18.  Decisions to identify oneself as a political Independent rather than a 
Republican partisan yield the following equation:  
log 
Pr|	
 
|
Pr|	 
   |
 = 8.619 − 1.508BlackW − 1.769BlackM + 0.218EthnicW 
       − 0.320Class − 0.356Age – 1.937Ideology.00 
  − 1.518Ideology.50 + 0.686Economy.00   
  + 1.303Economy
.50   
 
This model is used to predict the odds that a respondent makes an Independent (no party) 
identification decision. As can be seen in the above table, the variable Ethnic Women is 
not significant at p < .05 in the model output. In the odds prediction equation, as specified 
above, all predictors yield negative factors with the exception of assessments about the 
state of the national economy, which yields positive significant factors; all are significant 
at p < .05. The table displays the logistic regression coefficients, Wald test, and odds ratio 
for each of the predictor variables in the second equation. The Wald χ2 statistic of test 
results for the unique contribution of each predictor included in the analysis, using a .05 
criterion of statistical significance, shows that all of the independent variables have 
significant partial effects with the exception of the variable ethnic women. 
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Table 6.17 Model 3: Logistic Regression Analysis of Political Independence  
       Decisions for 2553 Respondents in 2004 by IBM SPSS 20 
 
MODEL PARAMETER ESTIMATES 
 
Predictor 
 
β 
 
SE β 
 
Wald’s χ2 
 
df 
 
p 
 
Expβ 
(odds ratio) 
Intercept 
BLACK WOMEN 
BLACK MEN 
ETHNIC WOMEN 
INCOME (CLASS) 
AGE 
IDEOLOGY=0.00 
IDEOLOGY=0.50 
IDEOLOGY=1.00 
ECONOMY=0.00 
ECONOMY=0.50 
ECONOMY=1.00 
 
8.617 
1.508 
1.769 
.218 
-.320 
-.356 
-1.937 
-1.518 
0b 
.686 
1.303 
0b 
 
1.030 
.340 
.357 
.135 
      .056 
.157 
.090 
      .578 
. 
.161 
.165 
. 
 
70.025 
19.629 
   24.603 
2.613  
       32.115 
  151.774 
15.674 
6.890 
. 
       18.096 
62.419 
. 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.106 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
       . 
.000 
.000 
       . 
 
 
.221 
.171 
1.244 
      .726 
.700     
.144 
.219 
. 
      1.987 
3.681 
. 
 
a. The reference category is: REPUBLICAN.  b. This parameter is set to zero because 
it is redundant.  
 
Furthermore, the output of the odds ratios (Expβ) indicates that when holding all 
other variables constant for each unit increase on the party identification scale ranging 
from 0=Republican through 0.5=Independent to 1=Democrat an African American 
woman is only 0.221 times more likely, while African American men are only 0.171 
times more likely, to decide in favor of an independent identification than all other 
respondents.  Even though political ideology is significant, the effect of conservative 
ideology is much smaller than the effect of African American women and men.  As 
decisions on the party identification scale increase from Republican to Independent, 
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holding all other variables constant, so too the effect of conservative ideology increases 
by a factor of 0.144.  On the other hand, Moderate/middle-of-the-road ideology increases 
the likelihood of political independence by a factor of 0.219.  The odds ratios for income, 
a measure for the effect of class on partisan identification decisions, and for age, holding 
all other variables constant, indicate that the probability of political independence is 
0.726 times higher for class, and 0.700 times higher for age.  Only assessments of the 
national economy (‘Worse’=0; ‘About the Same’=0.5) yield a larger effect, with a unit 
increase on the party identification scale associated with an increase in the odds of 
deciding Independent identification by a factor of 1.987 for ‘Worse’ economic 
assessments compared to ‘Better’ economic assessments.  When appraisals of the state of 
the national economy change to ‘About the Same’ the odds of an Independent decision 
increases 3.681 times higher when compared to an appraisal of ‘Better’ than the previous 
year. 
6.2.4 INFERENTIAL FINDINGS: MODEL FOUR 
 This final model explores the unique contribution of determinants expected to 
predict Democratic partisanship.  In Model 4 party identification, a polychotomous 
outcome variable (1=Democrat, 0.5=Independent, 0=Republican), is a function of the 
following predictor variables: linked fate, race/ethnicity, household income or class, 
gender, political ideology, approval of Bush’s presidential performance, the Nation’s 
economy, and age. Multinomial logistic regression analysis is the statistical technique 
used to determine the extent to which these variables predict political partisanship among 
comparative populations taken from the 2004 NPS survey data. The logistic regression 
model predicting the natural log of the odds of making a decision favoring the 
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Democratic, rather than the Republican, Party, or of making a decision electing political 
independence rather than Republican partisanship assumes the following form: 
log 
Pr|  	
     |
Pr| 	 
  |
 = a + β1Fate + β2Black + β3Hispanic + β4Asian + β5Caribbean 
           + β5Caribbean + β6Income2 + β7Income3   + β8Income4 
           + β9Gender + β10Ideology + β11Bush + β12Economy  
       + β13Age 
 
log 
Pr|	
 
|
Pr|	 
   |
 = a + β1Fate + β2Black + β3Hispanic + β4Asian + β5Caribbean 
           + β5Caribbean + β6Income2 + β7Income3   + β8Income4 
           + β9Gender + β10Ideology + β11Bush + β12Economy  
       + β13Age 
 
 Output shows that of 854 survey respondents included in the analysis there are 
300 (35.1%) Democrats, 265 (31.0%) Independents, and 289 (33.8%) Republicans.  The 
intercept-only model yields a -2 Log Likelihood statistic of 1772.853 (Table 6.20) while 
the model that includes the set of predictors produces a -2 Log Likelihood value of 
1244.385. The model Chi-Square statistic is 528.468, with a 0.000 level of significance. 
In addition, this model yields a 61.7 percent accuracy of observed and actual cases of 
partisan identification decisions.  Further review of the Pseudo R-Square table in the 
regression output renders a Cox and Snell R-Square of 0.461 and a Nagelkerke R-Square 
of 0.519. The strength of the relationship between the variables is moderate.  
Table 6.19 Model 4: Significance Test of the Model Log Likelihood 
 
Model Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept Only 1772.853 
Final 1244.385 528.468 30 .000 
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With the exception of the variable gender all other predictors in the logistic 
regression model are significant (p < .05).  As displayed in Table 6.20, when respondents 
decide to consider themselves Democrats, rather than Republicans, the equation takes on 
the following formulation: 
log 
Pr|  	
     |
Pr| 	 
  |
 = -2.571 – 0.214Fate
.00 – 0.742Fate.50 + 3.025Black 
        + 1.869Hispanic + 0.733Asian + 2.271Caribbean 
        –
 
0.339Income + 0.149Gender – 1.857Ideology
.00 
        − 1.657Ideology
.50 + 3.761Bush.00 + 2.151Bush.66 
        + 0.710Economy
.00 + 0.925Economy.50 
        + 0.198Age 
 
Table 6.20 Model 4: Output of Statistical Significance of Each Predictor Variable 
 
Effect Model Fitting 
Criteria 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced Model 
 
Chi-Square 
 
df 
 
Sig. 
Intercept 1244.385a .000 0 . 
BLACK 1314.798 70.413 2 .000 
HISPANIC 1277.188 32.802 2 .000 
ASIAN 1250.075 5.690 2 .058 
CARIBBEAN 1270.794 26.409 2 .000 
GENDER 1246.979 2.594 2 .273 
INCOME 1255.493 11.107 2 .004 
AGE 1253.516 9.131 2 .010 
EXTENT LINKED 
FATE 
1259.875 15.490 4 .004 
POLITICAL 
IDEOLOGY 
1295.980 51.595 4 .000 
APPROVE BUSH 1360.308 115.923 4 .000 
NATIONAL 
ECONOMY 
1258.838 14.453 4 .006 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting 
the effect does not increase the degrees of freedom. 
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 The logistic regression coefficients, Wald test, and odds ratio for each of the 
predictor variables in the equation as specified above are presented in Table 6.22. Using a 
.05 criterion of statistical significance, the Wald χ2 statistic of test results for the unique 
contribution of each predictor included in the analysis shows that gender, age, linked 
fate=0.00, political ideology=0.50, and national economy=0.50 do not have significant 
partial effects.  On the other hand, the variables that do have a statistically significant 
relationship with deciding to identify with the Democratic Party in this logistic regression 
equation are Black, Hispanic, Asian, Caribbean, Class (Income), extent of affect of 
Linked Fate (‘Some’), conservative Ideology, ‘Strongly Disapprove’ and ‘Somewhat 
Disapprove’ of Bush’s job as president, and appraisals that the state of the national 
economy over the previous year is ‘Worse.’ 
Reportedly, holding all other variables constant, for every unit change in the 
President’s job ratings when one strongly disapproves of Bush’s performance a 3.781 
increase in the log odds of decisions to identify with the Democratic Party is expected 
than when one approves of his job as president. Furthermore, high odds ratios (Expβ) 
observed in the regression output indicate Democratic Party, not Republican Party, 
preferences among survey respondents that ‘Strongly Disapprove’ George W. Bush’s job 
as president in 2004 when compared to those that ‘Strongly Approve.’ The odds of 
predicting who will decide to identify with the Democratic Party are 42.997 times higher 
when responses indicate a strong disapproval of the job performance of President Bush.  
Likewise, when respondents somewhat disapprove of Bush’s job as president there is a 
2.151 increase in the log odds of Democratic partisanship after controlling for other 
covariates in the model. In other words, the likelihood of Democratic Party identifications 
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is 8.597 times higher than when responses approve of Bush’s job as president.  Race and 
ethnicity also yield significant (p < .05) high odds of decisions to identify with the 
Democratic Party, rather than with the Republican Party.  
Table 6.21 Model 4: Logistic Regression Analysis of Democratic Partisan 
        Decisions for 854 Respondents in 2004 by IBM SPSS 20 
 
MODEL PARAMETER ESTIMATES 
 
Predictor 
 
β 
 
SE β 
 
Wald’s χ2 
 
df 
 
p 
 
Expβ 
(odds  ratio) 
Intercept 
BLACK  
HISPANIC 
ASIAN 
CARIBBEAN 
GENDER 
INCOME  
AGE 
LINKED FATE=0.00 
LINKED FATE=0.50 
LINKED FATE=1.00 
IDEOLOGY=0.00 
IDEOLOGY=0.50 
IDEOLOGY=1.00 
BUSH=0.00 
BUSH=0.66 
BUSH=1.00 
ECONOMY=0.00 
ECONOMY=0.50 
ECONOMY=1.00 
-2.571 
3.025 
1.869 
.733 
2.271 
.149 
-.339 
.198 
-.214 
-.742 
0b 
-1.857 
-1.657 
0b 
3.761 
2.151 
0b 
.710 
.925 
0b 
.757 
.417 
.336 
.350 
      .471 
.232 
.109 
      .161 
.269 
.364 
. 
.274 
.993 
. 
.412 
.343 
. 
311 
.309 
. 
11.545 
52.644 
   30.867 
4.370  
       23.233 
.411 
9.620 
1.500 
.631 
4.158 
. 
       45.922 
2.787 
. 
83.490 
39.320 
. 
5.206 
8.953 
. 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
.001 
.000 
.000 
.037 
.000 
.521 
.002 
.221 
.427 
.041 
       . 
.000 
.095 
       . 
.000 
.000 
      . 
.023 
.003 
      . 
 
20.589 
6.482 
2.081 
9.689 
1.161     
.713 
1.219 
.807 
.476 
. 
.156 
.191 
. 
42.997 
8.597 
. 
2.035 
2.521 
. 
a. The reference category is: REPUBLICAN.  b. This parameter is set to zero because it 
is redundant.  
 
 Further for every unit change in decisions of partisanship the likelihood of 
identifying with the Democratic Party increases by a factor of 3.025 when African 
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American, by about 2.3 times when Black Caribbean, nearly doubles when Hispanic, and 
yields 0.733 when Asian compared to White Non-Hispanic respondents, after holding 
constant all other covariates in the model.  Examination of the odds ratios (Expβ) for 
party preferences by race and ethnicity show that African American decisions to select 
the Democratic Party are 20.589 times higher than White Non-Hispanics, holding the 
other predictor variables constant. Among other population groups included in this study 
preferences for the Democratic Party are 9.689 times higher when Black Caribbean, 
6.482 times higher when Hispanic, and 2.081 times higher when Asian compared to 
White Non-Hispanics, after controlling all other variables included in the analysis.  In 
addition, increases in Democratic partisanship relates to evaluations of the state of the 
national economy. Those who evaluated the Nation’s economy as worse than the 
previous year are 0.710 more likely to prefer the Democratic Party than those who 
indicated the economy is better than the previous year.  Additionally, among those who 
indicate that the Nation’s economy is about the same as the previous year are 0.925 times 
more likely to make decisions favoring the holding Democratic Party as opposed to those 
who indicate the economy is better, when holding constant the other predictor variables. 
 On the other hand, perceptions of the extent to which linked fate affects 
respondents (Some=0.50) and the probability of decisions favoring the Democratic Party 
differs significantly (at p < .05) from the probability of favorable Democratic Party 
decisions among respondents with perceptions that linked fate affects them ‘A Lot’ 
(=1.00).  Results show that for every unit change in linked fate affecting respondents 
‘Some’ there is a 1.308 decrease in the log odds of Democratic partisanship expected, 
after holding constant all other predictor variables.  In short, the odds of deciding to 
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identify with the Democratic Party among persons who perceive that to some extent 
linked fate affects them is only 0.270 times higher than persons who perceive that the 
extent to which linked fate affects them is a lot.  Similarly, for every unit increase in 
conservative political ideology a decrease in the log odds of Democratic Party 
identification is expected, holding all other predictors constant.  So, the odds ratio of 
preferring the Democratic Party among conservatives is only 0.271 times more likely 
than among liberals.  Moreover, the independent effects of class, measured as annual 
household income, show that as income increases the likelihood of Democratic 
partisanship decreases by a factor of 0.339.  Hence the odds of being a Democrat, rather 
than a Republican, based on class of respondent as measured by annual household 
income, are only 0.713 times more likely.    
 Contrarily, in the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson et al. 2009) when 
respondent’s decisions indicate preferences for political independence, rather than 
identification with the Republican Party, the equation produced in the regression output 
(Table 6.23) assumes the following formulation: 
log 
Pr|	
 
|
Pr|	 
   |
 = 0.532 – 0.246Fate
.00 – 1.308Fate.50 + 1.489Black 
       + 0.938Hispanic + 0.591Asian + 1.311Caribbean 
       –
 
0.277Income – 0.153Gender – 1.304Ideology
.00 
       − 1.152Ideology
.50  + 2.253Bush.00 + 1.143Bush.66 
       + 0.607Economy
.00 + 0.371Economy.50  
  − 0.195Age     
 
 As shown in Table 6.23 below, predictor variables race (Black, Hispanic, Asian, 
Caribbean), Bush=0.00, Bush=0.66, and Economy=0.00 yield positive coefficients that 
are significant using the .05 criteria of statistical significance.  Whereas income (class), 
the extent of respondent’s race affecting respondent or linked fate=0.50 (‘Some’), and 
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political ideology=0.00 (Conservative) produce negative coefficients that yield a 
significant p-value in accordance with a .05 criterion.  While gender, age, linked 
fate=0.00 (‘Not Very Much’), political ideology=0.50 (Moderate/Middle-of-the-Road), 
and state of the national economy=0.50 (‘About the Same’) are not statistically 
significant at the p < .05 level.  These predictors are not included in the subsequent 
interpretation.  
Table 6.22 Model 3: Logistic Regression Analysis of Political Independence  
        Decisions for 854 Respondents in 2004 by IBM SPSS 20 
 
MODEL PARAMETER ESTIMATES 
 
Predictor 
 
β 
 
SE β 
 
Wald’s χ2 
 
df 
 
p 
 
Expβ 
(odds ratio) 
Intercept 
BLACK  
HISPANIC 
ASIAN 
CARIBBEAN 
GENDER 
INCOME  
AGE 
LINKED FATE=0.00 
LINKED FATE=0.50 
LINKED FATE=1.00 
IDEOLOGY=0.00 
IDEOLOGY=0.50 
IDEOLOGY=1.00 
BUSH=0.00 
BUSH=0.66 
BUSH=1.00 
ECONOMY=0.00 
ECONOMY=0.50 
ECONOMY=1.00 
 
.532 
1.489 
.938 
.591 
1.311 
-.153 
-.277 
-.195 
-.246 
1.308 
0b 
-1.304 
-1.152 
0b 
2.253 
1.143 
0b 
.607 
.371 
0b 
 
.632 
.401 
.285 
.285 
.439      
.206 
.097 
.145 
.235      
.351 
. 
.260 
.941 
. 
.340 
.241 
. 
.252 
.266 
. 
 
.709 
13.791 
   10.863 
4.311  
       8.910 
.549 
8.103 
1.823 
1.090 
13.856 
. 
       25.146 
1.501 
. 
43.887 
22.524 
. 
5.794 
1.940 
. 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
 
.400 
.000 
.001 
.038 
.003 
.459 
.004 
.177 
.296 
.000 
. 
.000 
.221 
. 
.000 
.000 
. 
.016 
.164 
. 
 
 
4.432 
2.556 
1.806 
3.709 
.858     
.758 
.823 
.782 
.270 
. 
.271 
.316 
. 
9.512 
3.137 
. 
1.834 
1.448 
. 
 
a. The reference category is: REPUBLICAN.  b. This parameter is set to zero because it 
is redundant.  
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 The coefficients for each of the predictor variables, which are statistically 
significant, indicate the amount of change in political party identifications to expect given 
a one-unit change in the value of a particular independent variable, given all other 
predictors in the model are held constant.  Coefficients for the race variables (Black 
1.489; Hispanic 0.938; Asian 0.591; and Caribbean 1.311) are positive and significant 
indicators of partisan identifications.  So, when race of respondent is Black predicted 
party identifications are expected to yield about a 1.489-unit increase in Independent 
political identifications above that of White Non-Hispanics, based on an estimate of 
about a 0.532-unit increase (Intercept), when all other variables in the model are held 
constant.  This produces an odds ratio predicting that Independent identifications among 
African Americans are 4.432 times higher than Independent identifications among their 
White counterparts. As race of respondent shifts from African American to Hispanic, 
Asian, and Black Caribbean predicted preferences for political independence increase to 
approximately a 0.938-unit, a 0.591-unit, and a 1.311-unit above those of White Non-
Hispanics.   So, the odds ratios of preference for political independence rather than 
Republican partisanship is 2.556 times higher among Hispanics, 1.806 times higher 
among Asians, and 3.709 times higher among Black Caribbeans when compared to White 
Non-Hispanics.  
 Additionally, respondents that strongly disapproved, and somewhat disapproved, 
of Bush’s presidential performance compared to respondents that strongly approved of 
Bush’s job as president yield positive, significant (at p < .05) coefficients.  When 
respondents disapprove strongly a 2.253-unit increase in predicted political independence 
is expected, while for respondents that disapprove somewhat there is an expected 1.143 
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unit increase in predicted political independence, after holding all other variables 
constant.  As approval of Bush’s presidential performance changes from ‘Strongly 
Disapprove’ to ‘Strongly Approve’ predicted political independence increases by 2.253 
units, or an odds ratio of 9.512 times higher. Likewise, as approval of Bush’s presidential 
job performance ratings change from ‘Somewhat Disapprove to ‘Strongly Approve’ there 
is a 1.143-unit increase in political independence, yielding an odds ratio of 3.137 times 
higher. Additionally, as assessments of the national economy increase by one unit from 
“Worse” to “Better” a 0.607-unit increase is expected in Independent identifications.  An 
appraisal of the state of the Nation’s economy as ‘Worse’ than the previous year means a 
decision to favor political independence is 1.832 times higher than an appraisal of the 
state of the Nation’s economy as ‘Better’.   
 Moreover, the log of the odds of decisions favoring political independence are 
negatively related to class or annual earned income; the extent to which linked fate=0.50 
(‘Some’) affects respondents; and, political ideology=0.00 (Conservative). So, holding 
constant all other covariates, as income increases there is a 0.277-unit decrease in the 
odds of political independence. A review of the odds ratio shows that Independent 
identification is 0.758 times higher than a Republican identification.  Further, as 
perceptions that to some extent linked racial fate affects respondents increase there is a 
log-odds parameter estimate of 1.308-unit decrease in decisions favoring political 
independence, after controlling for the other variables in the model. The odds ratio (Expβ) 
shows that when respondents’ hold perceptions that linked fate has some affect on them 
the probability of an Independent identification is 0.270 times higher than the probability 
of identification with the Republican Party.  Additionally, when holding all other 
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predictor variables constant in the analysis, as conservative political ideology increases 
the odds of decisions of Independent preferences, instead of Republican Party 
preferences, decrease by 1.152.  In other words, the likelihood of Independent political 
identifications for a conservative, rather than liberal, political ideology is only 0.271 
times higher than the likelihood of Republican Party identifications among respondents to 
the 2004 NPS. 
6.3 STUDY FINDINGS 
 The multinomial logistic regression analyses undertaken in this chapter explore 
factors that explain African American racial group partisanship. Results suggest that the 
contributing effects of race (and ethnicity) on party identifications are significant 
independent effects when holding constant the influence of all other predictors included 
in this research study. Most notable among African-Americans composing the 1996 
National Black Election Study (Tate 1997) is the dynamics of linked racial fate where 
persons that ‘Somewhat Agree’ that they are affected by what happens to the African 
American racial group are more likely to decide on Democratic partisanship than on 
political independence. In comparative analyses consisting of African American, White 
Non-Hispanics, Hispanics, Asians, and Black Caribbeans taken from the 2004 National 
Politics Study (Jackson et al. 2009) African American women are more likely to identify 
with the Democratic Party than both African American men and women of other 
racial/ethnic identifications.   Whites, Asians, and to a somewhat lesser degree, Hispanics 
are typically more varied in their political party identifications, and are also influenced by 
more social factors than African Americans and Black Caribbeans. Differences in class 
based on income, gender, the extent of the affect of linked fate, political ideology, and 
evaluations of Bush’s presidential performance make important contributions to the 
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model.  Nonetheless, all groups hold important, in their perceptions of the two main 
political parties, assessments of the state of the national economy over the previous year. 
Finally, findings support at least two conclusions: (1) The observed pattern of 
very strong sustained identification with the Democratic Party among black (both African 
American and Black Caribbean) citizens substantially rejects any prediction of the 
diminishing effect of race because of an increasing effect of economic class.  This is 
particularly so in structuring political preference attitudes toward the two main political 
parties, or political partisanship; and (2) Differential bases of party identifications 
continue to structure black-white political orientations of citizens in the United States.  
Given the continued prevalence of contemporary racial tensions, inequities, and 
discrimination a sense of interconnectedness with the racial group as well as perceptions 
of the interdependence of fate and task interdependence are expected to persist and 
predict political proclivities within the African American racial group. A discussion of 
research study results, conclusions, and recommendations for future research are 
presented in the final chapter.  
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CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The final chapter of this dissertation summarizes the study, presents general conclusions 
and recommendations for further research based on results of this investigation of African 
American partisanship. 
7.1 SUMMARY OF THE STUDY PROBLEM AND METHODOLOGY 
 The principle aim of this dissertation was to identify and further understand the 
extent to which linked racial fate and the black utility heuristic paradigm explained 
African American decisions about the two main political parties, particularly their 
overwhelming support for the Democratic Party.  Building on the scholarship of Michael 
C. Dawson (1994) this research tested empirically a modification of his study of “African 
American Partisanship and the American Party System,” Chapter Five in Behind the 
Mule: Race and Class in African American Politics.  Additionally, this research extended 
Dawson’s work beyond his study period, and included a comparative population 
comprised of racial and ethnic groups.  The methodological approach for Dawson’s 
examination involved data collected for the National Black Election Study panel series 
during 1984 and 1988 (Jackson 1984; 1988).  Whereas this study tested four hypotheses 
using national survey research data compiled for the National Black Election Study 
(NBES) panel series for 1996 (Tate 1997), and from the National Politics Study (NPS) 
for 2004 (Jackson, et al. 2009).  The sample population consisted of 824 adult African
 203
American survey respondents from the 1996 NBES, and 3,087 racial and ethnic 
respondents from the 2004 NPS.  The 2004 population sample included 706 (22.9%) 
African Americans, 868 (28.1%) White Non-Hispanics, 676 (21.9%) Hispanics, 466 
(15.1%) Asians, and 371 (12.0%) Black Caribbeans.  Questions germane to this research 
study as posed to survey respondents addressed decisions about partisan preference 
attitudes; ideas about individuals’ connectedness to, and interdependence with, their 
racial and/or ethnic grouping; evaluations of the political parties, national economy and 
presidential performance; and the influence of social demography on partisanship.  
 Seminal studies conducted by Michigan School researchers suggested that party 
identification, a psychological predisposition of preference, was preceded only by 
sociological background characteristics like race or ethnicity, economic class affiliation, 
gender, age, and other related social demography, which was also accepted by revisionist 
perspectives (Campbell, et al. 1960; Fiorina 1981). In the Michigan model partisan 
identifications were modeled as affective, stable, and persistent attitudes not often subject 
to change or to the influence of other factors. Further scholarly investigations revealed 
the more dynamic, rather than stable, nature of partisan preference attitudes (Brody 1991; 
Franklin and Jackson 1983; Page and Jones 1979; Markus and Converse 1979 Jackson 
1975). Empirical evidence showed that party identifications were susceptible to change, 
particularly in response to the influence of short-term forces like issues and candidates, 
the electoral setting, and the political context.  Nonetheless, such shifts in the partisan 
balance of party identifications in the American electorate did not explain African 
American attachments, which were notably distinctive attitudes of preference for the 
Democratic Party.  Instead of a psychological group (party) attachment, African 
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Americans’ partisanship appeared more consistent with revisionist explanations of party 
identification as a summary judgment or “running tally” of individual evaluations of the 
two main political parties.  Hence, their preferences for the Democratic Party reflected an 
information shortcut based on ideological and policy congruence between the Democrats 
and the race (Fiorina 1981; Key 1966; Downs 1957), procedurally more rational in 
accordance with the Simonesque perspective (Simon 1946).  
 Historical evidence pointed to the long-term force of race in shaping individual 
perceptions about the two main political parties.  Still, the question remained: How did 
individual African Americans’ arrive at virtually the same decisions when faced with 
multiple options in a political world of objects?  Linked fate emerged as a concept in 
political science scholarship to identify and explain African American political behavior 
(Shingles 1981; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Tate 1991).  The concept was first employed by 
Kurt Lewin (1947) in social psychology to further understand the interconnectedness and 
interdependence of a post-World War II Jewish population. Michael C. Dawson’s (1994) 
application of the linked fate construct was advanced in his Theory of African American 
Racial Group Interests.  In Dawson’s theory “linked racial fate” referred to perceptions 
that individual interests were shaped by the collective interests of the racial group.  The 
resulting interdependence among individuals explained group solidarity and political 
cohesion within the African American community. Here “community” relied on 
perceptions—a neurological process of observations and interpretations—of 
connectedness among individuals who became keenly aware of their common historical 
and contemporary experiences, disparate treatment of their racial group within the social, 
political, and economic order, and differential black life chance opportunities or the lack 
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thereof in comparison to the majority population.  This linked fate construct grew 
increasingly important when used to explore the group behavior of other racial and ethnic 
(or pan-ethnic) collectivities representing Latinos (Sanchez & Masuoka 2008; Sanchez 
2008; Nicholson, Pantoja & Segura 2005), Asians (Junn & Masuoka 2008), and Black 
Caribbeans (Watt 2009), and was found to be significant.   
Reliance on the centrality of race was essential to Dawson’s theory, primarily 
because his “black utility heuristic” paradigm was reinforced by the continued 
significance of race in shaping African American experiences and assessments of life 
prospects.  This was because, in Dawson’s perspective, individual African Americans 
used their perceptions of racial group interests as a substitute for their own interests.  In 
short, the linchpin in the concept of linked fate was an individual’s identification with the 
race; a black consciousness that grasped the significant consequences of “being black;” as 
well as a belief that what happened to the racial group was relevant to one’s own life.  
The black utility heuristic, instrumental racial (black) cues, which provided a meaningful 
explanation for uniformity of individual preference attitudes like partisan identifications 
ensured adherence to African American racial group interests.  This study investigated 
these claims. 
7.2 MAIN CONCLUSIONS OF THE STUDY 
 Four hypotheses were formulated for the research study.  Predicted measures 
included: linked fate, which quantified perceptions that what happens to people’s racial 
group affects them; race and/or ethnicity, based on self-reports of identification; 
economic class, computed as annual family income; gender; age; ideology, a summary 
scale that appraised the degree of individual preferences for liberalism; judgments about 
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the extent to which the Democratic Party worked hard to address issues of most 
importance to African Americans; political climate, determined by presidential job 
performance evaluations during the Clinton (1996) and Bush (2004) administrations; and, 
assessments of the Nation’s economy over the past year.  Each of these predictors 
analyzed the polychotomous outcome, party identification—Republican, Independent, 
and Democrat.  Variables used in the multinomial logistic regression analyses came from 
adult African American respondents to the 1996 National Black Election Study (Tate 
1997), while variables taken from the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson et al. 2004) 
analyzed survey responses from comparative racial and ethnic adult populations 
composed of African American, White Non-Hispanic, Hispanic, Asian, or Black 
Caribbean respondents.  Details on the manner in which each variable was 
operationalized and measured can be found in Chapter 5.  In what follows the main 
findings for each hypothesis are reviewed and discussed in the order in which they 
appeared in Chapter 2. 
7.2.1 LINKED FATE AND AFRICAN AMERICAN PARTISANSHIP 
    The first hypothesis argued that African Americans with stronger (black) linked 
fates were more likely to support a political party whose policy preferences were 
perceived as consistent with (black) racial group interests.  This hypothesis is not 
confirmed in the analysis.  Results showed that a sense of linked racial fate was only 
significant among those who somewhat agreed that what happened to the African 
American racial group affected them, but they preferred political independence rather 
than Democratic partisanship, as anticipated. The weak performance of linked fate in this 
study may have implied that while race continues to be an important force, African 
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Americans made party choices based on other factors. Socio-demographic attributes 
added to the equation seemed to have mitigated the expected power of linked fate.  For 
instance, independence or no-party preferences was more likely chosen by African 
American men than by women, suggesting a gender gap.  Furthermore, the one 
consistently distinguishing factor between Republican partisanship and Democratic 
partisanship in 1996 was preferred ideological orientations. Conservative ideology 
predicted accurately preferences for the Republican Party, whereas, moderate ideology 
decreased the likelihood of political independence.  The finding that linked fate does not 
explain political partisanship is consistent with previous findings that strong (black) 
racial group connection did not provide an explanation for political participation within 
the African American community once other factors were taken into consideration 
(Verba et al 1995; Tate 1991; Bobo and Gilliam, Jr. 1990; Shingles 1981).   
 7.2.2 GENDERED PERSPECTIVES OF POLITICAL PARTISANSHIP  
 The finding of gender distinctions relative to political partisanship was further 
explored in the second hypothesis, which stated that African American women were 
more likely to support the Democratic Party than African American men or women of 
other ethnicities.  Results from analysis of data from the 2004 National Politics Study 
(Jackson et al 2009) indicated that African American women were more likely to 
consider themselves Democrats, rather than Republicans. They were also slightly more 
likely to prefer political independence, instead of Republican partisanship, than African 
American men.  However, results measuring partisanship for ethnic women were not 
statistically significant.  This finding suggested that African American women were 
politically distinctive, especially in view of gender differences relative to Democratic 
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Party attachments.  There was a tendency for African American women to be more 
supportive of the Democratic Party than their male counterparts, and more likely to 
identify as Democrats than women of other ethnicities.  Since the 1980 presidential 
election when more men supported Republican Ronald Reagan, the noticeable gender gap 
attracted scholarly attention.  Research suggested that women were more likely to vote, 
and to identify with the Democratic Party than their male counterparts, which included 
African Americans (Cassese, et al 2007).   The findings in this study supported the notion 
of a gender gap within the African American community. 
 7.2.3 EVALUATION OF DEMOCRATS’ WORK ON BLACK ISSUES 
 This study further assessed the premise that African Americans were more likely 
to identify with the political party that they perceived best helped their racial group using 
data from the 1996 National Black Election Study (Tate 1997). Here preferences for the 
Democrats indicated influence of the black utility heuristic (Dawson 1994). When 
compared to assessments that the Democrats work very hard to address African American 
racial group issues all remaining categories increased the probability of identification 
with the Democratic Party.  Greatest support came from those that decided the Democrats 
work fairly hard, which was followed closely by responses that they worked not too hard.  
Still, Democratic partisanship was also likely among persons that thought Democrats 
worked not hard at all.  This finding confirmed that individual perceptions of the 
Democratic Party working harder (than the Republican Party) contributed to their support 
for the party, even when differences in evaluation of the efforts made by the Democratic 
Party to advance issues of most importance to African Americans were present.   
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7.2.4 RACIAL/ETHNIC GROUP IDENTITY CUES AND DEMOCRATIC     
         PARTISANSHIP 
 
 Pan-ethnic group consciousness and the use of group identity cues explored in 
political scholarship suggested the applicability of the Theory of African American Racial 
Group Interests to other collectivities.  Even though African Americans remain the most 
loyal supporters of the Democratic Party, the fourth hypothesis sought to explore factors 
that were most likely to predict the desired outcome among comparison population 
groups.   Specifically, the proposition indicated that the more a person viewed that the 
fate of their racial and/or ethnic group affects their own fate, the greater the likelihood of 
support for the political party perceived as addressing racial and/or ethnic group interests.  
In essence, this hypothesis returned to the question of linked fate and the use of a group 
utility heuristic to make decisions about the two main political parties in 2004. 
 The largest indicator of preferences for the Democratic Party was disapproval of 
George W. Bush’s presidential performance.  Democratic partisanship increased among 
those that strongly, and somewhat, disapproved of his job as president.  Nonetheless, race 
and ethnicity also accounted for decisions to identify with the Democrats.  As expected, 
African Americans’ choice of the Democratic Party, when compared to White Non-
Hispanics, far outweighed those of the other population groups.  Black Caribbeans, 
Hispanics, and Asians, when also compared to White Non-Hispanics distantly followed 
preferences of African Americans, but also expressed their preferences for the 
Democrats.  On the other hand, Democratic Party preferences decreased slightly among 
respondents with perceptions that to some extent linked fate affected them.  This was in 
comparison to people who thought that the extent to which what happened to their 
racial/ethnic group affected them a lot, an indication that the degree of racial and/or 
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ethnic group consciousness did influence partisanship, but not in the expected direction.  
Furthermore, Democratic identifications within this comparison population suggested 
some reliance on a racial (black) or ethnic group heuristic when faced with decisions 
about the two main political parties. 
7.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 This dissertation set out to determine why African Americans think the way they 
do politically and what induces them to change, supposing that the explanation was 
bound in the concept of linked fate.  Instead, the distribution of survey responses among 
African Americans in 1996, revealing a gender gap in such perceptions, showed virtually 
no variations across categories of the linked fate measure. In addition, linked fate was not 
significantly shown to impact decisions about Democratic Party identifications in the 
inferential statistics measuring survey responses in both 1996 and 2004.  Further 
investigation into the concept of linked fate is necessary because survey questions may 
not tap into the psychological impact of shared racial experiences and adverse historical 
and contemporary encounters between the races on partisanship.  National survey data is 
most often used to explore the influence of psychological attitudes like party 
identifications or constructs such as linked fate.  Nonetheless, to assess the political 
effects of linked fate may necessitate an alternative research design. Experiments on the 
influence of linked fate could prove beneficial in understanding the way people think 
about the two main political parties. Perhaps with the aid of “confederates” who would 
work with the experimenter, research could identify and further our understanding of the 
affect of such interconnectedness and the interdependence of fate on thoughts about the 
two main political parties.  Political science research experiments using confederates 
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have demonstrated their usefulness in investigations of racial tolerance (Hutchings and 
Jardina 2009), and the political effects of racial prejudice (Huddy and Feldman 2009).   
 Additionally, marked gender differences emerged in political party preference 
attitudes. Survey responses divulged distinctive preference attitudes toward the 
Democratic Party, which was also seen as the effective work of the black utility heuristic 
guiding individuals to choose the party that best addressed the interests of the racial 
group (Dawson 1994). There was a consistent disposition for the Democratic Party. Even 
when individuals perceived that the Democrats’ only worked ‘fairly hard’ or ‘not hard at 
all’ on issues of most importance to African Americans, most still decided to identify 
themselves as Democrats.  This may suggest that in the political arena there is an 
interdependence of fate and task that links them to the Democratic Party “group” more so 
than to the African American racial group.  Hence, electoral capture may actually reflect 
a kind of “linked fate” since no other rational alternative is available to the racial group 
besides the Democratic Party (Frymer 1999). 
African Americans are the most cohesive electoral group, believing almost 
unanimously that the racial group’s primary goals are best advanced via political action.  
Therefore, close proximity to political objects that give them relevance is vital, as well as 
the transmission of group political standards or norms to ensure consistency.  According 
to Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes in The American 
Voter (1960) when a group standard is “self evident,” like race, important political 
objects of orientation, like the political party, “embody” group cues, “so that the course 
of behavior characteristic of [a]  ‘good’ group member cannot be held in doubt” (p. 317).  
They further indicate the following:  
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Now issues and candidates are transient political objects; the entity that 
endures is the party.  If group influence leads the identified member to take 
on identification with the party, then little renewal of influence is needed.  
The individual has, as it were, acceded to a self-steering mechanism, that 
will keep him politically “safe” from the point of view of group standards.  
He will respond to new stimuli as a party member and code them properly.  
As time passes, his identification with the party will increase of its own 
accord, because the individual will find that event after event 
demonstrates—in non-group matters as well as group matters now—the 
rectitude of his own party and the obnoxiousness of its opponent (p. 328). 
Further study is therefore needed to assess whether group cues in partisan decisions 
reflect perceptions of linked racial fate or a sense that one’s fate is linked to that of 
the Democratic Party.  
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APPENDIX A – TABLES OF SURVEY QUESTIONS 
The following tables (A.1 – A.10) show comparability of survey questions used in the 
1996 National Black Election Study (Tate 1997) and in the 2004 National Politics Study 
(Jackson, et al 2004). Question wording is presented in the tables that follow for the 
dependent variable and each independent variable used in this investigation of African 
American political partisanship.  
A.1 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
Table A.1 Self-Identification With A Political Party: Dependent Variable Survey     
             Questions 
 
 
Investigator Year/Study Survey Question Responses 
 
Tate, K. 
 
1996 NBES 
Generally speaking, do you usually 
think of yourself as a Republican, a 
Democrat, an Independent, or what?  
[QG2] 
 
Republican 
Independent 
Democrat 
 
Jackson, et al. 
 
2004 NPS 
Generally speaking, do you usually 
think of yourself as a republican, a 
democrat, an independent, or 
something else?  [QB6] 
 
Republican 
Independent 
Democrat 
 
 
 230
A.2 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Table A.2 Linked Racial Fate: Independent Variable Survey Questions 
 
 
Investigator Year/Study Survey Question Responses 
 
 
Tate, K. 
 
 
1996 NBES 
Do you think what happens 
generally to Black people in this 
country will have something to do 
with what happens in your life?  
[QV1] 
 
 
Yes 
No 
 
 
 
Jackson, et al. 
 
 
 
2004 NPS 
Do you think what happens 
generally to [R RACE] people in 
this country will have something 
to do with what happens in your 
life?  Will it affect you a lot, some 
or not very much?  [QC6A] 
 
 
 
A Lot 
Some 
Not Very Much 
 
Table A.3 Race: Independent Variable Survey Questions 
 
 
Investigator Year/Study Survey Question Responses 
 
 
Tate, K. 
 
 
1996 NBES 
 
First, let me just confirm that you 
are of (some) African American 
background?  [Q1] 
 
 
Yes 
No 
 
 
Jackson, et al. 
 
 
2004 NPS 
 
Race in 5 categories 
[RACE5CAT] 
White 
Black 
Hispanic 
Asian 
Caribbean 
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Table A.4 Class – Family Income Measured in Dollars: Independent Variable Survey 
          Questions 
 
 
Investigator Year/Study Survey Question Responses 
 
 
 
 
 
Tate, K. 
 
 
 
 
 
1996 NBES 
 
Which of the following income 
groups includes the income of all 
members of your family living 
here in 1995 before taxes? This 
figure should include salaries, 
wages, pensions, dividends, 
interest, and all other income. [IF 
UNCERTAIN, what would be 
your best guess?]  [QY6] 
Up to $10,000 
$10,000-$14,999 
$15,000-$19,999 
$20,000-$24,999 
$25,000-$29,999 
$30,000-$39,999 
$40,000-$49,999 
$50,000-$74,999 
$75,000-$89,999 
$90,000-104,999 
$105,000 & More 
 
 
Jackson, et al. 
 
 
2004 NPS 
 
How much did you and all 
members of your family living 
with you receive in the year 2003 
before taxes?  [QF4] 
 
[Income cleaned 
& imputed] 
 
Table A.5 Gender: Independent Variable Survey Questions 
 
 
Investigator Year/Study Survey Question Responses 
 
Tate, K. 
 
1996 NBES 
 
Sex of Respondent  
(By Observation) 
 
Male 
Female 
 
 
Jackson, et al. 
 
 
2004 NPS 
 
INTERVIEWER QUERY 
(ASK ONLY IF NEC: Are you 
male or female?) 
 
 
 
Male 
Female 
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Table A.6 Age: Independent Variable Survey Question 
 
 
Investigator Year/Study Survey Question Responses 
 
Tate, K. 
 
1996 NBES 
 
Actual Age [QY1C] 
 
17 - 90 
 
Jackson, et al. 
 
2004 NPS 
 
Age [Cleaned]  [AGE] 
 
17 - 100 
 
Table A.7 Ideology – Liberalism/Conservatism: Independent Variable and Survey  
                 Questions 
 
 
Investigator Year/Study Survey Question Responses 
 
Tate, K. 
 
1996 NBES 
In general, when it comes to 
politics, do you usually think of 
yourself as a liberal, a 
conservative, a moderate or what? 
[QG1] 
 
Conservative 
Moderate 
Liberal 
 
Jackson, et al. 
 
2004 NPS 
We hear a lot of talk about liberals 
and conservatives.  When it comes 
to politics, do you usually think of 
yourself as liberal or conservative?  
[QB5] 
 
Conservative 
Moderate 
Liberal 
 
Table A.8 Presidential Job Approval: Independent Variable Survey Questions 
 
 
Investigator Year/Study Survey Question Responses 
 
 
Tate, K. 
 
 
1996 NBES 
Thinking about our nation’s 
leaders, do you approve or 
disapprove of the way Bill 
Clinton in handling his job as 
President?  [QC1] 
 
 
Approve 
Disapprove 
 
Jackson, et al. 
 
2004 NPS 
How much do you approve or 
disapprove of the way George 
W. Bush has handled his job 
as president?  [QB10] 
 
Approve 
Somewhat Approve 
Somewhat Disapprove 
Disapprove 
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Table A.9 The Nation’s Economy: Independent Variable Survey Questions 
 
 
Investigator Year/Study Survey Question Responses 
 
 
Tate, K. 
 
 
1996 NBES 
How about the economy?  
Would you say that over the past 
year the nation’s economy has 
gotten better, stayed about the 
same, or gotten worse?  [QE3]  
 
Gotten Better 
Stayed the Same 
Gotten Worse 
 
Jackson, et al. 
 
2004 NPS 
Would you say that over the past 
year the nation’s economy has 
gotten better, stayed about the 
same, or gotten worse?  [QF3]  
 
Better 
About the Same 
Worse 
 
Table A.10 Democratic Party Works Hard On Black Issues: Independent Variable Survey  
                   Question 
 
 
Investigator Year/Study Survey Question Responses 
 
 
Tate, K. 
 
 
1996 NBES 
How hard do you think the 
Democratic Party really works 
on issues Black people care 
about?  Do you think they work 
very hard, fairly hard, not too 
hard, or not hard at all on issues 
Black people care about? [F2] 
 
 
 
Very Hard 
Fairly Hard 
Not Too Hard 
Not Hard At All 
 
 
 
 
 
